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PRESSON, JOHNNY EARL. Constitutional Rights and the Public 
High School Student. (197U) Directed by: Dr. Thomas Joseph 
McCook. pp. 2 57. 
The purpose of this study is to examine on a case by 
case basis decisions in the federal courts which define the 
constitutional rights of public high school students. The 
following issues are considered: (1) freedom of speech and 
expression, (2) freedom of the press and student publications, 
(3) assembly and association, (4) search and seizure, (5) 
dress and grooming. 
These emerging student rights are protected by the First, 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu­
tion. The constitutional rights of students have increasingly 
come under scrutiny by federal courts since 1967. 
The data for this study are based primarily on research 
of federal court cases involving the constitutional rights of 
secondary students.* Pertinent state cases are used to supple­
ment the data in the absence of federal cases on a particular 
issue. Additional data have been collected from a review of 
the literature. 
Analysis and review of federal court cases and the lit­
erature indicate an emerging interactive pattern between stu­
dent life style and efforts to secure constitutional rights. 
This interactive pattern is having great impact on the total 
school program. This interaction is bringing about changes 
in the curriculum school organization and approaches, to disci­
pline in secondary schools. One finds greater student involve­
ment with high schools adopting codes of student rights and 
responsibilities, student disciplinary hearing boards and re­
vitalizing student council. These changes are also bringing 
about examination of other school practices. 
The status of the constitutional rights of secondary 
student, based on cases in this study, is given as a summary. 
Conclusions are given in the form of guidelines for school 
administrators. These guidelines should help administrators 
to maintain discipline and avoid litigation in the federal 
courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
v. 
INTRODUCTION 
Student life style, changes in society and decisions 
of the federal courts have had great impact on public schools 
since 1967. The period since 1967 has been one of dissent 
and protest in America with a large portion spawned and nur­
tured in the confines of secondary schools. In such an at­
mosphere one finds an increasing number of students supported 
by their parents challenging the authority of school officials 
in the courts. 
The legal rights of students vary to a considerable 
degree from state to state. Most state constitutions estab­
lish the basic principles governing students at school. State 
constitutions have been supplemented by statutes of the state 
legislature, rulings of state departments of education and 
policies of local school boards. Recently, the federal courts 
have interpreted the Constitution of the United States as ap­
plying to students in schools in the same manner as it applies 
to adult citizens. 
This application actually began with the In re Gault^ 
decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1967. This 
case held that juveniles have the same rights in criminal 
1In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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procedures as adults. The landmark case on the. constitutional 
rights of students in the secondary scho'ol remains Tinker v. 
Pes Moines Independent School District. This 1969 decision 
by the United States Supreme Court held that students could 
exercise their constitutional rights in school as well as out 
of school. 
This was an abrupt change by the courts for most in 
the past have given deference to administrative judgment. 
Prior to Gault and Tinker the courts usually resolved the 
issue by the doctrine of in loco parentis. 
The in loco parentis doctrine held that schools and 
teachers could exercise total control over students because 
they acted as parent-substitutes and out of concern for stu­
dents1 welfare. In loco parentis in schools has not been 
eliminated by the federal courts but has been narrowed in its 
application to students. Tinker made it clear that in loco 
parentis must yield to the broader concept of the constitu­
tional rights of the individual whatever his age. 
Though granting constitutional rights to high school 
students the courts have also stated that it is the duty of 
the school administrator to maintain order in the school. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U.3."T0TTl969"5T" 
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Thereforej school officials may impose reasonable rules and 
regulations but the closer the rule comes to infringing upon 
basic constitutional rights, the more justification adminis­
trators must have for the rule. 
Students have been aided in their efforts to secure 
their constitutional rights by local chapters of the American 
Civil Liberties Union. The American Civil Liberties Union be­
lieves that students are entitled to freedom of expression, 
of assembly, of petition, and of conscience, and to due pro­
cess and equal treatment under the law. 
The dissertation will look at both the life style and 
constitutional rights of students. The issues included in 
the paper are (1) freedom of speech and expression. (2) free­
dom of the press and student publications, (3) assembly and 
association, (4) search and seizure and (5) dress and grooming. 
• • • 
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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine on a case by 
case basis decisions in the federal courts which define con­
stitutional rights of students in public high schools. Issues 
included in the study are (1) freedom of speech and expression, 
(2) freedom of the press and student publications, (3) assembly 
and association, (H) search and seizure, and (5) dress and 
grooming. These issues are covered by the First, Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
The study also looks at conditions in society which 
have influenced students and attempts to show an emerging 
interactive pattern between student life style and efforts 
to secure their constitutional rights. This interactive pat­
tern is represented not only by the students' constitutional 
rights issue but from changes taking place in secondary schools 
as a result of the student revolution. A better understanding 
of this interaction should enable school officials to maintain 
discipline without infringing on the individual rights of 
students. 
Finally, after analysis and review of cases in the fede­
ral courts, the study summarizes the status of the constitu­
tional rights of students in secondary schools. Guidelines 
have also been formulated that hopefully will assist school 
administrators in avoiding litigation. 
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METHOD OF PROCEDURE 
The data for each chapter have been gathered from a 
variety of material including books, periodicals, pamphlets, 
professional journals and court cases. In Chapter I a re­
view of the literature is used to look at society in the 196O's 
to give background information and an overview of student life 
style. 
The research for Chapters II through VI is guided main­
ly by judicial reference to federal court cases. These include 
cases before the United States Supreme Court, the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Federal District Courts. The 
federal court decisions are supplemented by selected state cases 
in the chapters on assembly and association and search and seizure. 
The historical development of each constitutional right 
is given at the beginning of each chapter. This is necessary 
since the Bill of Rights prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied only to action of the federal government. The 
application of the Bill of Rights to state action did not become 
automatic with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
did not happen until 19 25 in Gitlow v. New York^ when the United 
States Supreme Court declared: 
^Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
For present purposes we may and do assume that free­
dom of speech and of the press - which are protected 
by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress -
are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the states.^ 
This began the Nationalization of the Bill of Rights even 
though the state statute was upheld in Gitlow. 
Each chapter attempts to develop the issue on a chron­
ological basis as courts define and expand the particular stu 
dent right. This is not always possible when the decision of 
a federal court is appealed to the federal circuit court of 
appeals. 
Chapter VII combines an analysis of court cases in­
volving student constitutional rights with a review of the 
literature on student life style to show an emerging inter­
active pattern. Because of the scope of this pattern chapter 
VII touches only on the major points of interaction in public 
secondary schools. 
A summary of the constitutional rights of secondary 
students based on the research in the study is given in 
Chapter VIII. The guidelines for administrators are also 
based on decisions of court cases included in the study. 
2Ibid. 
xi 
LIMITATIONS. OF THE STUDY 
This study is limited to an examination of the consti­
tutional rights of students in public secondary schools under 
the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. It is further limited in that religion 
and race issues under the First and Fourteenth Amendment have 
not been included in the study. Religion has not been an issue 
in the students' rights movement in the 1960's and race cases 
while related to the students' rights issue would constitute 
a separate study. 
Key cases have been selected when the number of cases 
on a particular issue prohibited the inclusion of all federal 
cases. In the absence of federal cases involving high school 
students reference has been made to allied or related cases 
in educational institutions of higher learning or to pertinent 
state cases applicable to the constitutional issue. This is 
especially true in chapters four and five. 
The study is confined to the period from 196 7 to the 
present - the period generally recognized as the beginning of 
the secondary school revolution. Some cases are included in 
the study prior to that date for background purposes. The In 
re Gault decision by the United States Supreme Court was in 
1967 and the Tinker case went into the federal district court 
the same year finally reaching the Supreme Court in 1969. 
• • 
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Finally, the study is limited by the judgment and 
interpretation of all the material cited. Based primarily 
on research of a legal nature the paper has been written for 
school officials who deal with high school students on a day 
to-day basis. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Action: To bring legal action against another for the 
protection of a right or the redress of a wrong. 
Amicus curiae: (Latin for "friend of the court") not a 
party to the party directly involved. 
Appellant: The party who takes an appeal from one court to 
another. 
Appellee: The party against whom an appeal is taken. 
Concurring opinion: An opinion written..by a judge who agrees 
with the majority of the court as to the decision in a 
case, but has different reasons for arriving at that 
decision. 
Court; Where the word Court is capitalized, it denotes the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Defendant- The party against whom relief or recovery is 
sought in a court action. 
Dissenting opinion: The opinion in which a judge announces 
his dissent from the conclusions held by the majority 
of the court. 
Due process: The exercise of the powers of government in 
such a way as to protect individual rights. 
En banc: ("as a whole") All federal judges in one circuit 
sitting as a court. 
Enjoin; To order a defendant in equity to do or not to do 
a particular thing by writ of injunction. 
• • • 
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Expulsion: Prerogative of the superintendent or school 
board and is usually permanent. 
Injunction: A judicial order requiring a party to take or 
refrain from some specified action. 
In loco parentis: (Latin for "in place of the parent") 
§eang charged with some of the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of the parent. 
In re: (Latin for "concerning"). 
Litigation: The act or process of carrying on a lawsuit. 
Penumbra: Marginal or unclear. 
Plaintiff: He who, in a personal action, seeks a remedy 
for an injury to his rights. 
Precedent: A judicial decision, or a form of proceeding, 
or course of action, that serves as a rule for future 
determinations in a similar or analogous cases; an 
authority to be followed in courts of justice. 
Quasi: As, as of, as it were, relating to or having the 
character of. 
Remand: To send it back to the same court out of which it 
came, for the purpose of having some action on it there. 
Rights: Commonly used in a quasi - legal or moral sense to 
identify "something to which one has a just claim." 
School disruption: Any event which significantly interrupts 
the education of students. 
Suspension: An act of a professional member of the school 
staff usually for a short period until pupil conforms 
to the rule or regulation. 
Writ of certiorari; (Latin for "to be informed of something") 
An order from a higher court to a lower court requesting 
that the entire record of a case be sent up for review 
by the higher court. 
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PLAN OF THE STUDY 
The constitutional rights of students in the public 
high school cannot be examined without looking at the rela­
tionship of their life style to the issue. In like manner, . 
one cannot look at the issue outside the context of the public 
schools. 
Chapter I presents an overview of conditions in society 
which influenced student life style in the late 19 60fs and 
early 19 70's. Among the major influences identified are 
(1) the Civil Rights movement in the 19 60's, (2) the Vietnam 
War, (3) use of drugs, and (4) Hippie subculture. Other in­
fluences also contributed in varying degrees to the life style 
of students in a particular area. 
Chapter II is concerned with pupil expression in the 
secondary schools as a constitutional issue. Pupil expression 
denotes (1) the right to speak and express an opinion, and 
(2) the right to "symbolic expression" which covers the wear­
ing of such items as buttons, badges and armbands. The first 
is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution and decisions in the federal courts have given First 
Amendment protection to certain forms of "symbolic expression" 
with some limitations. It is the latter which has become a 
major issue in the public schools and will be of primary con­
cern in this chapter. 
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In Chapter III the student's right of publication and 
distribution of literature on school premises is reviewed. 
Students have brought suits in the federal courts on the 
grounds that such activity is protected under freedom of the 
press in the First Amendment. The issue also involves the 
question of obscenity and censorship. 
Chapter IV looks at the issue of the student's right 
of assembly and association as a constitutionally protected 
right under the First Amendment. Federal cases involving 
higher education and some state cases are included due to 
the limited number of federal cases at the secondary school 
level. The right of association has not been challenged by 
high school students in the federal courts but state courts 
have ruled on secret fraternities and sororities in high 
schools. 
Chapter V is concerned with the issue of search and 
seizure in the public schools. The Fourth Amendment protects 
against unreasonable search and the chapter will look at both 
the search of the student and his locker. The growing problem 
of illegal drugs in the school has contributed to the need 
for clarification of the application of this constitutional 
right in the public schools. To date there have been only a 
few cases in the federal courts so selected state cases are 
included to give insight into future trends on this issue. 
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In Chapter VI the question of whether the dress and 
grooming of a high school student is a constitutionally pro­
tected right is considered. Because of the growing number of 
cases on the issue of dress and grooming only those in the 
federal circuit court of appeals and selected cases from the 
federal district courts are included in this chapteri Chal­
lenges have been made on this issue under several amendments 
to the Constitution but the majority of the federal courts 
felt the issue properly came under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause. The chapter considers due process only 
as a substantive right not as a procedural right. 
Chapter VII attempts to analyze the emerging inter­
active pattern between student life style and student efforts 
to secure their constitutional rights. This analysis attempts 
not only to establish interaction between the life style and 
constitutional rights of students but also to examine the im­
pact of both on the school program. Special emphasis is given 
to the changes in the public high schools brought about by the 
student movement. 
Chapter VIII gives a summary of the constitutional 
rights of students in secondary schools today as defined by 
the federal courts. Conclusions reached are given in the form 
of recommended guidelines for school administrators, on the 
constitutional rights of students. 
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CHAPTER I 
STUDENT. LIFE IN THE 70'S 
The life style and constitutional rights of public 
high school students represent an attempt on the part of 
the students to become active participants in determining 
their own future. Students want more control over their own 
lives and are saying they want to be contributors to the 
educational process, not just recipients. 
Students contend that the best way to learn about the 
democratic system is not out of a book but by participation. 
They call for student freedom, involvement and responsibility 
as necessary prerequisites for adult participation in society. 
This desire for participation by students is often 
repressed by an autocratic administrator who perceives it as 
a genuine threat to his authority. Thus the stage is set 
for either student demonstrations or litigation in the courts 
to obtain constitutional rights. 
While there has always been a generation gap, the one 
today reflects a real and serious conflict between the "es­
tablishment" and the youth of this nation. This generation 
gap and changes in life style, constitutional rights and 
values of the secondary students will be considered in the 
context of this paper. It presents an emerging pattern 
2 
which touches all aspects of the school program. 
Chapter one will look at student life as a background 
to the issue of the constitutional rights of students in 
public secondary schools. This will put the issue in per­
spective before a review of the cases adjudicated in the 
federal courts. 
The country experienced an unstable period marked by 
sit-ins, boycotts, marches, walk-outs, demonstrations, bomb­
ings and riots in the 1960's. Youth played a major role in 
this revolution as they protested against war, racism, poverty, 
poor teaching, irrelevant programs, unilateral decisions by 
teachers and principals and school rules and regulations. 
One finds many conditions and causes contributing to 
the dissent and unrest of students in the 1960's. The civil 
rights movement and the Vietnam War can be listed as major 
causes, but other related and non-related factors also con­
tributed to the upheaval during the decade. 
The early 196 0's saw the drive for individual rights 
and freedoms led by civil rights activists determined to 
gain equality for minority groups in the United States, par­
ticularly black Americans. 
The student activist movement is usually dated from 
the beginning of the Free Speech Movement in 1964, at the 
University of California at Berkeley which thrust organized 
3 
student protest into the national limelights.^" 
One college administrator marks the beginning of the 
student protest movement as February 1, 1960, when four fresh­
men from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College 
did not receive service at the lunch counter in Woolworth's. 
The incident occurred in Greensboro, North Carolina, and the 
black youths remained seated, reading their textbooks until 
the facility closed. 
The next day twenty-five of their fellow students 
joined the protest. By the end of the week more than one 
hundred students became involved in sit-ins at segregated 
facilities throughout Greensboro. The protest spread quick­
ly to nearby Durham and by spring, one found protest groups 
conducting sit-ins in every southern and border state,with 
more than 70,000 persons involved. 
The majority of sit-ins remained non-violent and many 
sympathetic whites joined the blacks. These whites later 
turned their protest to other issues and problems of society.^ 
^Dale Gaddy, Rights and Freedoms of Public School 
Students: Directions From the 19 60's (Topeka, Kansas: National 
Organization of Legal Problems in Education, 1971), p. 8. 
2 
Henry King Stanford, "The Tides of Change," Ten Year 
Report From the President of the University of Miami, 1962-1972 
tCoral Gabies: University of Miami, 1972), pp, 3-4-. 
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Today's youth is acknowledged as the best-informed 
generation in the history of the world. Aware of the events 
and circumstances surrounding the disturbances at the Ber­
keley's and Columbia's of higher education, pre-college 
youths have undoubtedly been influenced by college activists. 
This influence has either been indirectly through the news 
media or directly through personal contact. This is evidenced 
by the formation of chapters of Students for a Democratic 
Society at the high school level.3 
In examining student life in the 19 70's, one uses the 
term "student unrest" to describe the period. "Student un­
rest" is defined as: 
A discontented attitude on the part of students to­
ward school and its objectives, expressed in a manner 
that threatens the codes of conduct, written or implied, 
and disrupts the orderly process of education.4 
A survey by the National Association of Secondary 
School Principals in March of 1969, reported that fifty-nine 
percent of the high schools and fifty-six percent of the 
junior highs experienced some form of "protest." The survey 
involved one thousand schools.^ 
Q 
Dale Gaddy, op. cit., p. 9. 
^Student Unrest, California Association of Secondary 
School Administrators. 19 67, p. 51. 
^Editors of Education, U.S.A., The Shape of Education 
for 1969-70 (Washington, D.C.: National School Public Relations 
Association, 1969), p. 5. 
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A May, 1969, issue of LIFE magazine carried results of 
two thousand five hundred interviews across the United States 
among students, parents, teachers and principals conducted by 
Louis Harris. The interviews covered one hundred schools in 
big cities, suburbs, small towns and rural areas. Students 
expressed concerns for more student participation in policy 
making, making rules, deciding curriculum and discussion con­
cerning the use of drugs, sex, hygiene and Black students' 
rights. Harris concluded that: 
the key to what is going on among high school students 
today is that a majority clearly want to participate more 
in deciding their future. They are willing to be taught, 
but they will not abide by rules which put them down. 
They are aware of the need for authority, but not im­
pressed by it for its own sake.® 
Who are the student protestors? At least four different 
alienated student groups have been identified. They are: (a) 
the Hippies, (b) the New Left Activists, (c) the Advocates of 
Black Power, and (d) the Third World Liberation Front. 
The Hippies for the most part are largely apolitical. 
They are heavily involved with drugs, mysticism and communal 
living. Hippies do not want power, but flee from it. 
The Hippie Movement demonstrates the enormous appeal of 
withdrawal. However, the Hippie founders were not fourteen 
^Life, "What People Think About Their High Schools," 
66 (May 16, 1969), p. 2U. 
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year-old runaways, but very serious young people longing for 
the promises of America. The Hippies have enjoyed immense 
popularity evidenced by the dress and grooming of the young. 
The jeans, love-beads and long hair are not accidental fashion 
trends, but youth's way of recognizing and giving approval to 
the Hippie Movement. 
The New Left Activists are deeply committed to political 
action. They want change and some desire revolution to bring 
about this change. Their plan is to reshape society by assault 
ing school authorities and gaining power. 
The Black Power groups concentrate mostly on specific 
issues of race, such as the rights of black students, black 
studies in the curriculum and hiring of black teachers. 
The Third World Liberation Front has not had the impact, 
as yet, on high schools as have the other groups. It is the 
most radical of the four groups.7 
While these four groups represent nationwide activist 
organizations or movements, the majority of student protestors 
are simply those who feel most alienated by the high school 
environment. 
n 
Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor, Student Unrest: 
Threat or Promise (Washington : Association for Supervision 
and Curriculum Development, NEA, 1970), p„ 36. 
7 
In the middle-class and upper-middle-class schools, 
students direct their protests against: authoritarian regula­
tions leading to conformity of dress and hair styles, being 
considered as IBM numbers, lack of involvement and curriculum 
that fails to deal with adolescent concerns and controversial 
issues. 
In the less privileged schools, one finds a concentra­
tion of Negroes and other minority groups along with poor 
whites. The Negroes, for the most part, follow the concerns 
of the Black Power groups. Their strongest protest is usually 
over the lack of a black studies program, the need for more 
black teachers, or over such items as cheerleader selection. 
In the Southwest and West, the Mexican-American students pro­
test their lack of recognition and involvement. In these schools, 
both whites and minority groups protest: 
the impersonal big city atmosphere which demands smooth 
functioning of the bureaucracy and conformity of the mass 
above toleration of individual differences in dress, morals, 
and personal grooming.® 
The contemporary student has acquired a certain level 
of sophistication through technological development. This 
worldliness expands the youngster's scope on one hand; but on 
the other, it accelerates anxiety. Faced with this kind of 
®Samuel S. Brodbelt, "The Problem of Growing Dissent 
in the High Schools," The High School Journal, LIII (March, 
1970), p. 364. 
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world, the student may make one of three alternate choices: 
(1) to withdraw or drop out and join the Hippie Movement, 
(2) to challenge the system and fight the establishment or 
(3) to simply ride along with the institutional tide. The 
majority of young people make the third choice for it is the 
safest and most accepted. Both dropouts and rebels invite 
censure.^ 
The challengers of the schools not only represent an 
outspoken minority, but the feelings of many less vocal stu­
dents. The so-called "student movement" is not unified, for 
it is concerned with both in school matters, such as the right 
peacefully to assemble; and matters outside of school, such 
as the war in Vietnam. 
What are the issues that have brought about student 
unrest in the public? School rules are pointed out as 
causes of protest in eighty-two percent of the schools re­
porting to the National Association of Secondary School Prin­
cipals. Approximately one-third of these noted that unrest 
erupted over dress requirements and one-fourth of the schools 
experienced confrontations over hair styles. 
Other issues cited are smoking rules and cafeterias. 
Also at issue are assembly programs, censorship and regulation 
^Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
9 
of school papers, underground newspapers, open v. closed cam­
pus and cheerleader elections.10 
High school students increasingly look upon school re­
gulations as arbitrary and petty. This is especially true in 
regard to the wearing of beards, moustaches or sideburns and 
at what length a skirt may be worn above the knees. Other re­
gulations, such as requiring socks to be worn and not allowing 
shirttails out are thought of as totally unrelated to an edu­
cation by many students. 
The irony of many school regulations is apparent when 
one realizes that a school senior has to ask for a toilet pass 
and at age eighteen is permitted to vote. A junior needs permis 
sion to go to the school library yet most youths can legally 
drive an automobile at age sixteen.11 
Security personnel have been employed in many schools. 
One of the duties of the security personnel may be to check 
hall passes. This has a negative effect on students just as 
a curfew on a community in times of crisis. Security personnel 
may be needed to patrol the halls, restrooms, parking lots and 
other places where student traffic exists and where trouble is 
10National School Public Relations Association, High 
School Student Unrest (Washington : National School Public 
Relations Association, 19B9), pp. 1-3. 
^Samuel S. Brodbeltj op« cit., p. 365. 
10 
likely to break out. However, the security force should be 
seen and not heard. 
Today's high school students are the product of an en­
vironment which renders the classroom gray by comparison. The 
barrage and impact of the world has exhausted the student's 
capacity for drama. The student of today is distracted only 
by the outlandish and the preposterous. 
The youngsters of today comprise the first generation 
weaned by the mass media. The effects of watching the world 
in the living room are now becoming manifest. These students 
fed by the mass media and urged by parents and teachers to in­
quire, have become sensitive to the larger world. Students 
have also come to realize the limited role they play in the 
world in which they live. 
One report suggests that student activism can be attri­
buted, to some extent, to the alienation of the student sub­
culture way of life. Because the student is not currently 
occupied with adult concerns related to earning an income, 
raising a family and pursuing a career, a young person must 
express his judgment of our democratic system from a limited 
perspective and with mixed emotions. It would be helpful if 
this student concern could be channeled into a cooperative 
^Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor, op. cit., p. 7. 
11 
approach toward solving problems related to student activism. 
An editor saw the cause of student protest and confronta­
tions at the secondary and higher education level as being two 
fold: 
(1) The individual student is seeking some sort of 
identification because all schools have become 
impersonal and, 
(2) The majority of parents have become too permis­
sive and have not given their children a sense 
of direction.^ 
While there has always been a generation gap, the current 
one is more serious because youth under the age of twenty-five 
constitute a majority and are potentially better educated and 
better informed than those who are in positions of power and 
leadership. 
In contrast with the youth of previous generations, 
today's youth is more likely to grow up in the city rather 
than the country and be educated rather than trained. Because 
of the nation's affluence, teenagers have control of fifteen 
billion dollars which is used to buy clothing, records, cars, 
televisions, exotic foods, travel, drugs and entertainment. 
In addition, the automobile allows youth to be largely free 
13 "Confrontation or Participation:The Federal Govern­
ment and the Student Community, "NASSP Spotlight on Junior and 
Senior High Schools, Number 87 (March-Aprx1, 196 977 Washington, 
D.C., pp. 2-3. 
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of adult supervision adding another dimension to the problem. -1-4 
The Vietnam War, violence, television and drugs have 
all had an impact on student life. 
The Vietnam War was rivaled only by the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 19 6 0's as a cause of both division and dissent 
in this country. The war sparked protest by students ranging 
from the wearing of black armbands to the wearing of long hair. 
This Southeast Asian War beamed by television into the 
American home each evening on the news brought about a polari­
zation of political attitudes. Vietnam not only broadened the 
generation gap, but threatened the democratic system in this 
country. 
Violence in America has been a significant part of our 
culture since frontier days. The under thirty generation in 
the United States has grown up during a period of three wars: 
World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Since World 
War II, television has portrayed this violence in the American 
home whether it was an urban riot or the Vietnam War. Students 
in North Carolina and California thus can see pictured a riot 
that occurs in New York the same day.1̂  
14 
Samuel Brodbelt, "Values in Conflict:Youth Analyzes, 
Theory and Practice," The High School Journal, LV (November, 
1971), pp. 64-65. 
^Stephen K. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Public Secondary 
Schools (Washington:National Association of Secondary School 
Principals, 1970), p. 14. 
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With television, the youth of today in the United 
States is the first generation anywhere in history to receive 
graphic portrayals of almost every feature of the society in 
which they live. Over one hundred million television sets 
beam any newsworthy event almost anywhere in the country. 
Two unique features of television will be given here: 
First, a whole society is almost forced to see daily 
the grotesqueness of its blemishes, and there are social 
psychologists who are seriously asking whether any society 
can stand that. For the adolescent young, there is no 
innocence. The discrepancy between the nation's claims and 
its actual practices is starkly pictured. The results, as 
so many have pointed out, is assault by the young on the 
hypocrisy "of those over 30." . . . 
Second, education is suddenly a much bigger word than 
it used to be. Only a fraction of it goes on inside school 
buildings. One salutary effect has been a sharp widening 
of subjects to be considered . . . 
On the second point, instructors can no longer ignore 
or describe other than honestly such issues as racial conflicts 
or the war in Indochina. 
A recent report by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs indicated that drug abuse, nationwide, increased 
seven hundred percent for all ages from 1964 to 1969. During 
the same period, drug use by those under age eighteen increased 
twenty-four percent. 
16Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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The prevalence of drug use by youth is closely related 
to the dominant pressures of society and day-to-day existence. 
The past decade has seen unprecedented changes, resulting in 
1 7 confusion and disillusionment among youth. 
The introduction of new drugs since World War II and 
commercials which tell of their wonderous effects have also 
contributed to the problem. 
The way they dress indicates their free sexual expres­
sion. The girls wear hot pants, tight blouses and no bras 
and boys wear tank shirts and jeans. 
During the teenage years, youth typically is idealis­
tic; but today's youth has also rejected the materialism of 
society and returned to the fundamental humanism of the nine­
teenth century. They no longer are content to settle for 
the house in the suburbs, two cars and membership in the 
country club. This is evidenced by their commitment and 
involvement in the social environmental issues of today. Many 
of these dedicated youths have volunteered for the Peace Corps, 
Vista or other social work.18 
Jack Sarmanian, "An Interactional Approach to Prevent­
ing Drug Abuse," NASSP Bulletin Vol. 57, No. 372 (April, 1973) 
pp. 66-67. 
18 
Samuel Brodbelt, op. cit. 
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The United States is faced today with problems of value 
conflicts. Values are defined as the axis upon which society 
revolves. Therefore, social institutions exist to preserve 
the values of the society and values form the guidelines for 
institutions, particularly as they are stated in historic docu­
ments . 
"The Bill of Rights," the "Constitution," "Declaration 
of Independence" and "Pledge of Allegiance" are documents held 
sacred, because they are historically the greatest thoughts 
and desires of American democracy. For many youths today, 
the symbols of peace have replaced the traditional symbols of 
Americanism of past generations, such as the flag and "Pledge 
of Allegiance." Youth today want both peace and patriotism, 
but with an international flavor. 
Consequently: 
. . the older generation often reacts negatively to­
wards youth because of the perceived if not real value 
differentiation. The Spring, 19 70, confrontation of 
students and Ohio National Guard at Kent State University 
also indicated that the generation gap was viewed as a 
threat by the oldsters who with passion and malice seem­
ingly wished to eliminate debate, dissent, and outspoken 
youth in general.19 
Today's youth is dissatisfied with both the government 
and their role in the political process. They graphically 
19Ibid., p. 67. 
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portrayed their feelings on both matters during the 196 8 Demo­
cratic Convention in Chicago. Even though the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment has since given eighteen year olds the right to vote, 
the full impact is yet to be felt, despite their vote in the 
1972 presidential election. 
Student unrest will continue unless three major problems 
of the secondary school are attacked. These problems are: 
(1) dull and irrelevant curricular content and non-
motivating teaching methods (2) lack of broad involve­
ment of students in the decision-making process, and 
(3) poor human relations between students and their 
instructors.20 
The immediate reaction of school officials has been to 
treat symptoms rather than causes. Their attempts to maintain 
discipline may result in negative behavior on the part of 
students ranging from dropping out, to violent crime. 
Great numbers of students report that curriculum con­
tent is not only uninteresting, but also irrelevant. They 
contend that it does not reflect the rapid changes in society 
nor consider the major problems at the local, national or in­
ternational level. 
The second problem is the lack of involvement of stu­
dents in decisions that affect their lives. Students study 
democracy in the classroom, but do not experience such a 
20 Bernard McKenna, "Student Unrest:Some Causes and Cures," 
The Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals, Vol. 55 (February, 19 71), p. 54. 
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democratic system in their daily lives in school. Students 
soon come to realize that a school is a functioning bureau­
cracy under the control of the administration. The student 
council is thus limited to such things as planning dances, 
resulting in no meaningful involvement in the decision-making 
process. 
The third area is human relations. Students complain 
that their instructors do not treat them with dignity and 
respect. Students point out that teachers do not try to under­
stand how students feel and continually put down students' 
behavior, dress and hair style. The area of human relations 
is a difficult one with no ready-made solutions. With this 
in mind, teachers must realize that human relations is a 
vital ingredient in all phases of the school program.21 
Students do have some fundamental needs, regardless of 
cause, which many schools for the most part have ignored. All 
students want to be seen and acknowledged as thinking, feeling 
human beings. Second, they want to participate in the process 
of their education. Finally, students want their curriculum 
to be applicable to their individual lives - culturally, poli­
tically, socially and personally. The cry for relevance is 
21Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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self-evident and has echoes across the nation.^ 
The school has become the immediate target of the stu­
dent revolution, for it constitutes the community of the young. 
Moreover, the school as a miniature of society, exhibits the 
same shams and distortions that the radicals want to change in 
the larger society. 
The pressure and conditions of the past twenty years 
have contributed to the problem of student unrest in the public 
schools. Education has been faced with such challenges as 
Sputnik, finding enough buildings to house the post-World War II 
baby boom and providing a curriculum to enable students to pass 
college entrance examinations. 
During this twenty year period, schools have been pre­
occupied with devising an assembly line educational process 
which would disseminate the greatest amount of information to 
the largest number of students. This was during a time when 
9 Q 
there were too many students and too few teachers. 
Youth is aware that poverty, air pollution and racism 
exist in America, while the majority enjoy a high standard of 
living. Also known is that the most technologically developed 
nation in the world has a high rate of unemployment. These 
2 2 Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor, op. cit., p. 52. 
23Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
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and other related problems have created conflict in society 
and led George Counts to state: 
In the first place, we must realize that we have 
created a society founded on physical science and techno­
logy without giving much thought to the total problem of 
the rearing of the young. Except for the school, we have 
provided less and less place for boys and girls and youth. 
For many in our cities and urban communities, and we are 
overwhelmingly urban today, there is nothing of social 
significance to do. As a consequence, they tend increas­
ingly to become alienated from society and seek outlets 
for their energies by forming gangs and engaging in anti­
social and even criminal activities.2 4 
The United States today is at a crossroad, faced with 
many difficult, important decisions that may well determine 
if our democratic system is to survive. 
The youth of today are no longer willing to follow a 
value system that teaches one way and acts in another manner. 
They no longer accept things in a passive manner, but willingly 
and openly challenge all institutions and the establishment. 
Many people bemoan the fact that change is taking place 
in society. This group longs for a return to the ways of for­
mer days. These individuals call for repression of dissent by 
force, if necessary. 
This viewpoint is not limited to just those outside the 
education field. A survey by the National Education Association 
in 1969, found that eighty-five percent of the teachers polled 
24 George S. Counts, "Where Are We?" Educational Forum, 
30 (May, 1966), p. 404. 
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thought that schools should have the power to regulate both a 
pupil's dress and grooming. Only seven percent thought the 
school should not have such power. The remaining percent thought 
schools should be able to regulate one or the other.25 
Others look upon the times as presenting both a challenge 
and an opportunity. One who believes this way is the noted 
author, James A. Michener. He wrote: 
I am heartened by the responsibility demonstrated by 
our young people, black and white, in recent years. What 
some of their elders have described as rebellion I have 
seen as a proper assumption of responsibility and a long 
overdue attention to problems requiring change. This wil­
lingness to challenge patterns, if projected into adult 
life and if accompanied by competence, will do much to 
change America in those areas where change is needed.2® 
It is unfortunate that the youth of this nation had to 
turn to the federal courts rather than educational leaders to 
bring about change and achieve their constitutional rights in 
the public schools. One could almost attribute the educational 
philosophy of contemporary times to the federal judges rather 
than to educators. 
The next five chapters will review the decisions of the 
federal courts in regard to students' constitutional rights 
under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2 5 Education, U.S.A., Student Rights and Responsibilities 
(Washington; National School Public Relations Association, 1972), 
p. 30. 
2 6 
James A. Michener, America vs. Americans:The Revolution 
in Middle Class Values (New York:The American Library, 1968), 
pp. 73-74. 
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High school students in the 1970's seem to have taken 
the advice of the eighteenth-century French philosopher, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau who wrote: 
Teach him to live 
rather than avoid death; 
life is not breath, 
but action 
the use of our senses, 
our mind, 
our faculties, 
every part of ourselves 
which makes us conscious 
of our being.2 7 
O 7 
Jean Jacques Rosseau, Emil^ (New York; E.P. Dutton 
and Company, 19 3 8), p. 10. 
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CHAPTER II 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: FIRST AMENDMENT 
The "Bill of Rights" became effective on December 15, 
1791, a little more than three years after the United States 
Constitution was adopted. The first Ten Amendments were de­
signed to protect the individual rights of the citizen by re­
stricting the power of the Federal Government. 
The First Amendment follows: 
Article I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for redress of grievances. 
The First Amendment says a great deal and the guaran­
tees which it contains are basic to liberty. They are con­
sidered fundamental rights of man in a democracy. 
The first Ten Amendments applied only to Federal Laws 
and these rights were not protected from state and local 
governments unless included in the state constitution. 
With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868, it was assumed that the provisions of the first eight 
amendments would be made applicable to the states by the due 
process clause. This wcs not interpreted as such by the 
United States Supreme Court for many years. ̂ 
In examining the development of free speech, one finds 
the first major speech case before the United States Supreme 
Court was Schenck v. United States (1919).2 The Court in up­
holding the Espionage Act of 1917 stated that freedom of 
speech and press are not absolute rights and were never in­
tended to be so. They are relative in the sense that they 
are limited by the co-existing rights of others, by the de­
mands of national security and public decency. Mr. Justice 
Holmes writing the majority opinion said: 
The most stringent protection of free speech would 
not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre 
and causing a panic.^ 
The case of Gitlow v. New York (1925)4was the first case 
in which the Bill of Rights was applied to states under the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice 
Sandford made two points in the majority opinion of relevence 
here: (1) the Constitution does not confer an absolute right 
^"William R. Barnes, The Constitution of the United 
States, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 52. 
^Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
3Ibid. 
^Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
to speak, without responsibility; and (2) that it was entirely 
reasonable for a state to attempt to protect itself from 
violent overthrow. 
In Whitney v. California (19 27)^ the court ruled that 
an act of the legislative body may not be declared unconsti­
tutional unless it is an arbitrary or unreasonable attempt 
to exercise the authority vested in the state in the public 
interest. 
In the case of Dennis v. United States (1951)® the 
Court held that liberty of expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment can be abridged by state officials, if their pro­
tection of legitimate state interest necessitates an invasion 
of free speech. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that speech 
occupies a privileged position in the "Bill of Rights" re­
stricted only by the laws of libel and slander. 
The sentences taken from the four cases do not give 
a true picture of the decisions of the Supreme Court. It 
does, however, give a brief glimpse into the development 
^Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
^Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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of free speech; for the Court has repeatedly held that speech 
occupies a priviledged position as one of man's fundamental 
freedoms. Moreover, the Court has insisted this freedom does 
not extend to the obscene, the profane, the libelous or in­
sulting utterances which tend to cause an immediate breach of 
the peace. 
The case of Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community 
n 
School (1966) involving the protesting of the Vietnam War by 
wearing armbands came before the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Iowa in September of 1966. The 
district court upheld the school rule prohibiting the wearing 
of armbands. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's 
decision. This key case in the development of the constitu­
tional rights of students reached the Supreme Court in 1969. 
For this reason, the case will be discussed in detail later 
in this chapter. 
Two cases involving freedom of expression reached the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1966. The decisions in 
both cases were handed down by the court on the same day. 
The Blackwell v. Issaquena Board of Education (1966)® 
involved the wearing of "freedom buttons" at the all Negro 
n 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School, 
258 F. Supp. 97r~(T§"B6TT^ 
®Blackwell v. Issaquena Board of Education, 363 F. 2d 
7»*9 (196F7T 
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Henry Weather High School in Mississippi. A small number of 
students distributed the buttons among their classmates, 
forced the buttons on unwilling wearers, threw the buttons 
through the windows and otherwise caused a disturbance which 
disrupted class. Several students were suspended; their 
parents sought an injunction to re-admit the suspended students 
and allow them to peaceably wear the buttons. The injunction 
was denied by the district court. 
The issue involved here was whether a school rule for­
bidding the wearing of Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Com­
mittee "freedom buttons" was a reasonable rule necessary for 
the maintenance of school discipline or an infringement on 
students' constitutional right of free speech. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision 
noting that school authorities have the right to prohibit and 
punish acts undermining school routine. The statement of the 
court on this matter follows: 
The interest which regulation curbing freedom of ex­
pression seeks to protect must be fundamental and sub­
stantial if there is to be valid restrictions of speech.^ 
The court on students constitutional right of free 
speech said: 
Constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not 
confer an absolute right to speak and law recognizes that 
9Ibid., p. 753. 
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there can be an abuse of such freedom.-'-® 
The court also addressed itself to the relationship 
between the Federal Courts and public schools. The Fifth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals said: 
It is not for the court to consider whether rules 
and regulations promulgated by school authorities are 
wise and expedient, but merely whether they are a reason­
able exercise of the power and discretion of school au­
thority in protecting substantial interest in the school's 
operation. IJ-
Burnside v. Byars (1966) 2̂ was another Mississippi case 
involving the wearing of freedom buttons. 
Parents brought suit to enjoin school officials from 
denying their children the right to wear Student Non-violent 
Co-ordinating Committee buttons bearing the words, "SNCC" 
and "One Man One Vote", while attending Booker T. Washington 
High School in Philadelphia, Mississippi. 
Parents insisted that regulations were unreasonable 
and abridged their children's constitutional right of free 
speech. School authorities maintained that such regulations 
were reasonable in maintaining proper school discipline. 
The district court denied the injunction, but on 
appeal the decision was reversed by the court of appeals on 
10Ibid., p. 75H. 
i:LIbid. 
^Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966). 
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the basis that the buttons caused no commotion, only curiosity. 
The school rules were held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The court stated: 
The liberty of expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment can be abridged by state officials if their 
protection of legitimate state interest necessitates 
an invasion of free speech. The interest of a state 
in maintaining an educational system is a compelling 
one, giving rise to a balancing of First Amendment 
rights with the duty of the state to further and pro­
tect the public school system. The establishment of 
an educational program requires the formulation of 
rules and regulations the school is 
always bound by the requirement that the rules and 
regulations be reasonable. 
The injunction should have been granted and students 
should have been permitted to wear buttons peaceably. The 
court held: 
School officials cannot ignore expressions of feelings 
with which they do not wish to contend. They cannot in­
fringe on the student's right to free and unrestricted 
expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amend­
ment to the Constitution, where the exercise of such 
rights in the schools do not materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school. 
Thus in two similar cases decided the same day by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opposite decisions were handed 
down. The difference cited by the court was the disruption 
of the educational process in Blackwell which was not present 
in Burnside. 
13Ibid., p. 748. 
1HIbid.» p. 7U9. 
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The Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School 
Pistrict (1969)15 case mentioned earlier in this chapter came 
before the United States Supreme Court on Writ of Certiorari. 
The opinion of the majority of the Court was delivered by 
Justice Fortas on February 24, 1969. 
This case had a great impact on schools throughout the 
United States. It extended constitutional rights to students 
in school and weakened the doctrine of in loco parentis. 
This doctrine had given school officials the authority to act 
"in place of the parent." This case also opened the doors 
for many other cases involving students to be brought before 
the Federal Courts. In the majority of these cases Tinker 
was cited as the precedent case. 
The Tinker case involved the wearing of black armbands 
by the three Tinker children and another boy to protest their 
objection to the war in Vietnam. This was during the Christ­
mas season of 1965. Aware of the intentions of some students 
to wear black armbands, the principals of Pes Moines adopted 
a regulation against black armbands on Pecember 14. Knowing 
this regulation, the Tinker children wore black armbands to 
school on Pecember 16. All were suspended. 
A complaint was filed in the United States Pistrict 
•^Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School 
Pistrict, No. 21, full text of opinion taken from U.S. Law Week, 
37 LW 4121-4128. Feb. 25, 1969. 
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Court by petitioners, through their fathers. It sought an 
injunction restraining the school officials from disciplining 
the petitioners. The district court dismissed the complaint 
and upheld the school authorities action on the ground that 
it was reasonable in order to maintain school discipline. 
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deci­
sion of the district court without opinion. 
The district court did recognize the wearing of arm­
bands for the purpose of expressing certain views as the type 
of symbolic act that is within the free speech clause of the 
First Amendment. The wearing of armbands entirely divorced 
from disruptive conduct is closely akin to "pure speech." 
Justice Fortas wrote: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment, 
are available to teachers and students. It can hardly 
be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the school house gate. This has been the unmistak­
able holding of the Court for almost fifty years. 
The Court has repeatedly affirmed the authority of the 
states and school officials, consistent with fundamental con­
stitutional safe-guards, to prescribe and control conduct in 
the schools. The problem here comes when students in the 
exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of 
school authorities. 
16Ibid., p. 4122. 
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This case did not involve aggressive disruptive ac­
tion or even group demonstrations. It was the silent, pas­
sive, expression of opinion which was not accompanied by dis­
order. It should be pointed out here that the rule passed 
did not prohibit all symbols, only black armbands. 
In our system, state operated schools may not be en­
claves of totalitarianism. School officials do not pos­
sess absolute authority over their students. Students 
in school as well as out of school are "persons" under 
our Constitution In the absence of a specific 
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate 
their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expres­
sion of their views. As Judge Gwyn, speaking for Fifth 
Circuit Court said, school officials cannot supress "ex­
pressions of feelings with which they do not wish to con­
tend." Burnside v. Byars, supra at 749. 
A student may express an opinion in the cafeteria, on 
the playground or in the hall even on controversial subjects 
such as the war in Vietnam. However, any conduct which ma­
terially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others is not immunized by the 
Constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. 
The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) 
may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision 
means what it says. We properly read it to permit reason­
able regulation of speech connected activities in care­
fully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the 
permissable exercise of First Amendment Rights to a tele­
phone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to a 
supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom. 
17Ibid., p. 4123. 
18Ibid., p. 4124. 
32 
The prohibiting of the wearing of armbands in silent 
opposition to the Vietnam War is no less offensive than 
would be a regulation prohibiting the discussion of an oppo­
sition to the Vietnam War or school property. The Court said 
the Constitution does not permit officials of the state to 
deny this form of expression. The case was reversed and re­
manded. 
Justice White and Justice Stewart wrote concurring opin­
ions. Justice Stewart did not agree with the idea that First 
Amendment rights of children are coexistent with those of 
adults. 
Justice Harlan dissenting would in this case cast upon 
those complaining the burden of showing that a particular school 
measure was motivated by other than legitimate concerns. 
Justice Black in a vigorous dissent felt the control 
of pupils had been taken from school officials and transferred 
to the Supreme Court by the majority decision in this case. 
He disclaimed any purpose on his part to hold that the Federal 
Constitution compels the teachers, parents and elected school 
officials to surrender control of the American public school 
students. 
Justice Black further stated: 
While I have always believed that under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments neither the State nor Federal Govern­
ment has any authority to regulate or censor the content 
33 
of speech, I have never believed that any person has 
right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations 
where he pleases and when he pleases. This Court has 
already rejected such a notion. In Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536 (1964), for example, the Court clearly 
stated that the right of free speech and assembly "do 
not mean that anyone with opinions or beliefs to express 
may address a group at any public place and at any time." 
379 U.S. 536, 554 (1964).19 
Justice Black goes on to mention the constitutional 
test of reasonableness that brought on President Franklin 
Roosevelt's well known court fight. The Ferguson v. Skrupe, 
372 U.S. 726 (1962) case: 
Totally repudiated the old reasonableness due process 
test, the doctrine that judges have the power to hold 
laws unconstitutional upon the belief of the judges that 
they are "unreasonable", "arbitrary", "shock the conscience", 
"irrational", "contrary to fundamental decency", or some 
other such flexible term without precise boundaries. I 
have many times expressed my opposition to that concept 
on the ground that it gives judges power to strike down 
any law they do not like. If the majority of the Court 
today, by agreeing to the opinion of my Brother Fortas, 
is resurrecting that old reasonableness due process test, 
I think the constitutional change should be plainly, un­
equivocally, and forthrightly stated for the benefit of 
bench and bar. It will be a sad day for this country, 
I believe, when the present day court returns to the 
McReynolds due process concept. 
This concept was included in the opinion written in 
Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Bartells v. Iowa, 
262 U.S. 404 (19 23) by Mr. Justice McReynolds. 
A person does not have the constitutional right to say 
what he pleases, when he pleases, and where he pleases. The 
19_Ibid., p. 4125. 
20Ibid., p. 4126. 
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Supreme Court decided precisely the opposite in Adderly v. 
Florida, 358 U.S. 39 (1966). 
Tinker was a landmark decision in the extension of con­
stitutional rights to students in the public schools. This 
decision weakened the doctrine of in loco parentis and recog­
nized the rights of students. 
In Re Gault (1967)21 was as significant as Tinker in 
that for the first time the United States Supreme Court con­
sidered the rights of children in juvenile court. The Court 
ruled that juvenile courts must grant to children many of the 
procedural protections required in adult criminal trials by 
the Bill of Rights. 
While this case does not bear directly on the right of 
free speech it is mentioned here for it occurred during the 
same period as Tinker and the majority opinion was written by 
Mr. Justice Fortas. This case does have bearing on the con­
stitutional rights of students and will be included in chap­
ter five. 
School dress codes, especially regulations on the 
length of male students1 hair, were challenged as an infringe­
ment on constitutional rights. Students contended that hair 
style constituted symbolic expression of speech and was sub­
ject to First Amendment protection. 
21In Re Gault. 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). 
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The district court in upholding a school board rule 
regulating length of hair in Davis v. Firment (1967)22 and 
while agreeing that symbolic expression is entitled to First 
Amendment protection said: 
A symbol must symbolize a specific viewpoint or idea, 
what is student Davis trying to express? Nothing really. 
Even if hairstyle fell within this type of expression it 
would still be subject to reasonable regulation in fur­
therance of a legitimate state interest. 
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, (1966).^ 
The Supreme Court refusal to hear a haircut case has left 
the issue in the district courts. Length of hair on male 
students has not been decided under First Amendment protection 
of freedom of expression. The many cases in this area will 
be considered in Chapter VI for the question of hair length 
has come under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Following the decision by the Supreme Court in Tinker, 
other cases reached the Federal Courts on the issue of the 
First Amendment right of free speech. These cases involved 
armbands, buttons, berets and protests. Each case continues 
to interpret the Tinker decision. 
^Davis v_j_ Firment. 269 F. Supp. 524 (1967). 
23Ibid., p. 527. 
Oh 
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 F. 
Supp. 545 (1966). 
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The case of Einhorn v. Maus (1969) resulted from a 
civil rights action to enjoin school officials of Springfield 
Township Senior High School in Illinois from placing certain 
notations upon school records or making certain communications 
to institutions of higher learning. 
The confrontation with school officials began when a 
group of students distributed literature and wore armbands 
during the graduation ceremonies, even though school officials 
had requested that they not do so. 
Following the action of the students at graduation, 
school officials placed the following notation on the record 
of students involved and sent it as a supplement letter to 
colleges. 
The notation follows: 
This letter is submitted to supplement the information 
we have furnished concerning . He/she was one 
of 22 seniors who wore armbands at our Commencement Exer­
cises bearing the legend "Humanize Education" as an indi­
cation of his/her concern regarding certain aspects of 
our educational program. 
These students wore armbands even though they had been 
requested not to wear any insignia which deviated from 
the formal graduation attire. There was no disorder at 
the Commencement Exercises.26 
The court agreed that students expression of opinion 
through the wearing of armbands in orderly demonstration was 
^Einhorn v. Maus, 300 F. Supp. 1169 (1969). 
26 
Ibid., p. 1170. 
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constitutionally protected citing the Supreme Court ruling 
in Tinker. 
However, the district court went on to hold that the 
notation by school officials was a true factual account, with­
out expression of opinion as to the lawfulness of the demon­
stration. The court held there was no constitutional inva­
sion of plaintiffs' rights since they could not demonstrate 
likelihood of immediate, irreparable harm resulting from 
defendant's action. The court also pointed out there had 
been no disciplinary action by school officials. 
The plaintiffs1 motion for a preliminary injunction 
was denied by the court saying: 
We perceive no threatened irreparable harm flowing 
from the proposed letter nor have the plaintiffs offered 
any evidence to demonstrate any likelihood thereof. 
School officials have a right and we think, a duty to record 
and to communicate true factual information about their 
students to institutions of higher learning for the purpose 
of giving to the latter an accurate and complete picture of 
applicants for admission.2'7 
The case of Butts v. Dallas Independent School District 
2 8 (1969) involved the wearing of black armbands in the Dallas 
Schools in violation of the school district's policy prohibit­
ing the wearing of such bands in the schools. 
27Ibid., p. 1171. 
2 8 
Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 306 F. 
Supp. 488 (196977 
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Action was filed on behalf of six minors (age 15 to 17) 
to enjoin the Dallas Independent School District and Superin­
tendent Nolan Estes from enforcing the policy. 
The wearing of black armbands occurred on and soon after 
October 15, 1969. This was the date set for a National Mora­
torium day by various groups around the country. This has 
bearing on the case, since violence and unrest resulted in 
many parts of the country. In Dallas, students had attended 
moratorium rallies and urged other students to boycott classes. 
Moreover, a bomb threat had been received at one school. Demon­
strations took place near several schools on the morning of 
October 15. 
These circumstances prompted this statement by the court: 
It is difficult for the court to imagine that such dis­
order did not materially interfere with school work for 
at least part of that day.^9 
Reference to Tinker was often made in this case. The 
court at many points contrasted the case before it with Tinker. 
The court said: 
First Amendment Rights must be interpreted according to 
the "special characteristics" of environment therein.3* 
The court further stated in reflecting on Tinker that: 
The authority of a former decision as a precedent must 
29Ibid., p. H90. 
30Ibid., p. 491. 
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be limited to the points actually decided on the facts 
before the court 31 
The district court denied the request for a temporary 
injunction in the case. The record in this case revealed 
disruptive circumstances unlike Tinker and the court felt 
that school authorities had acted in the interest of its duty 
to educate those who were seeking an education. The court 
rejected the contention of the plaintiffs that school authori­
ties were not afraid of disruption, but had enforced the regu­
lation against the principle of the demonstration itself. 
The case of Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School 
District (1970)32 resulted from the suspension of two high 
school girls who attempted to bring about a boycott of the 
school candy drive for the purpose of protesting the school' 
dress code. 
The district court in its decision stated: 
In weighing importance of maintaining administrative 
authority to regulate and discipline students against 
students' personal rights to stir up boycott of school's 
candy drive for purpose of protesting school dress code, 
latter activity was without weight or substance and 
raised no question of constitutional proportions 
In considering action against school by student who 
claimed infringement of right of free speech, it is the 
31Ibid., p. 489. 
^Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School District, 
310 F. Supp. 1309 (1970TT 
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duty of the court to ask whether that which student wishes 
to say is of such importance as would justify court in 
interfering with school authorities attempt to regulate 
where, when and how he shall say it. 33 
The plaintiffs cited Tinker and Burnside in request 
for preliminary injunction against school officials. The 
court pointed out in both cases cited that young children 
were protesting and attempting to express an opinion in matters 
of great national concern. In both cases, the issues were 
wholly unrelated to the school program. 
In the present case the issue involved was solely a 
school one. The district court held that since students had 
been reinstated, candy sale was over and dress code had been 
modified though not entirely to their satisfaction that no 
question of constitutional proportion existed. The prelimi­
nary injunction was denied. 
The case of Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School Dis­
trict (197 0)3lf came in an action filed on behalf of five minor 
children who were students at Tahoka Jr. or Sr. High School, 
Tahoka, Texas. The students were suspended for wearing brown 
armbands to protest certain school policies. They were of 
Mexican-American descent. Their parents had met with school 
officials concerning certain practices and had filed suit 
33Ibid. 
3U 
Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School District, 
311 F. Supp. 664 TlSTTT. 
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alleging violation of their Civil Rights. 
The students in question first wore brown armbands 
on February 12. On that date no dress regulation was in 
effect which would have been violated by such armbands. 
The board of education met on February 13 and promul­
gated a supplement to the existing student handbook in which 
it was announced that: 
Any act, unusual dress, coercion of other students, 
passing out literature, buttons, etc., or apparel deco­
ration that is disruptive, distracting, or provocative 
so as to incite students of other ethnic groups will not 
be permitted.35 
The disciplinary procedure of suspension for violation 
was also passed on February 13. The plaintiffs continued to 
wear armbands and were suspended. 
The district court held that: 
Wearing of brown armbands by high school students for 
purpose of expressing view that substance of their griev­
ance, respecting certain educational policies and prac­
tices within school system was justified and worthy of 
corrective action came within protection of First Amend­
ment .3 6 
The case of Hernandez v. School District No. 1, (1970)3̂  
also involved students of Mexican descent. These students were 
suspended for wearing black berets to school. 
35Ibid., p. 665. 
36Ibid., p. 666. 
3̂ Hernandez v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
315 F. Supp. 289 (lSToT: 
H2 
In August of 1969 the plaintiff, Hernandez, asked the 
principal if students would be permitted to wear black berets 
to school. The reason given for the request was that the 
berets would be a symbol of their Mexican culture and show 
unity among Mexicans. 
Mr. Shannon, the principal, also of Mexican descent, 
agreed to the request with the statement: "we would try and 
see if we could live with it." He went even further and 
granted permission to celebrate September 16, as Mexican 
Independence Day in the school. 
After this, undisputed testimony showed that the plain­
tiffs were becoming arrogant, boisterous and trying to have 
their way in school. They were using their berets as a symbol 
of power and to exercise control over other students. 
Examples of conduct given were shouting in the halls, 
blocking students from passing in the halls, refusing to give 
names to teachers, walking out of class and attempting to 
interfere with discipline of other students. 
Mr. Shannon in trying to solve the problem talked 
with the students and then with the parents. This approach 
was not successful, so the plaintiffs were told they would 
have to cease wearing the berets in school or be suspended. 
They ignored the requer.t and were suspended for five days by 
the principal. The principal's suspension was upheld and 
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extended to ten days ( or until berets were removed^by the 
superintendent. 
The plaintiffs claimed that berets were worn as a 
political symbol and the ban on wearing berets was a violation 
of their Constitutional right to free speech. They cited 
Tinker as justification of their claim. 
The district court dismissed the complaint and in its 
decision said: 
It follows that the disruptive conduct of the plaintiffs 
in this case is not immunized by the Constitutional guaran­
tee of free speech. 
qq 
The case of Guzick v. Drebus (1970) went before the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio. The complaint had been dismissed by the district court. 
The complaint charged that Thomas Guzick, Jr., a seventeen 
year old, eleventh grade student at Shaw High School, had been 
denied the right of free speech guaranteed to him by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. His charge fol­
lowed his suspension: for refusal to remove, while in school, 
a button which solicited participation in an anti-war demon­
stration that was to take place in Chicago. The legend of the 
button was: 
38Ibid. 
39Guzick v. Drebus, 305 F. Supp. 479 (1970). 
im 
April 5 Chicago 
GI - Civilian 
Anti-V7ar 
Demonstration 
Student Mobilization Committee1̂  
The plaintiff sought reversal of the district court 
decision on grounds that facts in the case brought it under 
the rule of Tinker. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had 
to either distinguish the case from Tinker or reverse the de­
cision of the lower court. 
The rule applied to Appellant, at Shaw High School in 
East Cleveland, Ohio, was of long standing. The rule origi­
nated when fraternities were competing for the favor of stu­
dents and causing disruption in the school. The rule had been 
uniformly enforced since that time. 
The school population had changed from all white to 
70% black and racial buttons such as "White is Right" and 
"Black Power" had been prohibited. Such buttons had caused 
disruption at Shaw High School in the past. 
The district judge in looking at Tinker said: 
Furthermore, there is in the present case much more 
than an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur­
bances likely to result from the wearing of buttons at 
Shaw High School. The wearing of buttons and other em­
blems and insignia has occasioned substantial disruptive 
conduct in the past at Shaw High. It is likely to occa­
sion such conduct if permitted henceforth. The wearing 
""ibid. 
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of buttons and insignia will serve to exacerbate an al­
ready tense situation, to promote division and disputes, 
including physical violence among the students, and to dis­
rupt and interfere with the normal operation of the school 
and with appropriate discipline by school authorities.41 
The district court in reference to black armbands being 
singled out in Tinker while other students wore buttons made 
this statement: 
In addition any rule which attempts to permit the 
wearing of some buttons, but not others, would be vir­
tually impossible to administer.42 
The Sixth Circuit compared the case before it with the 
Fifth Circuit decisions in Blackwell and Burnside. In Black-
well the court in upholding the school rule found that the 
wearing of freedom buttons caused disturbance of the educa­
tional process. In Burnside the wearing of freedom buttons 
by students was upheld since there had been no previous rule 
and it caused no disturbance in the school. 
Judge 0'Sullivan, Senior Judge for the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals said: 
We will not attempt extensive review of the many great 
decisions which have forbidden abridgment of free speech. 
We have been thrilled by their beautiful and impassioned 
language. They are a part of our American Heritage. None 
of these masterpieces, however were composed or uttered 
to support the wearing of buttons in high school classrooms. 
H2Ibid., pp. 477 S 478. 
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We are not persuaded that enforcement of such a rule as 
Shaw High School's no-symbol proscription would have ex­
cited like judicial classics. Denying Shaw High School 
the right to enforce this small disciplinary rule could, 
and most likely would, impair the rights of its students 
to an education and the rights of its teachers to fulfill 
their responsibilities. ^ 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed several 
historic cases and writings concerning the First Amendment 
right of free speech. Two of these are included in this chapter. 
The first was made by Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for 
the majority of the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago (1949)41* 
which had to do with utterances made at a public meeting in 
a Chicago auditorium. Justice Douglas describing the nature 
of free speech, said: 
(A) function of free speech under our system of govern­
ment is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its 
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challeng­
ing. It may strike at prejudices and pre-conceptions and 
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for accept­
ance of an idea.4̂  
The Circuit Court in application: 
However correct such language when applied to an open 
public protest meeting, we doubt the propriety of protect­
ing in a high school classroom such aggressive and colorful 
H3Guzick v^ Drebus, 431 F. 2d 600 (1970). 
^^Terminiello v. Chicago, 3 37 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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use of free speech.4® 
The second was taken from a monograph by Mr. Justice 
Brennen entitled "The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Inter­
pretation of the First Amendment". He had this to say about 
balancing of First Amendment Rights with governmental power. 
The 'redeeming social value,' 'clear and present dan­
ger,' and 'balancing' tests recognize some governmental 
power to inhibit speech, but it must also be said that 
none of these limitations has been given an across the 
board application. Each has been primarily utilized to 
sustain governmental regulation in particular contexts 
and the 'balancing' test primarily in the case 
of regulations not intended directly to condemn the con­
tent of speech but incidentally limiting its exercise.^7 
The majority of the three judge panel affirmed the dis­
missal of the complaint by the district court. Judge McAllister 
dissented and filed opinion. Judge 0'Sullivan in the majority 
decision stated: 
Where high school rule prohibiting wearing of any 
buttons or any insignia was of long standing and had been 
universally applied, and situation at high school which 
had undergone change of racial composition from all white 
to 70% black was incendiary, enforcement of rule against 
student who wore button soliciting participation in anti­
war demonstration did not deny right of free speech.4® 
Judge McAllister dissenting: 
When a few students noticed the button which Appellant 
was wearing, and asked him "what it said," Appellant's 
46Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F. 2d 600 (1970). 
**^'79 Harvard Law Review 1, 11 (1965). 
^Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F. 2d 601 (1970). 
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explanation resulted only in casual reaction; and there 
was no indication that the wearing of the button would 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school 
would reverse judgment of the district court and dismiss 
case on the authority of Tinker v. Pes Moines.^ 
Tinker and other decisions of the federal courts on the 
right of expression have not provided specific guidelines for 
students. The decisions did tell students that if they pro­
tested silently and with no substantial disruption, their 
actions would be upheld and protected by the Free Speech and 
Due Process Clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
This was indicated by the Fifth Circuit Court decision in 
Blackwell and Burnside. 
The cases that have dealt with the First Amendment free­
dom of speech have emphasized repeatedly that the state and 
school authorities have comprehensive authority and may ex­
ercise this authority as long as it is within the constitu­
tional framework to conduct and prescribe conduct in the schools. 
49 
Ibid. 
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CHAPTER III 
FREEDOOM OF THE PRESS AND STUDENT PUBLICATIONS: FIRST AMENDMENT 
Freedom of the press in the First Amendment of the Con­
stitution of the United States gives protection to written ex­
pression. Since the Tinker decision students have attempted 
to establish their right to publication and distribution. 
Justice William 0. Douglas writing about the basic free­
doms in this country pointed out that United States Constitu­
tion prohibited any form of censorship over the newseditor, 
the author or the lecturer. He also raised the question of 
movie and television censorship which is certainly not clear 
with the 19 7 3 decision of the United States Supreme Court to 
judge obscenity by local standards. 
Justice Douglas stated: 
The argument against censorship is clear: no person 
shall dictate our tastes, ideas or beliefs. No official 
has the right to say what is trash and what has value. 
Fiction, movies, cartoons, painting, sculpture, though 
intended primarily for entertainment, also convey ideas. 
To allow suppression of a publication on the basis of 
someone's opinion that such utterances are offensive to 
some political or sectarian group and have no artistic 
or intellectual merit would afford an easy device for the 
silencing of unpopular ideas. As a work of literature, 
UNCLE TOM'S CABIN was no model, but its effect on people's 
ideas was tremendous. 
^"William 0. Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (New York: 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rlth, 1966), pp. 25, 26. 
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Douglas went on to point out that James Madison's view 
had been, the constitution gave no power whatever over speech 
or press to the federal government, because of the First 
Amendment. The importance of free speech and a free press 
has led the courts to hold that guarantees of the First Amend­
ment extend to state action by reason of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York (1925) 
The case of Near v. Minnesota (1931)3 involved the 
"Minnesota gag law" of 19 25. This law provided for the pad­
locking by injunctive process, of a newspaper for printing 
subject matter which was scandalous, malicious, defamatory, 
or obscene. Such an injunction could be lifted only by con­
vincing the judge who issued it that publication would, in 
the future, be acceptable. 
Such action was brought against THE SATURDAY PRESS 
published by the. defendants in the city of Minneapolis. The 
paper had attacked city officials and charged that gangsters 
were running the city. 
A temporary injunction and then a permanent injunction 
had been issued by a judge. This action had been affirmed in 
2lbid., p. 28. 
^Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
51 
the state courts. 
The case reached the United States Supreme Court on 
appeal. Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Court pointed 
out that freedom of the press is not an absolute right, and 
the state may punish its abuse. He also stated that remedies 
for libel remained available and unaffected by the gag law. 
Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Court said: 
. . . the statute in question does not deal with pun­
ishments, it provides for no punishment, except in case 
of contempt for violation of the court's order, but for 
suppression and injunction, that is, for restraint upon 
publication we hold the statute so far as it 
authorized the proceedings in the action under clause 
(b) of section one, to be an infringement of the liberty 
of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.14 
This case, Near v. Minnesota, was the first case in 
which a state law was held unconstitutional by the United 
States Supreme Court. The Court held that it violated free­
dom of the press and was protected from state action by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The case of Kingsley Books v. Brown (1957)5 raised the 
question of prior restraint in the sale of books judged to be 
obscene. The appellants questioned the use of an injunction 
by the state of New York to halt the sale of books pending a 
**'Ibid. 
^Kingsley Books v. Brown, 35^ U.S. ^36 (1957). 
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judicial decision. At issue was the procedure used by the 
state of New York, not obscenity.. 
The United States Supreme Court in a five to four de­
cision upheld the New York law. Justice Frankfurter in the 
majority opinion stated: 
The phrase prior restraint is not a self-wielding 
sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.6 
Prior censorship of motion pictures raised the consti­
tution issue of prior restraint. The question concerned the 
application of the broad language of Near v. Minnesota to 
motion pictures. 
n 
The case of Times Film Corporation v. Chicago (1961) 
challenged a city ordinance requiring submission of all mo­
tion pictures for examination before they were shown. 
In a five to four decision the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the ordinance. The Court once again recognized 
that previous restraint was not absolutely unlimited. How­
ever, this limitation was only recognized in exceptional cases. 
The majority opinion saw the legal question as the sub­
mission of the film. The dissenting opinion saw the Court 
giving official license to censors. 
6Ibid. 
^Tiiries Film Corporation v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
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The case of Freedman v. Maryland (1965)® once again 
brought the question of prior restraint before the Court. In 
this case the Court ruled that a Maryland statute requiring 
submission of motion pictures to the state board of censors 
prior to showing was unconstitutional. The Court found the 
statute did not meet procedural safeguards, since the burden 
of proof did not fall on the censors. 
The findings of the censors had the effect of finality 
and delay was built into any final judicial determination. 
These cases have been reviewed to give historical back­
ground to the question of freedom of the press. One must re­
member that the laws of libel and slander protect a person 
from being injured by false statements which another makes 
about him. These are state laws which also permit a person 
to recover damages. 
The growing phenomenon of underground newspapers and 
the problem of censorship of school papers was pointed out by 
SATURDAY REVIEW in February of 1969. At that time, it was 
estimated there were five hundred such underground newspapers 
published off campus.^ 
^Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
^Diane Divoky, "Revolt in the High Schools: The Way It's 
Going to Be," Saturday Review, (February 15, 1969). p. 83. 
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The National Association of Secondary School Principals 
in 1969 conducted a poll of one hundred representative schools. 
The poll found that in sixty per-cent of the schools reporting, 
the school newspaper was firmly under the thumb of the princi­
pal. The students in the schools polled said that over half 
the principals attempted to suppress under-ground newspapers.10 
This attempt on the part of administrators to suppress 
underground newspapers or to censor school newspapers resulted 
in litigation in the federal courts following the Tinker deci­
sion. This has been especially true where students have been 
punished by suspension or expulsion. 
The case of Segall v. Jacobson (19 69)^ arose from the 
publication of a name-calling article containing obscenities 
published in a paper which forged the official masthead of the 
school newspaper. The student involved was suspended from a 
Manhattan, New York, high school, but was allowed to transfer 
to another school. The student brought action for reinstate­
ment to his original school. 
The plaintiff was involved in disruptive activities at 
school in December of 1968 which resulted in injury to a fellow 
student. After this incident, he signed an agreement to obey 
Lloyd Trump and Jane Hunt, "The Naturae and Extent 
of Student Activism," The Bulletin: National Association of 
Secondary School Principal's, Vol. 5*3 (May, 1969), p. 151. 
•^Segall v. Jacobson, 295 F. Supp. 1121 (1969). 
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school rules and to not become involved in disruptive activi­
ties. 
In January of 1969 he distributed in the school lunch­
room and gymnasium the forged paper. The plaintiff admitted 
breaking his agreement and further stated that he would assist 
in any disruptive conduct at school when the opportunity pre­
sented itself. 
The student was suspended and a hearing was held before 
the district superintendent who sustained the suspension and 
transferred the student to another school. 
The district court denied the preliminary injunction, 
since plaintiff had been admitted to another school and because 
of the facts presented in the case. 
The case of Schwartz v. Schuker (1969)also occurred 
in a New York City High School. The plaintiff, Jeffrey Schwartz, 
had distributed peace strike material on the school ground 
during the school day and called for a student strike. 
Jeffrey was not punished, but was advised by the dean 
that distribution of outside literature was not permitted on 
campus without specific permission. 
Jeffrey admitted to the administrative assistant that he 
was part of the group calling for a student strike. At this 
19 
Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (1969). 
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time city-wide riots were occurring because of the length of 
the school day. 
In conference with the parents, they asserted Jeffrey 
had a right to carry on student strikes at all times and in 
any manner he deemed proper. 
Unable to resolve the problem, Jeffrey was suspended 
and the parents given written notice of a hearing. Prior to 
the hearing he appeared in class in defiance of school officials 
on the instructions of his mother. 
At the hearing Jeffrey was given the option of gradua­
tion as of January 31, 1969, or transferring to another high 
school. Neither option was exercised. 
Action was brought before the district court for rein­
statement and other relief on the grounds that First Amendment 
rights had been violated. 
The district court held: 
. . . that suspension of high school student who had 
been cautioned by principal not to bring on school pre­
mises copies of newspaper published off school property 
but nevertheless did so and who when asked to surrender 
newspapers refused to do so and attempted to influence 
another student to do likewise and who after suspension 
defied superintendent's orders by appearing in school 
did not violate student's First Amendment right of free 
speech.13 
13 
Ibid., p. 239. 
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The court in denying the injunction went further and 
said: 
. . . that First Amendment rights must be balanced 
against the duty and obligation of the state to educate 
students in an orderly and decent manner and to protect 
the rights not of a few but of all the students in the 
school system.14 
New York continued to be the scene of court battles 
over student publications. The case of Zucker v. Panitz 
(1969)1® arose in New Rochelle, New York. 
The conflict leading to a court case resulted when a 
group of students attempted to put a paid advertisement in 
school newspaper in opposition to the war in Vietnam. The 
principal directed that it not be published in keeping with a 
long standing policy of the school. This policy did not per­
mit advertisements of a political nature. 
The plaintiffs brought action against school officials 
for violation of constitutional rights. The court ruled that 
high school students, on freedom of speech grounds, were en­
titled to publish paid advertisement in school newspaper. This 
decision was based on evidence introduced that articles on the 
war and the draft had appeared in the school newspaper. 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted 
ll*Ibid. , p. 2^2 
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (1969). 
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by the court saying: 
. . . that newspaper was a forum for dissemination of 
ideas and was open to free expression of ideas in news and 
editorial columns and letters to editors.16 
The issue of possession of obscene literature by students 
is closely related to distribution of literature. Because both 
questions have come before the federal courts, a case dealing 
with possession of obscene literature will be included at this 
point. Possession of obscene literature has most often been 
in the federal courts when students have been punished by sus­
pension or expulsion. 
Such a case, Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools (1969)17, 
resulted from student possession and disciplinary action by 
school officials in a high school in Wayne County, Michigan. 
The principal of Belleville High School took from the 
plaintiff, David Vought, copies of a slick page booklet called 
"White Panther Statement". He was sent home, but re-admitted 
when his mother returned with him for a conference with the 
principal. 
The very same day the principal read a memorandum to the 
student body that any student found with obscene literature in 
his possession would be suspended from school. 
16Ibid. 
^Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 
(1969). 
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A few days later, David was suspended for having a copy 
of the magazine ARGUS at school which contained a certain four 
letter word. He was suspended and then expelled by the board 
of education without receiving notice of the meeting. The 
plaintiff, through an attorney, appealed to the board to rescind 
its expulsion; but the board refused. 
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the district court. 
The court granted a temporary restraining order which reinstated 
student in school pending the outcome of the trial. 
Since the suspension and expulsion was based on possession 
of a magazine containing a four letter word, evidence was brought 
before the court that plaintiff had been required to read CATCHER 
IN THE RYE in the tenth grade, which contained the same four 
letter word. A copy of HARPER'S magazine in the school library 
also contained the same four letter word. 
The court in reference to the four letter word said: 
If we, as a trial court, are confused, what are we to 
suppose is the state of mind of a student subjected to 
such a double standard.18 
The court in its decision did not consider obscenity, 
but found for the plaintiff on the grounds of denial of due 
process. The court went on to say that a school regulation pro­
viding that any student found with obscene literature in his pos­
session would be suspended from school did not violate the free 
18Ibid., p. 1395. 
60 
speech provision of the First Amendment. The court went further 
in stating that in this particular case the punishment did not 
fit the crime. 
The case of Baker v. Downey City Board of Education (196 9)19 
involved the publication of an off-campus newspaper called OINK 
by two senior boys at Earl Warren High School in Los Angeles, 
California. The two boys were suspended for ten days for pro­
fanity and vulgarity appearing in the newspaper. In addition, 
both boys were removed from their elected school office for 
failure to keep their oath of office. 
The court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
the injunctive or declaratory relief sought by their complaint. 
The court said: 
Temporary suspension of high school students for use of 
profanity or vulgarity appearing in off-campus newspaper 
published by them and distributed to students just outside 
main campus gate did not violate students' First Amendment 
right of freedom of speech.20 
The court emphasised the earlier finding of the Supreme 
Court in that freedom of speech is not the right to say anything 
one pleases in any manner or place. 
The case of Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District 
19 Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 30 7 F. Supp. 517 
(1969). 
20 .  
Ibid., p. 520. 
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21 (1969) grew out of the publication and distribution of an 
off-campus newspaper called PFLASHLYTE by two senior boys at 
Sharpstown Junior/Senior High School in Houston, Texas. The 
Newspaper was published at the University of Houston Print 
Shop in cooperation with the Students for Democratic Society 
chapter on the campus. The boys distributed the newspaper 
across the street from the school in a park. Students re­
ceiving the newspaper were asked not to have it out in school. 
School officials found a stack of the newspapers in a 
restroom with a sign saying take one. Copies were also found 
in a towel dispenser and a sewing machine in a girl's home-
making class. 
Groups of students gathered in the hall to discuss the 
newspaper. Copies were taken from students in class, but only 
one student was sent to the principal because of the newspapers. 
When the two boys were identified and had admitted to 
the distribution of the newspapers, they were expelled for the 
rest of the school year. This occurred on March 12, 1969. A 
visit to the assistant superintendent did not help in their 
effort to gain admittance to another high school in Houston. 
21 Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 
307F. Supp. 1328 (196971 
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The plaintiffs brought action for reinstatement and 
declaratory relief against school authorities in the district 
court. They challenged the school district regulation giving 
authority to the principal to make any necessary and reasonable 
rules. 
The court in April granted a preliminary injunction rein­
stating the two boys in school while trial was in session. The 
court also enjoined school officials from disciplining plaintiffs 
for the publication or distribution of other written material 
away from school premises. 
The case did not reach the court until after the two boys 
graduated. School officials contended that the question was 
moot since plaintiffs were no longer students. The plaintiffs 
argued that it was still on their school records and that the 
suit was a class action on behalf of other students in Houston. 
The court agreed to the class action, since all students in Hous­
ton were subject to the same regulations. 
The case reached the court in November of 1969 and the 
district court cited Tinker in saying: 
. . . freedom of speech, which includes publication and 
distribution of newspapers, may be exercised to its fullest 
potential on school premises so long as it does not unreason­
ably interfere with normal school activities. Administra­
tion can properly regulate the times and places within the 
school building at which papers may be distributed. Obvious­
ly the first amendment does not require that students be 
allowed to read newspapers during class periods. Nor should 
loud speeches or discussions be tolerated in the halls during 
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class time. A proper regulation as to place might reason­
ably prohibit all discussion in the school library, admini­
stration may not, however, apply regulations as to time or 
place or manner in a discriminatory fashion.22 
The court further stated in answering the question of 
school disruption that: 
It is also clear that if a student complies with reason­
able rules as to times and places for distribution within 
the school, and does so in an orderly, non-disruptive man­
ner, then he should not suffer if other students, who are 
lacking in self-control, tend to over react thereby becom­
ing a disruptive influence.2 3 
The court while not clear whether the law gave schools 
authority to discipline students for off-campus conduct said 
certainly that a school could not exercise more control over 
off-campus activities than over on-campus conduct. The court 
said that students off-campus are subject to the same laws as 
other citizens. 
The court concluded by saying: 
There is no question that these minor plaintiffs were 
engaged in acts of expression protected by the first amend­
ment; indeed excepting only oral expression, the publica­
tion of a newspaper is First Amendment activity in its 
purest form. It appears that (the two students) were dis­
ciplined because school officials disliked PFLASHLYTE's 
contents. The constitution prohibits such action.211' 
The court in its judgment for the plaintiffs found the 
22Ibid., p. 1340. 
2 3 lb id. 
24 
Ibid., p. 1341. 
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regulation of the Houston Independent School District vague 
and overbroad. 
This case did give some guidelines for administrators 
on distribution of literature on school grounds. The court 
said that reasonable rules could be made in regard to the 
time, place, manner and duration of distribution. 
The next four cases in this chapter are significant in 
that in each one, the decision in the district court was ap­
pealed to the circuit court of appeals. The cases are not 
listed in the order in which they arose, but in the order 
they were decided on by the court of appeals. 
The first of these cases was Scoville v. Board of Edu­
cation of Joliet Township High School District 204 (1970).^5 
This case resulted from the publication and distribution of 
a paper entitled GRASS HIGH by two students at Joliet Central 
High School in Illinois. 
On January 18, 196 8, three days after GRASS HIGH was 
sold in the school, the dean advised the plaintiffs they could 
not take their semester exams. Four days later, they were sus­
pended for five days. Some nine days later one boy was removed 
as editor of the school paper and the other boy deprived of the 
privilege to participate in debate activities. 
25Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Township 
High School District 204, 425 F. 2d 10 (197077 
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Following this, the dean recommended to the superinten­
dent that plaintiffs be expelled for the remainder of the 
school year. The plaintiffs' parents were advised that a re­
commendation would be presented to the board and they were in­
vited to be present. The mother of one of the plaintiffs 
wrote the superintendent that she felt the boys had been ade­
quately punished. The parents did not attend the meeting and 
the board expelled the plaintiffs on the grounds of gross dis­
obedience and misconduct. The plaintiffs were allowed to at­
tend a day class in physics and night school on a probationary 
basis. 
Action was brought by the plaintiffs in district court 
for injunctive relief and damages. The court applying the 
clear and present danger test upheld the expulsion. The ex­
pulsion was upheld on the basis of a statement in GRASS HIGH 
urging students not to accept for delivery to parents any pro­
paganda issued by the school and to destroy any material, if 
accepted. 
Thus, the decision of the board was justified only on 
objectionable content; since no objection was made to place, 
time or manner of distribution. In addition, no charges were 
made that publication was libelous or obscene. The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
dismissed the complaint and appeal was taken. 
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A panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court decision and subsequently a petition for re­
hearing en banc was granted. 
Both defendants and plaintiffs cited Tinker in their 
arguments before the six judges of the Seventh District Court 
of Appeals. Before the court were questions of student con­
stitutional rights, school rules and regulations and disrup­
tions of the school day. The court made the following state­
ment in regard to school rules governing expression: 
State and school officials have comprehensive authority 
to prescribe and control conduct in schools through rea­
sonable rules consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards and where rules infringe upon freedom of ex­
pression the school officials have burden of showing jus­
tification. 26 
The court said that the burden of forecasting substan­
tial disruption lay with school authorities if student free­
dom of expression was infringed by school board action of ex­
pulsion. 
The court agreed that statements in GRASS HIGH were 
disrespectful and tasteless, but cited Burnside in saying that: 
school officials cannot suppress expression by students 
with which they do not wish to contend.27 
A random statement in GRASS HIGH illustrates this point. 
26Ibid., p. 13. 
2̂ Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966). 
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The statement said, "oral sex may prevent tooth decay." 
The court commented: 
This attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an older 
generation. But today's students in high school are 
not insulated from the shocking but legally accepted 
language used by demonstrators and protestors in streets 
and on campuses and by authors of best-selling modern 
literature. A hearing might even disclose that high 
school libraries contain literature which would lead 
students to believe that statements made in GRASS HIGH 
were unobjectionable. 
The circuit court of appeals in a five to one decision 
reversed and remanded the decision of the lower court. 
One judge dissenting did not agree that the present 
case was in line with Tinker. This judge saw the action of 
the minor plaintiffs in GRASS HIGH calling upon their fellow 
students to flaunt the school administrative procedure by de­
stroying, rather than delivering to their parents material 
given to them for that purpose. 
The judge stated: 
(he) could not find for the plaintiffs private interest 
of free expression against the state's interest in conduct 
ing an efficient system of public schools.29 
In the case of Katz v. McAulay (1971)3̂  court action 
resulted from a challenge to a New York Board of Regents rule, 
^^Scoville _v^_ Board of Education of Joliet Township High 
School District 204, 425 F. 2d 10 (1970). 
29lbid., p. 13. 
30Katz v^ McAulay, 438 F. 2d 1058 (1971). 
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some forty years old, which prohibited soliciting of funds 
from pupils in the public schools. The plaintiffs, four 
students in a public high school in Westchester County, N.Y., 
brought a civil rights action for anticipatory relief against 
enforcement of the rule. Their action arose when school offi­
cials threatened plaintiffs with expulsion, if they distri­
buted on school premises leaflets soliciting funds from their 
fellow students. The leaflets sought funds for defense of the 
"Chicago 8." 
The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a pre­
liminary injunction and found the Board of Regents' rule: 
. . . was not intended to prevent the exercise of free 
speech but rather set for'th a reasonable regulation to pro­
tect school children from annoyance at the hands of solici­
tors eager, for one cause or another, to induce them to 
part with their pocket money.31 
The plaintiffs appealed and the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in a two to one decision affirmed the decision of the 
lower court saying: 
The Board's regulation appears to be reasonable and 
proper and has a rational relationship to the orderly 
operation of the school system.32 
J. Joseph Smith, Circuit Judge, in his dissent was con­
cerned, since this was a public issue. He also pointed to the 
31Ibid., p. 1060. 
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absence of gross disruption in the case before the court. 
Judge Smith stated: 
. . . I think on a showing such as this the courts 
must protect the students in their efforts to communicate, 
misguided as we may consider them. I would reverse.̂ 3 
The case of Riseman v. School Committee of City of 
Quincy (19 71)34 came when junior high students sought to dis­
tribute political material and were denied the right by the 
school committee. 
The case went to district court which denied the plain­
tiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. However, the court 
temporarily restrained school authorities from interfering with 
orderly and non-disruptive distribution on school premises, out­
side the school building, of material of a political nature or 
of public concern. 
The plaintiffs appealed, they felt they had gained only 
half a victory. The court of appeals granted a temporary in­
junction prohibiting enforcement of the regulation both within 
the building as well as on school grounds. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals pointing to the fact 
that the committee regulation was not designed or aimed at 
First Amendment rights, but was used as such to prohibit dis-
3 3Ibid., p. 1062 
34 Riseman v. School Committee of City of Quincy, 439 
F. 2d 148 (1971). 
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tributions of a political nature,, ordered the school committee 
to come up with guidelines for distribution of material. 
The court of appeals in its decision said: 
. . . (committee) rule appeared devised only to control 
in school advertising or promotional efforts of organiza­
tions and, as sought to be applied to First Amendment ac­
tivities, was vague, overbroad, and did not reflect effort 
of prior restraint. Reversed and remanded.35 
The case of Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education (19 70)36 
came as a challenge to a school board regulation requiring 
prior approval by school officials of material distributed on 
school grounds. The case arose after three issues of the 
STAMFORD FREE PRESS were distributed outside school; but when 
the fourth issue was distributed at school, it brought warning 
of suspension from school officials. Negotiations on the issue 
broke down and a suit was filed in district court. 
The only issue before the court concerned the constitu­
tional validity of the requirement that content of the litera­
ture be submitted to school officials for approval prior to 
distribution. The plaintiffs acknowledged that school authori­
ties could establish reasonable regulations governing the time, 
place and manner of distribution. They further agreed the 
author of each article should be identified and to a prohibition 
35Ibid._ 
3 6 Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 314 F. Supp. 
832 (1970Ti 
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of obscene or libelous material. 
The district court cited Near v. Minnesota and Freedman 
v. Maryland on the constitutional questions of prior restraint 
and censorship. 
The court found: 
Board of education could not constitutionally require 
that content of student newspaper, which was printed at 
students' expense and which was sought to be distributed 
on school grounds, be submitted to a board of education 
for approval prior to distribution; regulation on its face 
constituted unjustified prior restraint.37 
The broad, comprehensive order of the district court 
prohibiting any system of prior restraint and the reliance of 
the court on several college cases indicated the court viewed 
the rights of high school students as parallel to those of 
college students where distribution of literature was concerned. 
Therefore, the decision of the district court was appealed by 
the school board. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote an opinion 
establishing several specific guidelines under which a valid 
rule requiring prior approval might be developed. The court 
said: 
. . .  t o  r e s o l v e  t h i s  p r o b l e m  w e  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o n ­
sider principles and concepts which courts have fashioned 
over several decades of this century, giving effect to the 
proscription of the First Amendment against any law abridging 
37Ibid. 
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freedom of expression, and applying them to the. unique 
social structure prevailing in a public system of secon­
dary schools.38 
The court suggested that school board should make 
policy more specific in how school officials would attempt 
to prevent disruption in other ways, before limiting distri­
bution rights. 
The appeals court in its opinion pointed out that United 
States Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota and other cases had 
not prohibited all prior restraints. Prior restraint can be 
justified, if it does not unduly restrain protected speech. 
While generally approving the procedural requirements es­
tablished in Freedman v. Maryland, the appeals court recognized 
the impracticality of requiring a prior judicial hearing before 
school officials may place a restraint on distribution. The 
court stated: 
. . . we believe that it would be highly disruptive to 
the educational process if a secondary school principal 
were required to take a school newspaper editor to court 
everytime the principal reasonably anticipated disruption 
and sought to restrain its cause.39 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the fol­
lowing as essential elements in setting up a procedure for sub­
mission of material which will satisfy the demands of the 
3 8 
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F.2d 803 
(1971). 
39Ibid., p. 810. 
constitution. 
1. Adequate definition must be given to the term "dis­
tribution" to make clear that policy is directed 
at substantial disruption and not the passing of 
a note from one student to another or the exchange 
of copies of TIME or LIFE. 
2. A definite person must be established to whom the 
material is to be submitted for approval and how 
the submission is to be accomplished. 
3. A definite, brief period must be set within which 
the review will take place and be completed. 
4. A provision that the policy will not operate until 
each school has established its review procedure 
and informed its students.^0 
These guidelines set forth by the court give direction 
to school boards in making policy limiting high school students' 
rights to distribute literature in school. The court left no 
doubt they would approve properly drawn regulations involving 
a prior restraint. 
The court of appeals also confirmed the distinction be­
tween the rights of high school students and college students 
in the area of First Amendment rights. The district court 
earlier in its decision had viewed the rights of high school 
students as parallel to those of college students. 
T. Page Johnson, "Eisner v. Stamford! Prior Restraint 
on Distribution of Literature in High Schools," Nople School 
Law Journal, Vol. 2 (Spring, 1972), p. 30. 
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The court of appeals modified, affirmed and remanded 
the case back to the district court. 
The decision of the Second Circuit of Appeals in Eisner 
by giving guidelines seemed to have resolved the issue of dis­
tribution of literature on school premises. This was not to be, 
as other cases soon followed in the federal courts. 
A North Carolina case, Quarterman v. Byrd (19 71), 
resulted from the suspension of a tenth grade student for dis­
tribution of an underground newspaper. The Pine Forest High 
School near Southern Pines had a rule requiring permission of 
the principal before literature could be distributed. The 
plaintiff violated the rule and was suspended for ten days. 
He returned to school after the suspension and two months later 
distributed another underground newspaper. The plaintiff was 
once again suspended for ten days. He brought action in the 
district court asking for declaratory judgment. Plaintiff al­
leged that school rule violated First Amendment rights. He 
sought temporary and permanent injunction against enforcement 
of his suspension and damages. 
The district court denied the temporary injunction and 
stayed the action until state administrative and judicial remedies 
^Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F. 2d 810 
X1971). 
^Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F. 2d 54 (1971). 
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had been exhausted. The plaintiff appealed the stay order to 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The court of appeals granted injunctive relief pending 
the appeal. The circuit court saw the issue as dealing direct­
ly with a fundamental constitutional right under the First 
Amendment. The court concluded that administrative remedies 
did not provide a satisfactory alternative and the federal, not 
the state, court was the proper place for the suit. 
The Fourth Circuit Court while reaffirming that First 
Amendment rights were not absolute for either students or adults, 
that a difference did exist between the constitutional rights 
of secondary students and college students in the area, of publi­
cations and that constitutional rights of secondary students 
could be modified, nevertheless, found the school regulation 
invalid. 
The court in regard to prior restraint on the distribu­
tion of literature said: 
Specifically, school authorities may.by appropriate 
regulation, exercise prior restraint upon publications dis­
tributed on school premises during school hours in those 
special circumstances where they can "reasonably forecast" 
substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities^on account of the distribution of such 
printed material. 
H3Ibid., p. 58 
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The court pointed to the Fifth Circuit case of Butts 
v. Dallas Independent School District (19 71) where the court 
held that school authorities in exercising a power of prior 
restraint did not have to wait until disruption actually oc­
curred. 
The court also made reference to the position of the 
American Civil Liberties Union on student publications. In 
their pamphlet one finds the following statement: 
Neither the faculty advisors nor the principal should 
prohibit the publication or distribution of material ex­
cept when such publications or distribution would clearly 
endanger the health or safety of the students, or clearly 
or imminently threaten to disrupt the educational process, 
or might be of a libelous nature. Such judgment, however, 
should never be exercised because of disapproval or dis­
agreement with the article in question. 4l+ 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found the school 
regulation in this case invalid due to the absence of any cri­
teria to be followed by school authorities in deciding whether 
to grant or deny permission and the absence of procedural safe­
guards in regard to review procedure of the decision of school 
authorities. The court said: 
Eisner, which involved largely the same issue as is pre­
sented here, set forth the reasonable requirements for "an 
expeditious review procedure" that are practical as applied 
in connection with the operation of a public school and 
^American Civil Liberties Union, Academic Freedom in 
the Secondary Schools (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 
1968), pp. 11-12. 
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that will meet the basic requirements of Freedman. 4̂  
The court in reference to the guidelines, drawn by the 
Second Circuit in Eisner said: 
. . . the regulation involved in this action includes 
neither such limited procedural safeguards nor any guide­
lines for determining the right to publish or distribute 
and is accordingly constitutionally defective.46 
The Quarterman case relied heavily on the finding of 
the court in Eisner. The case of Baughman v. Freinmuth (1972)^ 
in Montgomery County, Maryland, quoted often from Quarterman 
in reaching its decision. 
The action in Baughman was filed in December of 196 9 on 
behalf of infant plaintiffs against the Montgomery County Board 
of Education and the Maryland State Board of Education. The 
suit alleged that school regulations, by way of prior restraint, 
violated the First Amendment right of students to distribute 
non-school sponsored literature on school grounds. 
The action arose over the distribution of a position 
paper critical of the regulations on distribution. The parents 
of the students involved were notified in a letter by the prin­
cipal of their children's behavior. There was no other punish­
ment. 
^Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F. 2d 60 (1971). 
"6ibid. 
^Baughman v. Freinmuth, 343 F. Supp. 487 (1972). 
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After the action was filed, all types of procedural 
maneuvers were used including appeals, a counter suit by con­
cerned parents opposed to the plaintiffs and action by the 
state board to void the Montgomery County regulation. These 
legal steps delayed the case from reaching the district court 
until Hay of 1972. The board regulation had been modified 
twice in the interval between the filing of the action and the 
case reaching the court. Due to these factors and the fact 
that no punishment was involved, the district court considered 
only the constitutional validity of the regulation. 
The district court using Quarterman as the precedent 
case suggested the Fourth Circuit Court had called for the same 
guidelines drawn by the court in Eisner. Judge Northrup in 
this case saw Eisner as requiring: 
(1). The specifying of a definite brief period within 
which review of material will be completed; 
(2). The specifying of to whom and how material must 
be submitted; and 
(3). A provision that the prohibition against distribu­
tion will not become operative until each school 
I I Q 
has established its own screening procedure. 0 
In comparing the Montgomery County regulation to these 
guidelines, the court found that a time period was not provided, 
that principal as the receiving officer seemed all right and 
U8Ibid.» p. 492. 
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that it was a uniformly administered county policy. 
On the basis of this comparison the court held: 
. . . that the Montgomery County rule must fall in 
light of the requirements of Eisner via Quarterman be­
cause of the absence of a definite short period of time 
in which the censoring individual must make his decision. 
The district court refused to enjoin the Montgomery 
County Board from adopting a rule of prior restraint following 
the principles of Quarterman. The court further refused to 
enjoin the board from enforcing in the future a rule re-drafted 
within the parameters of Quarterman. The district court said: 
. . . if Quarterman stands for anything at all, it stands 
for the proposition that a rule of prior restraint may be 
imposed if that said rule is properly drafted to avoid con­
stitutional pitfalls. This Court is not about to declare 
the Montgomery County Board incapable of carrying out this 
task any more than this Court is about to take over the 
running of the schools themselves, however much certain 
elements of the school patron population would like to see 
that unlikely event come to pass. Indeed, one sometimes 
gets the feeling in cases such as this that the mouths of 
babes are oft times the vehicles by which the parents seek 
to publicize their pet peeves.^0 
The case of Fujishima v. Board of Education (197 2)^1 
resulted from action brought by three high school students in 
Chicago, Illinois. They were suspended for violating a school 
rule. This rule prohibited distribution of material on the 
U9Ibid. 
50Ibid., p. 49 3. 
^Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F. 2d 1355 (1972). 
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school ground without the approval of the general superinten­
dent of schools. The plaintiffs alleged violation of their 
constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 
In an unprecedented move, the district judge gave an 
opinion on all motions before the court without a hearing or 
oral argument. The judge granted some of the plaintiffs' re­
quests, denied others and left the issue in a general state of 
confusion. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The defendants contended the regulation was constitu­
tionally permissible, because it did not require approval of 
the content of a publication before distribution. The court 
of appeals did not agree and held that a regulation requiring 
prior approval is unconstitutional as a prior restraint in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
The Seventh Circuit traced the course of litigation in­
volving distribution of literature in the public schools. The 
circuit court said: 
We believe that the court erred in Eisner in interpret­
ing Tinker to allow prior restraint of publication - long a 
constitutionally prohibited power - as a tool of school 
officials in "forecasting' substantial disruption of school 
activities. 
The court pointed out that the forecast rule in Tinker 
52lbid., p. 1358. 
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was meant to be used to justify punishment of students for 
exercise of their First Amendment rights, not to prevent First 
Amendment rights by establishing a system of censorship. 
The Seventh Circuit Court in its decision stated: 
Because we believe Eisner is unsound constitutional 
law and because defendants in effect concede that they 
cannot require submission of publications before approval 
of distribution, we declare section 6-19 unconstitutional 
and remand the case for entry of an injunction against 
its enforcement. 3 
The decision went further by denying a class action in 
the suit and expunging suspensions from the records of all 
three students. 
In the case of Koppell v. Levine (19724 the court 
applied the "reasonable forecast of substantial disruption or 
material interference with school activities test" and found 
the principal had invaded student rights by the suppression of 
material he felt was obscene. 
The principal was ordered to return to plaintiffs the 
impounded copies of the literary magazine in question. The 
court refused to award damages, but did award court cost since 
the plaintiffs were forced to sue to obtain constitutional 
rights. 
53Ibid., p. 1359. 
^Koppell v. Levine. 3U7 F.. Supp. H56 (1972). 
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The case of Egner v. Texas City Independent School Dis­
trict (1972)^ took an unusual turn and resulted in a decision 
which was a complete reversal of the procedure in Quarterman. 
Action was commenced in a state court over the suspen­
sion of a high school student for distribution of certain liter­
ature in violation of a school rule. Before the hearing in the 
state court, the defendants removed the suit to the federal 
court. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand. 
The plaintiff's motion was granted by the United States 
District Court on the basis that available and adequate judi­
cial remedy had not been exhausted. The district court said: 
The times must indeed be out of joint when an agency of 
the state flies headlong into a federal court in order to 
avoid subjecting itself to a federal constitutional adjudi­
cation in a court of its own state. Although this court is 
reluctant to attribute to defendants the base motive of 
judge-shopping, this would appear to be the only rational 
explanation for such an anomolous procedural maneuver.56 
On the issue of publication and distribution of litera­
ture in the public schools, the federal courts have made it 
clear that school officials may regulate the time, place and 
manner of distribution. However, the constitutional right 
to distribute does not give the student the right to disrupt 
the educational process in the school. 
55 
Egner v. Texas City Independent School District, 338 F. 
Supp. 931 (197277 
56Ibid., p. 9H5. 
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One facet of this issue that remains to be resolved 
is the submission of material for approval by school authori­
ties or even approval by school authorities to distribute ma­
terial. The court in Eisner and Quarterman held that rules of 
prior restraint could be drawn up by boards of education within 
certain parameters. The court in Fujishima v. Board of Educa­
tion held that no rule of prior restraint could be adopted by 
boards of education. 
Nat Hentoff writing in SATURDAY REVIEW put the issue in 
proper prospective when he said: 
Not all cases have been won, but the direction of court 
opinion is toward broadening high school students' rights 
to publish and distribute their news. Censorship of school 
papers and the banning of outside material remain the nor­
mative conditions in most schools, but now when these re­
strictions are challenged, the burden is increasingly on 
school authorities to prove that unfretted freedom of ex­
pression will lead to substantial disorder in the school 
or to infringement on the rights of others.57 
^Nat Hentoff, "Why Students Want Their Constitutional 
Rights Now," Saturday Review (May 22, 1971), p. 63. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION: FIRST AMENDMENT 
This chapter will look at the constitutional right of 
students to assemble in the public schools. This First Amend­
ment right of the people peaceably to assemble is closely re­
lated to the right of free speech and expression. Both issues 
have manifested themselves in the public schools. 
The right of secondary students peaceably to assemble 
is an emerging issue in the federal courts. For this reason, 
it will be necessary to include in the chapter related high­
er education cases and state cases involving the use of an 
injunction to prohibit meetings. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States reads as follows: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances. 
The clause on assembly in the First Amendment did not 
grant any new freedom, but was simply a constitutional bar to 
congressional restrictions of freedom of assembly as the right 
was understood to extend at that time. 
This interpretation of freedom of assembly was upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States 
8b 
v. Cruikshank (1876).Cruikshank and others were charged 
with conspiring in violation of the Enforcement Act of Hay 
31, 1870, to hinder certain persons from peaceably assembling. 
Holding the act applicable only to deprivation of national 
rights and not state rights, the majority decided the general 
right to hold a lawful meeting was in the latter category and 
dismissed the indictment. Chief Justice Morrison Waite; in 
the opinion for the Court, gave the intent and effect of the 
First Amendment Assembly Clause: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for law­
ful purposes existed long before the adoption of the Con­
stitution of the United States. In fact, it is and al­
ways has been one of the attributes of citizenship under 
a free government.... It is found wherever civilization 
exists. It was not, therefore, a right granted to the 
people by the constitution.^ 
Since the First Amendment right of assembly offered 
protection against abridgement only by the federal government, 
an individual had to rely on his state constitution for pro­
tection against state action. Only four of the original thir­
teen states had expressed guarantees of the right of assembly 
in their state constitution in 178 9. 
A statement on the right of assembly first appeared 
in a state constitution in the North Carolina Constitution 
^United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
2Ibid. 
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of 1776. Article XVIII states: 
That the people have a right to assemble together to 
consult for their common good, to instruct their Repre­
sentatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress 
of grievances. 
Today, only Virginia and Minnesota do not have specific con­
stitutional guarantees of the right of assembly. 
With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment con­
taining the "equal protection" and "due process" clauses, 
questions arose that the liberty protected should include at 
the very least, the freedom of speech and press mentioned in 
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court under jurisdiction of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment brought 
freedom of speech in the First Amendment under protection from 
impairment by the states in Gitlow v. New York in 1925. The 
Court followed by voiding a state law in Near v. Minnesota 
in 1931, because it denied due process by unreasonably re­
stricting freedom of the press.^ 
In DeJonge v. Oregon (19 37)^ the Court brought freedom 
of assembly under the same rule announced for freedom of speech 
^Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press , 1961), p. 15. 
4 
Easter C. Sweet, Civil Liberties in America (Princeton, 
N.J.: Van Nostrand Company, Inc. , 1966), p. 80. 
^DeJonge v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 353 (1937). 
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in Gitlow. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, speaking for* 
a unanimous Court in the DeJonge case, stated: 
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental 
rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution 
... The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate 
to those of free speech and equally fundamental ... The 
First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guar­
antees that right against abridgment by Congress. But ex­
plicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. 
For the right is one that cannot be denied without violat­
ing those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all civil and political institu­
tions , principles which the 14th Amendment embodies in 
the general terms of its due process clause ® 
The Court went even further in 1944, in a statement in 
Thomas v. Collins to the effect that First Amendment rights 
be accorded a preferred position in the American pattern of 
7 democracy. 
The exercise of freedom of speech so often involves a 
gathering of people, that conflicts often affect more than one 
right under the First Amendment. Because freedom of speech 
occupies a "preferred position" in the words of the Court, many 
decisions are made on the basis of this right; although, the 
freedom to assemble is also in question. This happened in 
Q 
civil rights cases such as Edwards v. South Carolina (1963). 
6Ibid. 
7 
Abernathy, op. cit., p. 16. 
^Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
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After assembling peaceably on the State House grounds to 
protest discriminatory actions against Negroes, the peti­
tioners were told they would be arrested if they did not dis­
perse in fifteen minutes. They continued their protest, were 
arrested and charged with breach of peace. The Court reversed 
the decision which had been upheld by the South Carolina Su­
preme Court. The Court held that South Carolina infringed on 
the petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free 
speech and assembly. The decision of the Court was based on 
the First Amendment freedoms, protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment from invasion by the states. 
The strategy used by civil rights groups has been adopted 
by both college and public school students. Thus the problem 
of the right of assembly in the public schools has been associ­
ated with protests, demonstrations, boycotts and sit-ins. 
Limitations can be placed on First Amendment rights as 
pointed out in the Court in DeJonge v. Oregon. If the right 
of assembly is used to incite violence or crime, the govern­
ment is free to take appropriate action against such conduct. 
However, assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime 
merely because those who exercise the right are despised or 
unpopular. 
A gathering of people together often creates problems 
which must be subject to some control in the interest of law 
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and order. A person may not; for example, call a meeting in 
the middle of a busy highway. Such things as noise, riots 
and traffic jams can be regulated so long as the regulation 
is not used as a cloak for stifling freedom of expression. 
ASSEMBLY 
The student's right peaceably to assemble has not 
arisen as a separate issue in the public secondary schools. 
It has arisen in connection with a number of court cases in­
volving freedom of expression or speech in the schools. 
The right of assembly has manifested itself most often 
in connection with boycotts, walkouts, sit-ins and demonstra­
tions. The authority of school officials has been challenged 
in the courts for suspending students for participating in the 
above named activities. The constitutional right of students 
to assemble and express themselves comes into conflict with 
the authority of the school to maintain order and discipline. 
The school does have the legal authority to prohibit activity 
that disrupts the educational process. 
Another issue is the challenge to injunctions that pro­
hibits certain activity in school or on school grounds. These 
temporary restraining orders issued by state courts have been 
upheld and overruled by the federal courts. Each case stands 
on its own merit. 
The federal courts have repeatedly affirmed the authori­
ty of the states and school officials, consistent with fundamen­
tal constitutional safeguards to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schools. The problem here comes when students in the exer­
cise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of school 
authorities. 
The Supreme Court said in Tinker that students may ex­
press an opinion in the cafeteria, on the playground, or in the 
hall; even on controversial subjects. However, any conduct 
which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial dis­
order or invasion of the rights of others is not immunized by 
the Constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment.9 
Since most cases involving right of assembly come to the 
courts usually after the suspension of students, this brings 
into the courts alleged violation of due process along with 
First Amendment rights. Due process will be mentioned in this 
chapter only in its relation to First Amendment rights. 
The claim of a First Amendment right was raised by a 
student in the Dunn v. Tyler Independent School District (1971) 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, U.S. 21 L Ed 2nd 781, 89 S. Ct. (1963) 
l^Dunn v. Tyler Independent School District, 327 F. 
Supp. 5287TT971). 
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case in Texas. The case arose over the protest of the elec­
tion procedure of cheerleaders by black students. The black 
students were suspended after they walked out of school and 
gathered around the flag pole. The United States District 
Court found the following school rule constitutionally defec­
tive . 
Any student who participates in a boycott, sit-in, 
stand-in, walk-out or other related forms of distraction 
shall by this action be subject to automatic 
suspension from school.H 
The court found the regulation defective, because it 
did not stress that it was limited to disruptive activity 
that materially interfered with the educational environment. 
The court in the decision did say: 
School district's interest in preventing substantial 
disorder and material disruption of classroom activity 
is of such compelling interest as to justify reasonable 
regulation which will have some impact upon speech and 
assembly rights.12 
In Farrell v^ Joel (1971),13 Molly Farrell, a high 
school sophomore, was suspended for participating in a sit-
down outside the school administrative offices. The incident 
occurred in Connecticut" and came before the Court of Appeals 
i:LIbid. , p. 533. 
12Ibid., p. 529. 
13Farrell v. Joel, 437 F. 2d 160 (1971). 
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in 1971. The sit-in was in protest to the suspension of three 
fellow students and involved approximately thirty students. 
The suspension was for violation of Rule 15 Cc) of the 
Clinton Board of Education Policies, which was read to the pro­
testers by the principal. The rule stated in part that: 
Pupils who walk out of school, sit-in, damage property, 
harass teachers will be dealt with as follows: 
ft ft ft A ft ft ft ft ft A ft ft ft ft it A A ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
2. Pupils who walk-out or sit-in will be given the oppor­
tunity to return to their classes and appoint designated 
leaders to meet with school officials to discuss and 
seek solutions to the problem. 
3. Pupils who fail to heed the warning to return to classes 
and continue the walk-out and/or sit-in, will be sus­
pended at once. I1* 
The Court affirming the decision of the lower court, 
upholding the decision stated: 
First Amendment does not guarantee right to substantially 
disrupt operation of a school; thus where substantive por­
tions of school rule governing suspension of students for 
participating in sit-in were reasonable, student's suspen­
sion under authority of rule was not invalid on ground that 
it had a significant chilling effect on exercise of First 
Amendment rights by other students. 
Two cases involving picketing recently heard by the 
United States Supreme Court polished up the Tinker doctrine 
and at the same time provided schoolmen with guidelines under 
which picketing may be banned on or near school grounds. Both 
cases concerned city ordinances prohibiting picketing on or 
1̂ Ibid., p. 161. 
15Ibid. , p. 160. 
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near schools. 
The first case occurred in Rockford, Illinois, in 
which the defendant was convicted of violating the city ordi­
nance by demonstrating in front of the senior high school. 
Mr. Justice Marshall speaking for the Court in the decision 
of Grayned v. City of Rockford (19 72):16 
held that city antinoise ordinance prohibiting a per­
son while on grounds adjacent to a building in which a 
school is in session from willfully making a noise or a 
diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or 
good order of the school session is not unconstitution­
ally vague or overbroad. 
Mr. Justice Marshall in reference to Tinker in the 
decision of the Court stated: 
But we nowhere suggested that students, teachers, or 
anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use 
all parts of a school building or its immediate environs 
for his unlimited expressive purposes. Expressive ac­
tivity could certainly be restricted but only if the for­
bidden conduct materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. 
The second case concerned a Chicago ordinance which 
said: 
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly 
pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet 
of any primary or secondary school building while the 
school is in session and one-half hour after the school 
has been concluded, provided, however, that this subsec­
tion does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any 
^Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S. Ct. 2294, (1972). 
17 
Ibid., p. 2304. 
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school involved in a labor dispute. 
The defendant was frequently a lone picket with a 
sign alleging racial discrimination. After the ordinance 
was passed, he filed suit in federal court alleging the 
statute was unconstitutional; because it was too broad and 
restricted free speech. 
The Supreme Court in this case, Police Department of 
City of Chicago v. Mosely (1972)^ did not follow the Tinker 
doctrine in ruling that the ordinance was too broad a re­
striction. It voided the ordinance on a point not even con­
sidered by lower courts: the special exception for labor 
disputes, an exception the Court considered arbitrary. Mr. 
Justice Marshall delivered the unanimous decision of the 
Court: 
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause,-
not to mention the First Amendment itself, government 
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views 
it finds acceptable but deny use to those wishing to ex­
press less favored or more controversial views. And it 
may not select which issues are worth discussing or de­
bating in public facilities.20 
Several cases involving higher education will be con­
sidered for they may have implications for future cases in­
volving the right of assembly in the public schools. The 
l8Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92(1972). 
19Ibid. 
20Ibid., p. 96. 
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first three cases will involve cases in state courts and are 
included here, because they are concerned with injunctions or 
temporary restraining orders limiting the rights of students. 
In the case of Board of Higher Education of the City 
of New York v. Marcus (1970)^1 Brooklyn College had been granted 
a temporary restraining order against disruptive student acti­
vity on the campus. The students in a counter motion asked the 
court to vacate the order. The court continued the temporary 
order in effect with a modification that permitted peaceful pro­
test, demonstration, and assembly on campus by the students. 
In the case of People v. Hariston (1970)^2 in Los Angeles 
County, an order of a university president was challenged. The 
court held that in view of the history of violence and disrup­
tion on a state university campus, an order by the president 
prohibiting "during the emergency" all demonstrations, assem­
blies, rallies and meetings in open forum or elsewhere, except 
for classes was constitutional. 
In a Florida case, Lieberman v. Marshall (1970)^3 the 
right of the university to deny recognition to Students for 
^Board of Higher Education of the City of New York v. 
Marcus, 311 N. Y. S. 2nd 579, (19707. 
2 2  People v. Hariston, 87 Cal. Reptr. 470, Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County, (1970). 
^Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 S. 2nd 120, Florida, (1970). 
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Democratic Society (SDS) was held valid. The court did not 
decide the question of whether any student group could use 
campus buildings without permission, but in ruling against 
the SDS motion the court said: 
The rights of students must be balanced against the 
right of the university to maintain order and respect 
for fair rules, and its need to pursue educational goals 
without disturbance. The court found this balancing re­
sulted in favor of the university, and the activities of 
SDS and^its members fell beyond the limits of protected 
speech. 
The next three cases have been decided by the Federal 
Courts. The first case is Hammond v. South Carolina State 
College (1967).̂ 5 The case involved the suspension of students 
at South Carolina State who assembled to express themselves 
against certain practices of the college. 
The district court held that a rule promulgated by 
college authorities prohibiting "parades, celebrations, and 
demonstrations" without prior approval of college authorities 
was a prior restraint on the right of freedom of speech and 
assembly, and was incompatible with the First Amendment and 
therefore invalid. 
Judge Hemphill stated in his decision: 
Unless the officials have authority to keep order, they 
have no power to guarantee education ... 
2tfIbid. 
^Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 
947 (19677: 
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colleges, like all other institutions, are subject to the 
Constitution.^ ® 
In the Wisconsin Student Association v. Regents of 
2 7 University of Wisconsin (1970) case at issue was the use 
of sound-amplifying equipment. The court held that a state 
statute which delegated unrestricted discretion to the admini­
strative head of an educational institution to decide whether 
sound-amplifying equipment may be used in educational or ad­
ministrative buildings owned or controlled by a state insti­
tution was declared unconstitutional, since there was an ab­
sence of standards to govern the exercise of discretion by 
the administrative officer. 
As a result of student protest, demonstrations, sit-ins, 
and walk-outs many state legislatures, including North Carolina, 
have passed bills involving trespass and disorderly conduct. 
The North Carolina law will be considered later in the chapter. 
p p 
In Tennessee, the case of Baxter v. Ellington (1970) ° 
involved rulings on several Tennessee statutes in regard to dis­
orderly conduct. Baxter was a student leader at the University 
of Tennessee and Ellington the governor. The court upheld one part 
of the statutes, modified one part and held one unconstitutional. 
26Ibid., p. 949. 
^Wisconsin Student Association v. Regents of University 
of Wisconsin, 318 F. Supp. 591, (1970). 
2̂ Baxter v. Ellington, 318 F. Supp. 1079 (1970). 
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This part of the statute made one guilty of trespass, if he 
failed to leave an educational building or grounds when ordered 
to do so by an administrative official. This was declared to 
constitute a prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms. 
ASSOCIATION 
The issue of students' right of association arose in 
the state courts in the early 1900's. The controversy centered 
around secret societies and fraternities; it resulted in pas­
sage of anti-fraternity laws in at least twenty-five states. 
Local boards of education in most of the other twenty-five 
states adopted policies prohibiting such organizations. 
The first recorded case was adjudicated in Washington 
in 1906. The case resulted from a school board regulation 
denying fraternity members the right to participate in extra­
curricular activities. Even though the fraternity met outside 
school hours, the state court upheld the board regulation. 
Several similar cases followed upholding school board 
regulations. The legal precedent was reversed in a Missouri 
case in 1922. This was the first and only time an anti-
fraternity rule was declared illegal by a court. 
One of the key cases on the issue arose in North Caro­
lina in 1944. Students in Durham were required to sign pledge 
cards of non-affiliation with secret societies. Those who re­
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fused to sign the pledges were denied participation in extra­
curricular activities. The court upheld the school rule and 
emphasized that attendance at a public school is not an abso­
lute right, since students are subject to all school rules 
and regulations. 
Despite the firmness of the North Carolina decision, 
other cases reached the state courts. An Oregon case in 19 52 
resulted from a regulation subjecting students to suspensions 
or expulsions for joining secret societies. The plaintiffs 
contended the rule violated the right of assembly. The state 
court in upholding the board regulation called attention to 
the fact that by enrolling in and attending the public schools, 
the pupils came under the control and discipline of school of­
ficials. Other cases followed with the courts upholding school 
2 9 board regulations. 
One must realize these were state cases and most occurred 
before the civil rights movement in the 1960's. The Brown v. 
30 Board of Education (19 54) decision made education a right 
which had to be made available to all on equal terms. This 
case and the Civil Rights Act of 196 4 marked the beginning of 
a procession of school related issues in the federal courts. 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure 
(Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Company, 196*87, pp. 211-214. 
30Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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These cases involving association also occurred be­
fore the Tinker decision in 196 7. This was a landmark deci­
sion in the area of student constitutional rights and any en­
suing challenge on the issue of association would certainly 
weigh the applicability of Tinker to the issue. 
ANALYSIS 
Since the First Amendment right of assembly is so 
closely related to that of speech and expression it is diffi­
cult to get an accurate and clear picture of students' right 
to assemble in the public schools. 
The second problem that exists is the problem of de­
fining a peaceable assembly. The definition often depends 
on the opinion of those in authority. It is in this context 
that courts must decide reasonableness of rules in relation 
to the rights of students. 
The courts made it quite clear in Tinker v. Pes 
Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and 
other decisions that students do not give up their constitu­
tional rights at the school house gate. In Tinker the Court 
stated: 
In our system, state operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not 
possess absolute authority over their students. Stu­
dents in school as well as out of school are persons 
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under our Constitution.3-*• 
Several implications to school administrators should 
be evident as a result of Tinker and other court decisions. 
First, students may not be punished on the presumption that 
an act might cause disruption. Second, students may express 
objection to or rejection of any issue as long as it does not 
result in disruption of class. Thirdly, the concept of in 
loco parentis has been eroded as it relates to free speech 
and non-disruptive types of protest. The administrator's dis­
agreement with the student's words is no longer sufficient 
q o 
grounds for punishment. 
On the other side of the question, the courts have 
clearly stated that unreasonable and disruptive behavior will 
not be tolerated in the schools. This was shown in the Black-
well case in 1966. This Mississippi case involving the wearing 
of freedom buttons in a high school saw the District Court up­
hold the school rule forbidding buttons. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision 
and in its decision noted that school authorities have the 
right to prohibit and punish acts undermining school routine. 
31 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393, UTS. 503 (1969). 
32 
National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
"A Principal's View of The Tinker Case," The Bulletin, 
Vol. 55 (February, 19 71), p. 73. 
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It also stated that the student's constitutional right of 
free speech is not absolute, but must be balanced against the 
3 3 need for school order. 
Burnside (1966) was another Mississippi case involv­
ing the wearing of freedom buttons. In this case, the court 
held that the school rule was arbitrary and unreasonable since 
the wearing of the buttons did not cause disruption. The 
court stated in the decision: 
The liberty of expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment can be abridged by state officials if their 
protection of legitimate state interest necessitates 
an invasion of free speech. The interest of a state 
in maintaining an educational system is a compelling 
one, giving rise to a balancing of First Amendment 
rights with the duty of the state to further and pro­
tect the public school system. 
The Tinker decision which gave wide latitude to school 
demonstrators has been modified by the Supreme Court in 
Grayned v. City of Rockford and Police Department of City of 
Chicago v. Mosley. Within the guidelines of these two cases, 
communities can adopt special, limited, and non-discriminatory 
regulations forbidding noisy - or even peaceful - demonstrations, 
3 3 Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Educatxon, 
363 F. 2d 749 (1966). 
3̂ Burnside v^_ Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966). 
35 . 
Ibid. 
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36 while schools are in session. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacted legis­
lation in 19 71 covering riots and civil disorders. In light 
of the decision in Baxter v. Ellington in Tennessee, section 
four and five of the North Carolina statute will probably be 
challenged in the courts. Parts of Article 36A entitled 
Riots and Civil Disorders follow: 
14-288.4. Disorderly conduct. - (a) Disorderly con­
duct is a public disturbance caused by any person who: 
it it it it i': i- it it it it it i; it it it it it it it it it it it it it i: 
(3) Takes possession of, exercises control over, or 
seizes any building or facility of any public or 
private educational institution without the speci­
fic authority of the chief administrative officer 
of the institution, or his authorized representa­
tive; or 
(4) Refuses to vacate any building or facility of any 
public or private educational institution in 
obedience to: 
a. An order of the chief administrative offices, 
the institution or his authorized representa­
tive, or; 
(5) Shall after being forbidden to do so by the chief 
administrative officer, or his authorized represen­
tative , of any public or private educational insti­
tution : 
a. Engage in any sitting, kneeling, lying down, or 
inclining so as to obstruct the ingress or egress 
of any person entitled to the use of any build­
ing or facility of the institution in its normal 
and intended use; or 
36 
Lawrence W. Knowles, "High Court Uses Picketing to 
Tinker with Tinker," Nations Schools, Vol. 90 (November, 
1972), p. 17. 
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b. Congregate, assemble, form groups or formations 
(whether organized or not:, block, or in any 
manner otherwise interfere with the operation 
or functioning of any building or facility of 
the institution so as to interfere with the cus­
tomary or normal use of the building or facility. 
As used in this section the term "building or 
facility" includes the surrounding grounds and 
premises of any building or facility used in 
connection with the operation or functioning of 
such building or facility.^7 
Violation is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not 
to exceed $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months. 
The American Civil Liberties Union believes that if 
secondary school students are to become citizens trained in 
the democratic process; they must be given every opportunity 
to participate in the school and community, with rights par­
allel to those of adult citizens. In a broad sense, students 
are entitled to freedom of expression, of assembly, of peti­
tion, due process and equal treatment under the law. 
The difference in age between secondary school and 
college students suggests the need for a greater degree of 
advice, counsel, and supervision by the faculty in the high 
schools than is appropriate for the college and university. 
It is the responsibility of faculty and administra­
tion to decide when a situation requires a limit on freedom 
from harsh consequences. In exercising that responsibility, 
North Carolina, Public School Laws of North 
Carolina (Charlottesville, Va. : The Michie Company, 1971), 
p. 230. 
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certain fundamental principles should be accepted in order 
to prevent the use of administrative discretion to eliminate 
legitimate freedom. The principles are: 
(1)A recognition that freedom implies the right to 
make mistakes and that students must therefore 
sometimes be permitted to act in ways which are 
predictably unwise so long as the consequences 
of their acts are not dangerous to life and pro­
perty, and do not seriously disrupt the academic 
process. 
(2) A recognition that students in their schools should 
have the right to live under the principle of "rule 
by law" as opposed to "rule by personality." To 
protect this right, rules and regulations should be 
in writing. Students have the right to know the 
extent and limits of the faculty's authority and, 
therefore, the powers that are reserved for the 
students and the responsibilities that they should 
accept. Their rights should not be compromised by 
faculty members who while ostensibly acting as con­
sultants or counselors are, in fact, exercising 
authority to censor student expression and inquiry. 
(3) A recognition that deviation from the opinions 
and standards deemed desirable by the faculty is 3g 
not ipso facto a danger to the educational process. 
The right peaceably to assemble is constitutionally 
bracketed with the right to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances. Accordingly, individual students and 
student organizations should be permitted to hold meetings 
in school rooms or auditoriums, or at outdoor locations on 
American Civil Liberties Union, Academic Freedom 
in the Secondary Schools (New York: American Civil Liberties 
Union, 1968) , p. 10. 
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school grounds. In such meetings, students should be free 
to discuss, pass resolutions, and take other lawful action 
respecting any matter which concerns them. Such assemblages 
should not be limited to the form of audience meetings; any 
variety of demonstration, whether it be a picket line, a walk­
out, or any other peaceful type, should be permissible. The 
school administration is justified in requiring that meetings 
or demonstrations be held at times that will not disrupt 
classes or other school activities and in places where there 
will be no hazards to persons or property. The administra­
tion may also require advance notice when necessary to avoid 
conflicts and arrange for faculty supervision.39 
The American Civil Liberties Union released a later 
statement in April of 1969. It warned student protest leaders 
and their followers against lawlessness and violence that 
could lead to backlash and counterviolence. The ACLU pointed 
out that it was committed to the protection of all peaceful, 
nonobstructive forms of protest, including mass demonstra­
tions, picketing, and rallies. The organization was, however, 
disturbed about methods that some student activists have used 
in an attempt to achieve their ends. These methods violate 
39Ibid., p. 15. 
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and subvert the basic principles of freedom of expression 
and academic freedom. 
The ACLU said: 
Protest that deprives others of the opportunity to 
speak or be heard, that requires physical take-over of 
buildings to disrupt the educational process, or the 
incarceration of administrators and others are anti-
civil-libertarian and incompatible with the nature 
and high purpose of an educational institution.1+0 
Assemblies are recommended to give students an oppor­
tunity to voice concerns and/or frustrations. Such assemblies 
could be both highly educational and serve as emotional out­
lets. The principal and key staff members should attend 
assemblies, participate in discussion and answer questions. 
The principal in the Farrell v. Joel case called an assembly 
to keep a small protest rrom developing into a large demonstra^ 
tion. 
Institutional control of campus facilities must not 
be used as a device for censorship. A committee made up of 
student, faculty and administration should draw up written 
procedures for organizational use of institutional facilities. 
National School Public Relations Association, High 
School Student Unrest (Washington: National School Public 
Relations Association, 1969), p. 23. 
41Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor, Student Unrest: 
Threat or Promise (Washington: Association For Supervision And 
Curriculum Development, NEA, 19 70), pp. 91, 92. 
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Such procedures should be designed only to facilitate schedul­
ing and to permit adequate preparation. The procedures may 
include regulations on timing of request and the proper main­
tenance of facilities. The actual assignment function may be 
delegated to an administrative official with the committee 
U 2 retaining the right to hear appeals. 
Another consideration in the secondary school is the 
requirement of student organizations to obtain faculty ad­
visers. The function of the adviser is to counsel, not con­
trol. Faculty, students and administration should all be 
aware of this role. In order to function, the adviser must 
not be held responsible for the actions of the group he 
counsels.^^ 
Today, the question of association in the secondary 
schools revolves around student organizations. This question 
has not reached the federal courts. In several cases before 
the United States Supreme Court involving the NAACP, the 
Court pointed out that the Constitution protects expression 
and association without regard to the race, creed or political 
42 NEA Task Force on Student Involvement, Code of 
Student Rights and Responsibilities (Washington : National 
Education Association, 1971), p. IT. 
H3 . 
Ibid., p. 18. 
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or religious affiliation of the members of the group.1+11 
The issue of association becomes complex, because it 
involves not only the First Amendment, but also the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 19 64. The right of 
association falls into the same category with the right of 
expression and assembly. 
Alternatives to the traditional school day for public 
secondary students will have bearing on the issue of assembly 
and association. The traditional school day finds the student 
in class or study hall each period of the day. 
One of these alternatives is the open campus concept 
where students are not in class each period, but have free time 
during the school day. The only criteria limiting any gather­
ing of students would seem to be activity that disrupted the 
educational process of the school. Students would have free­
dom of movement, but would also have the responsibility of 
deciding how to best use their time. 
Another alternate concept is that of independent study. 
Students would be free to work in the media center, the lounge 
or any other acceptable place on campus. The only limitation 
would be consulting with the instructor and a specified time 
period within which to complete an assignment. 
NEA Task Force on Student Involvement, op. cit., p. 16. 
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Finally, there is the alternate school; such as the 
Parkway Project in Philadelphia where there is no school 
building. Students meet in the community and this school 
and others like it are called schools without walls. Here 
the question of assembly becomes a daily one of where to meet 
as a group. 
The constitutional right of assembly must be viewed 
in the framework of the organizational and instructional pat­
tern of the school. These alternate patterns may remove the 
question of the right of assembly and association as well as 
other issues from the courtroom back to educational planning 
within the school. 
CHAPTER V 
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE : FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Until recently the right of school officials to search 
a student's person or his locker had been little questioned. 
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, as applied to the states and their in­
stitutions through the Fourteenth Amendment, was generally 
thought inapplicable. 
The schools exercised this right under the in loco 
parentis doctrine which holds that parents transfer authority 
over the child to school officials while he attends class. 
This places great responsibility on the school admini­
strator who must act for the welfare of the child. The re­
sponsibility becomes more difficult with the growing problem 
of illegal drugs, bomb threats and weapons in the school. In 
addition, the decision to search a student or his locker en­
tails the risk of bringing a legal action where the school 
official could be charged with violation of the student's 
constitutional rights. 
The following review of legal precedents and recent 
court decisions concerned with cases involving alleged illegal 
search should be helpful to the school administrator in es­
tablishing guidelines to decide when to search a student or 
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his locker. 
The first Ten Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States, Bill of Rights, were to protect the individual 
rights of citizens from infringement by the Federal Government. 
These rights were not protected from state action unless in­
cluded in the state constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or af­
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The provisions of the Fourth Amendment can be traced 
back to the injustices suffered by American colonists under 
the British. During the colonial period, the British king 
permitted his judges to issue writs of assistance which were 
blanket search warrants.^ 
With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment it 
was assumed that provisions of the first eight amendments would 
be made applicable to the states by the due process clause. 
This was not interpreted as such by the United States Supreme 
1 
Frank K. Kelly, Your Freedoms : The Bill of Rights 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 96. 
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Court for many years. 
The case of Boyd v. United States (18 86)2 was the first 
in which the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment protection. The decision of the Court was significant 
in that it tied together the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to make 
a search unreasonable if it resulted in self incrimination. 
In Weeks v. United States (1914)^ a conviction in a lower 
court was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, because 
Week's home had been searched by a U. S. Marshall without a 
search warrant. In the opinion the Court said that the action 
of the marshall was in direct violation of the constitutional 
rights of the accused. The decision resulted in the "Week's 
rule." This rule excluded illegally seized evidence in Federal 
Courts. Some states voluntarily adopted the rule, but most did 
not and so evidence illegally obtained was still permitted in 
state courts. 
Olmstead v. United States (1928 >^ brought the question 
of wiretapping to the Court. The decision in the case was 
that wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
2 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
^Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
^Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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In Wolf v. Colorado (1949)^ the Court was urged to make 
the rule of the Weeks case obligatory on the states. The Court 
refused to do so and Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion 
stated: 
We hold, therefore, that in prosecution in a state court 
for a state crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid 
the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search 
and seizure.^ 
This issue came before the Court once again in Rochin 
v. California (1952).^ The Court bypassed the issue of illegal 
search by ruling that due process had been violated by methods 
that "shock the conscience." 
Rochin was suspected of selling narcotics and three 
deputy sheriffs went into his bedroom and saw two capsules on 
a night stand beside the bed. Rochin put the capsules in his 
mouth. The deputies tried, but were unsuccessful in extracting 
the capsules. He was taken handcuffed to the hospital and at 
the direction of one of the officers, his stomach was pumped. 
The two capsules were recovered and found to contain morphine. 
Rochin was convicted and sentenced to sixty days. 
The United States Supreme Court in reversing the deci­
sion of the state court found these methods to be too close to 
5Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
6Ibid. 
7Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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the rack and screw. 
In a five to four decision in Irvine v. California (1948)8 
the Court upheld the admission of evidence obtained by wire­
tapping in state courts. The majority opinion held that this 
was not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment in state cases. 
In Mapp v. Ohio (19 61),9 the Court in a five to four de­
cision made the provisions of the Fourth Amendment applicable 
to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Justice Clark in the majority opinion stated: 
. . . . right to privacy no less important than free 
speech, free press, fair public trials, etc. 
. . . .  o u r  h o l d i n g  t h a t  t h e  e x c l u s i o n a r y  r u l e  i s  a n  
essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also 
makes very good sense. 
The Court looked at the fact that it was thirty-five 
years from the time of the Weeks' rule to the Wolf case in 1949. 
In Wolf the Court had ruled that the Fourth Amendment could be 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
was not done and the Mapp decision removed the double standard 
as applied to state and federal courts. 
^Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
9Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
10Ibid. 
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The question of wiretapping continued to pose a pro­
blem for the Court and is still permitted today under certain 
guidelines set down by the Congress and the Court. 
Prior to the In re Gault (1967J11 decision the courts 
had for many years operated under the philosophy that procedu­
ral safeguards were not necessary in juvenile proceedings. 
The Gault decision was a landmark case in that it was 
the first time the United States Supreme Court considered the 
constitutional rights of children in juvenile courts. The 
Court ruled that Juvenile courts must grant to children many 
of the procedural protections required in adult criminal trials 
by the Bill of Rights. 
Justice Abe Fortas in the majority opinion stated: 
. . . Neither Fourteenth Amendment nor Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone. 
. . . The United States Constitution would guarantee 
him rights and protections with respect to arrest, search 
and seizure and pretrial interrogation.-^ 
Justice Fortas with this statement in Gault made the 
Fourth Amendment right of search and seizure applicable to 
juvenile proceedings. The Gault case did not involve search 
and seizure, but it is significant in the extension of this 
right of juveniles. 
1XIri re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). 
12Ibid., p. 1W. 
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An example of the application of this Fourth Amend­
ment right can be found in a North Carolina case that occurred 
in Alamance County. The case of Bumper v. State of North 
Carolina (1968)^3 finally reached the Unites States Supreme 
Court on writ of certiorari. 
Bumper, a sixteen year old black boy who lived with his 
grandmother, was convicted in superior court of rape and felon­
ious assault. The implicating evidence in the trial was a rifle 
found by authorities in the grandmother's home, where the boy 
resided. The authorities had gained entrance into the house by 
telling the grandmother they had a search warrant. However, 
the search warrant was never shown to the grandmother. 
The decision of the superior court was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina which affirmed the decision of 
the lower court. The case then went to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision and 
Mr. Justice Stewart in the majority opinion stated: 
Search conducted in reliance upon search warrant cannot 
later be justified on basis of consent where warrant turns 
out to be invalid or state does not attempt to rely on va­
lidity of warrant or to show that there was, in fact, any 
warrant at all. 
Bumper v. State of North Carolina, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968). 
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Law enforcement officers claiming authority to search 
a house under a search warrant announces, in effect, that 
occupant has no right to resist search, and therefore, 
situation is instinct with coercion, albeit colorably law­
ful coercion, and hence, there cannot be consent to search. 4̂ 
The probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
has been rarely raised in the lower courts as it applies to 
the detention of juveniles by authorities. In Baldwin v. 
Lewis (1969) 5̂ the Wisconsin Court held that the probable cause 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment did apply to a juvenile 
who was taken into custody. 
The question of the right of school officials to search 
students is not a new one for the courts. The Gault decision 
has raised the constitutional question of the protection of 
juveniles from unreasonable search and seizure. The right of 
school officials to search both students and student lockers 
is being challenged today. 
1 6 
The case of Phillips v. Johns (19 30) involved a young 
boy and girl who were searched after twenty-one dollars was 
taken from a teacher's pocketbook. The principal searched the 
boy and the woman teacher, the fourteen year old girl. The 
teacher told the girl she was looking for notes written by the 
girl. The girl had to remove her clothes during the search. 
1HIbid., p. 1792. 
Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (1969). 
^Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354 (1930). 
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It turned out that neither the boy nor girl who was searched 
had taken the money. 
The girl learned later the real reason for the search. 
She was too ashamed to go back to school. Her mother trans­
ferred her to another school and brought charges against the 
teacher. 
The jury upheld the right of school officials to con­
duct such a search and held that: 
A school teacher stands in loco parentis, and when 
a child is charged with taking money the teacher has 
a right to search the child the same as a parent would 
have in order to remove suspicion.-^ 
On appeal the appellate court reversed the decision 
and declared that the search was illegal. It ruled that even 
though the search was made in good faith and without violence, 
it was made for the benefit of the teacher and not the child. 
18 In another Tennessee case, Marlar v. Bill (1944), 
a ten year old child entered a classroom during recess in vio­
lation of school rules. He lied to the teacher and was turned 
over to the superintendent. He was punished by the superinten­
dent. Shortly afterwards, a dime was reported missing in class 
and the teacher searched this same boy's pocket. 
17Ibid. 
18MarTar v. Bill, 178 S.W. 2d 634 (1944). 
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An action was brought on behalf of the ten year old 
student on a charge of an illegal search by school personnel. 
The teacher explained in court that she had searched the child 
not to find the money, but to remove suspicion since he had 
lied earlier about being in the room. 
The trial court found for the teacher and the decision 
was upheld by the appellate court. The appellate court ruled 
that unlike the Phillips case, the search was to clear the 
child of suspicion and was not to recover the money and there­
by benefit a third party. The court found the search per-
• • 1Q 
missable because it was done for the benefit of the child. 
Two recent state cases, both involving drugs, give 
some guidelines on the search of a student by school officials. 
2 0 In a New York case, People v. Jackson (1971), a high 
school coordinator of discipline, alerted to possible drug use, 
asked a student to go with him to his office. On the way the 
student broke and ran from the building pursued by the coordi­
nator who with the assistance of a policeman caught the student 
after a three block chase. The. coordinator confiscated various 
drug apparatus from the student and turned them over to the 
policeman. At the trial the court disallowed the evidence on 
19Ibid. 
2°People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S. 2nd 731 (1971) 
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the grounds that the coordinator was acting as a governmental 
official and searched the student without probable cause. 
The appellate court reversed the decision on the basis 
of the high school standing in loco parentis to the student. 
The court stated that the evidence would have been inadmissi­
ble, if the search had been made by the policeman. The coordi­
nator because of his relationship to the student was not bound 
by the probable cause doctrine and had a duty to investigate 
suspicions of illegal narcotics use. The court went even fur­
ther ruling that this duty extended beyond the physical limi­
tations of the school grounds. 
In another state case, State of Delaware v. Baccino 
(1971),a high school assistant principal while trying to 
get a student to return to class seized his coat. Because he 
had been suspected of previous drug use, the school official 
made a search of his coat. He discovered narcotics and the 
student was arrested. 
An attempt was made to suppress the evidence on the 
grounds that the assistant principal, as a state official, 
made the search without probable cause and therefore the evi­
dence was inadmissible, stating: 
. . . that a principal is not a private individual for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but that his actions are 
91 
State of Delaware v. Baccino, Del. Super., 282 A. 2d 
869 <197lTl 
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those of a state official and are subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. This does not mean, however, that the entire 
law of search and seizure as it applies in the criminal 
law is automatically incorporated into the school system 
of this state. The Fourth Amendment is the line which 
protects the privacy of individuals including students, 
but only after taking into account the interests of soci­
ety. In Delaware a principal stands in loco parentis to. 
pupils under his charge for disciplinary action, at least 
for purposes which are consistent with the need to main­
tain an effective educational atmosphere.22 
The court said the in loco parentis doctrine must be 
balanced against student's Fourth Amendment rights to deter­
mine if these rights have been violated. The court ruled: 
(The) in loco parentis doctrine is so compelling in 
light of public necessity and as a social concept ante­
dating the Fourth Amendment, that ... a search, taken 
thereupon on reasonable suspicion should be accepted as 
necessary and reasonable . . . This standard should ade­
quately protect the student from arbitrary searches and 
give school officials enough leeway to fulfill their 
duties.23 
The court in its decision denied the motion to suppress 
the evidence on the basis that the vice-principal had reason­
able suspicion to believe that defendant's jacket contained 
contraband. 
The problem of search and seizure is not only a consti­
tutional issue, but presents a real problem to school admini­
strators and teachers. The Fourth Amendment protects against 
unreasonable search and seizure, but the Constitution does not 
22Tbid., p. 871. 
23Ibid., p. 872. 
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define what constitutes unreasonable or illegal search. 
The principal or teacher must therefore decide whether or 
not to search a student, his desk or locker. 
The problem is made more complex in today's schools 
by the problem of drugs, bomb threats and weapons such as 
knives and guns. 
One author states: 
While the student is under his jurisdiction, the admini­
strator's responsibility and relationship with the child 
is that of in loco parentis, and he must act for the wel­
fare of the child. The administrator or teacher, in his 
role as supervisor of children, has assumed the serious 
obligation of protecting the student from injuring him­
self or injuring others^ He must also act to protect the 
child's best interests. 
Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, parental au­
thority over the student is transferred to school officials 
while a youth attends class. This doctrine permits school 
officials to use whatever means a reasonable parent would em­
ploy in disciplining the student. 
The doctrine of in loco parentis has recently been 
eroded by the federal courts. The United States Supreme Court 
in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent School District (1969)^ 
recognized and acknowledged that students, like adults, have 
rights which "do not stop at the school house gate." While 
^Charles M. Wetterer, "Search and Seizure in Public 
Schools," Nolpe School Law Journal, Volume 1 (Springy 1971), p.21. 
2 5 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 89 
S. Ct. 737 (196977 
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some rudiments of _in loco parentis still exist, judges have 
interpreted the First Amendment as giving students increased 
freedom of the press and enlarging their right to speak. 
The Gault decision extended the Fourth Amendment right 
of protection against unreasonable search and seizure to ju­
veniles. The question to be considered here is whether this 
prohibits school personnel from inspecting lockers. 
First to be considered will be cases that have reached 
the Federal Courts. In Fiazzola v. Watkins (1970)̂ 6 the United 
States Middle District Court in Alabama in 19 70 held: 
It is settled law that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit reasonable searches when the search is conducted 
by a superior charged with a responsibility of maintain­
ing discipline and order or of maintaining security.27 
The court also stated: 
A student is subject only to reasonable rules and re­
gulations, but his rights must yield to the extent that 
they would interfere with the institution's fundamental «_ 
duty to operate the school as an educational institution. 
9 Q 
The case of Overton v. Rieger (1970) in New York 
started when Dr. Panitz, the vice principal, was presented by 
three detectives of the Mount Vernon Police Department with a 
26Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (1970). 
27Ibid., p. 626. 
28 
Ibid., p. 628. 
^Overton v. Rieger, 311 F. Supp. 1035 (1970). 
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search warrant. The warrant seemingly authorized a search of 
two students and their lockers. The boys were searched and 
nothing found; but because of the suspicion, the vice princi­
pal opened the school locker of one of the boys, Carlos Overton, 
and found four marijuana cigarettes. The warrant was later 
declared defective as to school lockers, but the evidence was 
allowed on the grounds that the vice principal had voluntarily 
consented to the search of the student's locker and had the 
right to do so. 
The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in New York 
reversed Overton's conviction saying that since the consent 
for the search was induced by the search warrant, it was not 
freely given. 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate 
Term and reinstated the original conviction. The court in 
Overton said: 
The power of Dr. Panitz to give his consent to this 
search arises out of the distinct relationship between 
school authorities and students. The school authorities 
have an obligation to maintain discipline over the stu­
dents. It is recognized that, when large numbers of teen­
agers are gathered together in such an environment, their 
inexperience and lack of mature judgment can often create 
hazards to each other. Parents, who surrender their chil­
dren to this type of environment, in order that they may 
continue developing both intellectually and socially, have 
a right to expect certain safeguards. 
Indeed, it is doubtful if a school would be properly 
discharging its duty of supervision over the students, if 
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it failed to retain control over the lockers.^0 
The case was appealed to: the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court in a brief unsigned opinion, vacated the judgment of 
the New York Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the 
New York Courts for further consideration in light of another 
United States Supreme Court decision, Bumper v. North Carolina. 
This case held that a search cannot be justified as lawful on 
the basis of consent where that "consent" has been given only 
after the official conducting the search has asserted that he 
possesses a search warrant. 
In a rehearing of the Overton case by the New York Court 
of Appeals the court in a four - three decision reaffirmed 
their previous decision and held that the Bumper decision was 
not relevent in the Overton case, because Dr. Panitz obviously 
consented to the search and was not coerced by the search warrant. 
It is a noteworthy case, since it is most unusual for a state 
court to find contrary to the obvious desires of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
State cases in Kansas and California were also concerned 
with the legality of locker searches. 
The case of State v. Stein (1969was refused certiorari 
by the United States Supreme Court which allowed the decision of 
3°Tbid., p. 10 38. 
^State v. Stein, 203 Kansas 638, ̂ 56 P. 2d 1 (1969). 
127 
Kansas Supreme Court to stand. 
The Stein case grew out of an incident involving police 
officers who requested a high school principal to open a stu­
dent's locker. A key was found which led to stolen goods in 
a bus station locker. Though he had agreed to the search of 
his locker, the student contended that the evidence obtained 
could not be used against him, because he had not been given 
the Miranda warning before the search, see (Appendix A). This 
warning is the explanation of one's rights by the police. The 
court ruled that the Miranda warning was not applicable to 
search and seizure generally, and to school student lockers 
specifically. 
The court sustained the legality of the search since 
prior approval had been given by the student and the student 
did not have exclusive ownership of the locker. The court in 
Stein said: 
Although a student may have control of his school locker 
against his fellow student, his possession is not exclusive 
against the school and its officials. A school does not 
supply its students with lockers for illicit use in harbor­
ing pilfered property or harmful substances. We deem it a 
proper function of school authorities to inspect the lockers 
under their control and to prevent their use in illicit 
ways or for illegal purposes. We believe the right of 
inspection is inherent in the authority vested in school 
administration and that the same must be retained and exer­
cised in the management of our schools, if their educational 
functions are to be maintained and the welfare of the student 
body pres erved.^ ̂ 
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In a California case, In re Donaldson (1969):,33 a high 
school assistant principal, acting on information from a stu­
dent, conducted a search of a student locker and seized mari­
juana. The search was conducted without a search warrant and 
without the student's consent. The student was convicted in 
juvenile court, but the decision was appealed on the basis that 
the marijuana was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure 
conducted by a school official who was a governmental official 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The California Court of Appeals found in Donaldson that: 
. . . the vice principal of the high school (was) not. ; . 
a government official within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment so as to bring into play its prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizures .... that the school 
official's search was not to obtain conviction, but to se­
cure evidence of student misconduct .... (that) school 
officials . . . have a responsibility for maintaining order 
upon the school premises so that the education, teaching 
and training of the students may be accomplished in an at­
mosphere of law and order.^ 
The court did say that had the principal and police 
jointly searched the locker, the search would have been tainted 
with state action; therefore, illegal. 
The law generally allows administrators to search lockers, 
but it is not a carte blanche right. School officials are 
33 
In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969). 
â Ibid., p. 222. 
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charged by the state with operating the school, and safe­
guarding the health, welfare and safety of students; therefore, 
when drugs, weapons, or other dangerous material is suspect, 
the principal not only has the right, but duty to make a 
thorough investigation. 
Dr. H. C. Hudgins, associate professor of school law, 
Temple University, points out that the courts have not answered 
specifically if teachers may conduct locker searches. It is 
wise, therefore, to limit this responsibility to the principal 
or to a person delegated with specific administrative assign­
ments . 
Hudgins also states that while it is recognized that 
administrators can search lockers, they should be prudent in 
doing so. He recommends that the student be present when his 
locker is searched and that a third party be present as a wit-
35 ness. 
Eric Olson, an attorney, writing for the National Asso­
ciation of Secondary School Principals listed four circumstances 
for a lawful locker search by school officials: 
1. The search is based on reasonable grounds for believing 
that something contrary to school rules or significantly 
detrimental to the school and its students will be found 
in that locker. 
35 
H. C. Hudgins, Jr., "Locker Searches and the Law," 
Today's Education 60:8 (November, 1971), p. 31. 
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2. The information leading to the search and seizure are 
independent of the police. 
3. The primary purpose of the search is to secure evidence 
of student misconduct for school disciplinary purposes, 
although it may be contemplated that in appropriate cir­
cumstances the evidence would also be made available to 
the police. If evidence of a crime or grounds for a juve­
nile proceeding is lawfully obtained by school personnel, 
it may be turned over to the police and used by them. 
The school has keys or combinations to the lockers 
and the students are on some form of prior notice that 
the school reserves the right to search the lockers.^ 
The courts have also held that police officers with a 
valid warrant may make a search of a student locker in connec­
tion with a valid arrest. The principal or other school offi­
cial should be present at the time of the search. Parents 
should also be notified. In all instances a complete written 
report of the incident should be immediately recorded. 
The Gault decision in 1967 did not answer all questions 
about the rights of juveniles. It was in effect only the first 
step in defining the constitutional rights of juveniles. Only 
Justice Douglas and Justice Black have advocated the same appli­
cation of the Bill of Rights for both adults and juveniles. 
The Supreme Court will deal with the question of the constitu­
tional rights of juveniles on a case by case method. 
The precedent case of the juvenile right of protection 
Eric Olson, "Student Rights - Locker Searches," The 
Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School 
Principalis, 55 :352 (February, 19 71), pp. 47-48. 
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from unreasonable search and seizure remains the Bumper v. 
North Carolina case. This case was cited by the Court in 
remanding the Overton case back to the New York Courts. The 
refusal of the Court to grant certiorari in the Stein case 
seems to leave the question of search and seizure in the state 
courts unless due process is violated. 
While upholding the right of school officials to search 
student lockers, the cases do suggest that a school should 
publicize its locker policy, see (Appendix A). A reservation 
of right to search a student's locker should be published, 
stating that the administration retains the right to search stu­
dent lockers, if such is necessary to maintain the integrity of 
37 
the school environment and to protect other students. 
Still another question that remains unanswered is a 
search that does not satisfy Fourth Amendment standards, by 
school officials, of either a locker or a student's person to 
obtain evidence as a basis for suspending or expelling a stu­
dent. One writer on the subject of searches of high school 
students thinks that such evidence illegally obtained under 
Fourth Amendment standards cannot be used against the student 
in a disciplinary proceeding that may lead to suspension or 
37 
National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
h. Legal Memorandum (Washington: National Association of Second­
ary School Principals, 19 72), p. 6. 
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expulsion. This would bring school disciplinary procedure in 
line with criminal procedure. At this writing, no court has 
held evidence in an expulsion hearing inadmissible on the 
grounds that it was obtained by methods which violate the 
Fourth Amendment.3® 
38 Robert E. Phay, editor, "Searches of Students and 
Lockers," School Law Balletin, Vol. II, No. 1, Institute of 
Government (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina, January. 
1971), p. 6. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DUE PROCESS; DRESS AND GROOMING:FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
While dress and grooming regulations in the public 
schools have been challenged under the First, Fifth, Eighth 
and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution, most 
cases have been considered by the federal courts under either 
the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection 
of the law. 
The majority of cases involving dress and grooming re­
gulations have been considered by the courts under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, a 
brief explanation of due process will be given, but only in 
its relation to the issue of dress and grooming regulations in 
the public schools. 
A due process clause is found in both the Fifth and Four-
^"Edward C. Smith, The 'Constitution of the United States 
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 52*. 
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teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a re­
straint upon the federal and state governments respectfully. 
A clause in the Fifth Amendment states. . . "nor be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . 
In discussing due process, one must break it down into 
two parts: Procedural due process concerns itself with correct 
procedures. This is especially true in the area of how cases 
are to be tried and steps leading up to the trial. As an ex­
ample, a grand jury indictment and a trial by jury is essential 
in criminal cases J In some school cases where violation of 
constitutional rights were alleged the issue was not considered 
by the court, because due process was not followed either by 
not giving notice or by not conducting a hearing before sus­
pension or expulsion. 
The second part is substantive due process. It is con­
cerned with the underlying freedom of liberty. Justice Harlan 
in defining the term said, "It was the right founded in natural 
equity and based on the principle of universal law."4 
2Ibid. , p. 50. 
O 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, United States 
Senate, Laymen's Guide to Individual Rights Under the United 
States Constitution/Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1966) „ pp. 8-9. 
^Patterson v. Colorado, 27 S. Ct. 559 (1907). 
135 
The Bill of Rights originally applied only to action by 
the federal government. Through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, many of the guarantees and protections 
of the first ten amendments have been made applicable to state 
governments and their subdivisions. Operating under this prin­
ciple : 
. . . certain rights and freedoms are deemed so basic 
to the people in a free and democratic society that state 
governments may not violate them, even though they are not 
specifically mentioned in the Constitution. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prevents the state from making unreasonable, arbitrary distinc­
tions between different persons as to their rights and privi-
g 
leges. This clause has been cited by the federal courts in 
only a small number of cases, because of the difference in the 
application of school rules and regulations to boys and girls. 
The problem of dress and grooming in the public schools 
is not new, but only since the Tinker and Gault cases have the 
federal courts considered the issue. 
In 1923 the Arkansas Supreme Court in Pugsley v. Sellmeyer 
upheld the right of a school to prohibit any style of dress tend­
ing toward immodesty. The case involved the wearing of trans­
parent hosiery and make up by girls. The Court said in its 
^Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, United States 
Senate, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 
6Ibid. 
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decision, that unless the rule was unreasonable the Court 
would not question the wisdom of the rule. 
In 19 32 the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Stromberg 
v. French upheld the right of school officials to prohibit the 
wearing of heel taps at school. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Antell v. Stokes 
in 1934 by dismissing the case upheld the right of school offi­
cials to prohibit the wearing of jerseys and caps of a secret 
society on the school premises.*^ 
In the 1950's the problem of tight pants on girls was 
unresolved. In 1966 the New York State Commissioner of Educa­
tion ruled that a Saratoga Springs High School had overstepped 
its authority in suspending a girl who came to school on a cold 
day wearing slacks. 
In the 196O's the problem was a girl's skirt length be­
ing too short and the hair length of boys too long. Where pa­
rents and school officials agree, it has been possible to es­
tablish regulations and enforce them. Though the number of 
parents siding with their offsprings is still a minority, the 
number is growing.8 
n  
Edward C. Bolmeier and Anne Flowers, Law And Pupil 
Control (Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1966), p. 83. 
®Paul Woodring, "Long Hair and Mini-Skirts," Saturday 
Review (January 21, 1967), p. 55. 
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Both students and school officials cite Tinker as the 
basis for their position on dress and grooming regulations. 
Students challenge school regulations using Justice Fortas 
statement in Tinker that: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be en­
claves of totalitarianism. School officials do not pos­
sess absolute authority over their students. Students in 
school as well as out of school are "persons" under our 
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights 
which the state must respect, just as they themselves must 
respect their obligations to the State.^ 
School officials point to Tinker because the Court said: 
The problem posed by the present case does not relate 
to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of cloth­
ing, to hair style, or deportment.^ 
While there has been an avalanche of cases in the fed­
eral courts involving the length of male hair, only one case 
could be found dealing with dress per se as an issue. 
This case, Bannister v. Paradis (1970),^ saw action 
brought on behalf of a twelve year old sixth grader who was 
sent home for wearing dungarees to school in violation of the 
dress code in the Pottsfield, New Hampshire, schools. 
Q 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
89 S. Ct. 739 C19697"! 
10Ibid. , p. 737. 
"^Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185 (1970). 
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The court did not see the First Amendment as an issue, 
since there was no suggestion that wearing of blue jeans, clean 
or otherwise, constituted a right of expression. The court could 
find no other cases under the Civil Rights Act where the issue 
has been wearing apparel. 
The district court did not see the right to wear clean 
blue jeans as being very high on the value scale of constitu­
tional liberties. However, the court found no evidence that 
the wearing of dungarees inhibited or tended to inhibit the 
educational process. 
The district court in prohibiting the school from en­
forcing that portion of the dress code which prohibits boys 
from wearing dungarees said: 
A person's right to wear clothes of his own choosing 
provided that, in the case of a school boy, they are neat 
and clean, is a constitutional right protected and guaran­
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court went on to say that schools can exclude persons 
who are unsanitary, obscenely or scantily clad. Good hygiene 
and the health of other pupils require that dirty clothes be pro­
hibited. Also obvious was that the lack of proper covering, 
particularly with female students, would distract other students 
and disrupt the educational process. The court thus recognized 
12Ibid., p. 188. 
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that school boards have the power to adopt reasonable re­
strictions on dress as part of its educational policy. 
The court in its decision permanently enjoined the 
principal and school board from enforcing that portion of the 
dress code which prohibits boys from wearing dungarees. There 
were, no costs to either party before the court. 
The district court overruled only the section dealing 
with dungarees, thus upholding the rest of the school dress 
code. See Appendix B for the dress code adopted by the 
school board in April, 1970. 
While only one case was found in the federal courts 
dealing with dress, every circuit court of appeals with the 
exception of the second circuit has ruled on school hair 
length or hair style regulations. There have been cases in­
volving this issue in the district courts of the second circuit. 
Three early cases in the federal courts will introduce 
the hair issue in the public schools and serve as background 
for the rest of the chapter. Cases reviewed will then be di­
vided into those where school regulations were upheld and those 
decided in favor of the student. 
An early case involving the length of a boy's hair, 
13 Davis v. Firment (1967), saw a suit filed by a parent on 
13 
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (1967). 
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behalf of his fifteen year old son against the New Orleans 
School Board, the superintendent, and the principal of his 
high school. 
The suit asked damages in the amount of $12,000 each 
for himself and his son, for embarrassment resulting from the 
boy being suspended for sixteen days because his hair was too 
long. 
It was argued that action of the school authorities 
violated rights guaranteed by the First, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as buttressed by 
the Civil Rights Act. 
A conflict developed since Louisiana law requires school 
attendance for fifteen year olds and also provided for suspen­
sion with good cause. 
A student handbook with regulations for dress was dis­
tributed the first three days of school. The principal warned 
all students on two successive days that students ignoring re­
gulations would be suspended. The student in this case was 
warned by two teachers and then suspended for three days. Sev­
eral conferences were held with no result prior to court action. 
The boy was finally readmitted when he showed up with an accept­
able haircut. 
The issue revolted around the question of the boy's con­
stitutional right to keep his hair long in direct disobedience 
mi 
to rules and regulations of the school. He contended that his 
hair style constituted symbolic expression of speech and was 
subject to First Amendment protection. 
The court upheld the school board and while agreeing 
that symbolic expression is entitled to First Amendment pro­
tection it said: 
A symbol must symbolize a specific viewpoint or idea, 
what is student Davis trying to express? Nothing really. 
Even if hair style fell within this type of expression it 
would still be subject to reasonable regulation in further­
ance of a legitimate state interest. ̂ 
The first major haircut case was Ferrell v. Dallas 
Independent School District (1966).^ In this case three high 
school boys were denied admission to school, because they wore 
their hair "Beatle" style. These students were members of a 
professional music group whose performance contract required 
them to have this hair style. 
They did not follow normal registration procedures at 
the beginning of school year, but went straight to the princi­
pal's office. His refusal to admit them and the publicity that 
followed was thought to have been planned by their agent. 
The students brought action seeking to restrain school 
authorities, claiming that action of the school principal 
1HIbid., p. 527. 
^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 
F. Supp. 5i*5 (19617. 
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denying them admission into school until they cut their hair 
was arbitrary and discriminatory and violated their constitu­
tional right to equal opportunity for a public education. 
The court held there was no abuse of discretion on the 
part of school authorities and that they had acted reasonably 
under the circumstances, considering the individual student 
and the need for an academic atmosphere. 
It found no violation of the students' state or federal 
rights and went on to say that terms under which a free public 
education is granted in the high schools of Texas cannot be 
fixed or determined by the students themselves. 
Therefore, the court dissolved the temporary order re­
quiring admission of the students without compliance with the 
haircut rule and denied the students motion for a temporary 
injunction. 
On appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a two 
to one decision upheld the regulation and the decision of the 
district court. 
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
the Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, Mr. Justice 
Douglas dissenting said: 
2^0 
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 39 3 
F. 2d 697 (1968). 
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It comes as a surprise that in a country where the 
states are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a 
person can be denied education in a public school because 
of the length of his hair. I suppose that a nation bent 
on turning out robots might insist that every male have 
a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas 
of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," expressed 
in the Declaration of Independence, later found specific, 
definition in the Constitution itself, including of course 
freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had 
supposed those guarantees permitted idiosyncrasies to 
flourish, especially when they concern the image of one's 
personality and his philosophy toward government and his 
fellow-men.^ 
The next major hair case was in the United States Dis­
trict Court in Wisconsin. The following policy of the Williams 
Bay Board of Education affecting male students was challenged 
in Breen v. Kahl (1969):^"® 
Hair should be washed, combed and worn so it does not 
hang below the collar line in the back, over the ears on 
the side and must be above the eyebrows. Boys should be 
clean shaven; long sideburns are out. 
An important distinction was made in the hearing in 
that the state superintendent did not find the length of hair 
a disruptive influence or factor, but only that Breen's re­
fusal to obey the rule was disruptive. 
The question before the court concerned the board re­
gulation as applied to the plaintiff violating the United 
17 Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 89 
S. Ct. 98 (1968). 
18Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (1969). 
19lbid., p. 703. 
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States Constitution. The judge placed the burden of justifi­
cation on the defendents and summarized their justification 
under the following two points: 
(1). . .than in Williams Bay a male high school student 
whose hair is longer than the Board standard so departs 
from the norm that his appearance distracts his fellow 
students from their school work. 
(2). . .that students whose appearance conforms to 
community standards perform better in_school, both in 
strictly academic work and extra-curricular activities, 
than those whose appearance does not conform.20 
The district court held that school regulations for­
bidding high school students' long hair violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The school board appealed the decision. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in considering the 
case agreed with the district court that: 
Defendants here have fallen far short of showing that 
the distraction caused by male high school students where 
hair length exceeds the board standard is so aggravated, 
so frequent, so general, and so persistent that the inva­
sion of their individual freedom by the state is warranted. 
The same is true of defendants showing with respect to the 
differential in school performance between male students 
with long hair and those with short hair.21 
The school board argued before the circuit court that 
disciplinary powers of school authorities would be diminished, 
if the regulations were not upheld. 
9 0  
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1036 (1969). 
21Ibid. 
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The court replied: 
To uphold arbitrary school rules which sharply impli­
cate basic constitutional values for the sake of some 
nebulous concept of school discipline is contrary to the 
principle that we are a government of laws which are passed 
pursuant to the United States Constitution.2̂  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis­
trict court's decision by a vote of two to one. 
One circuit judge dissented on the basis that: (1) the 
regulation was not vague; (2) the norms were in accordance 
with area; (3) wearing long hair was the same as carrying a 
sign defying school officials; and (4) federal courts should 
not be the arbitrator of school regulations and hair length.23 
The United States Supreme Court following their prece­
dent in Ferrell denied certiorari in Breen v. Kahl.24 
With the introduction of the hair issue, the cases in 
the remainder of the chapter will be divided into those decided 
in favor of the board of education upholding school regulations 
and those decided in favor of the student holding such regula­
tions unconstitutional. Decisions in the courts are running 
about fifty-five percent to forty-five percent in favor of the 
student. These cases are only representative cases, but attempt 
to cover all phases of the problem of hair length. 
22Ibid., p. 10 37. 
23Ibid., p. 1038. 
2 4  
Breen v. Kahl, 90 S. Ct. 1836 (1970). 
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In Neuhaus v. Torrey (1969),25 a suit was brought by 
high school athletes against the. superintendent for injunctive 
and declaratory relief against enforcement of school district 
regulations which established grooming regulations for athletes. 
The grooming regulations challenged in a federal dis­
trict court in California follows: 
(a) Each athlete will be well groomed and neat in 
appearance at all times. 
(b) Each athlete will be clean shaven. 
(c) The hair will be out of the eyes, trimmed above 
the ears and above the collar in back.2® 
The penalty for violation of the rule was suspension 
from all athletic competition for the season. The plaintiffs 
conceded they were in violation of the rules. 
The court considered testimony of a number of witnesses, 
including team coaches called by both parties. In addition, 
authority was granted the California Coaches Association and 
the American Civil Liberties Union to file briefs amici curiae 
and to argue the case at length. 
The court noted that the rules applied only to students 
participating in athletic competition and the alternatives 
were merely to forego athletic competition or trim the hair 
^^Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (1969). 
26 
Ibid., p. 193. 
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above the collar and around the ears for a few months. 
The court was convinced through testimony offered by 
the defendants, especially the coaches; that athletics require 
discipline, individual sacrifice and teamwork. Evidence was 
also presented that long hair could adversely affect perform­
ance in track events and certain other sports. 
The court in its decision held that grooming standards 
for male students participating in extra-curricular athletic 
competition was rational, reasonable and was not an arbitrary 
or capricious decision of school officials. The decision 
held there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
denied motion for preliminary injunction and vacated a tempo-
2 7 rary restraining order. 
The issue in Corley v. Daunhauer (1970)^8 was the length 
students participating in band must wear their hair. The plain­
tiff, a twelve year old seventh grade student, contended he was 
wearing long hair to protest United States involvement in the 
Vietnam War. The regulation was challenged as violating free­
dom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 
The court could find no evidence that school officials 
were trying to prevent the plaintiff from protesting against 
27 Ibid., p. 194. 
^Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (1970). 
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the Vietnam War or against anything else. There was no at­
tempt to punish him for his protest. 
On the application of the band policy to plaintiff the 
court said: 
Reasonable restrictions on students in the fields of 
conduct, dress, and appearance are desirable if the schools 
are to operate effectively and efficiently. That is neces­
sarily so because learning for many people is a discipline 
rather than a pleasure, and if it is to be practiced suc­
cessfully, the practice must be carried out in dignified 
and orderly surroundings. Public school students, particu­
larly those at the elementary and junior high school levels, 
are still immature, some of them are children of tender 
years. They are excitable and prone to be distracted from 
their tasks. Whatever may be thought about conformity in 
general, it seems clear that unreasonable conformity to es­
tablished norms of dress and appearance contributes to 
orderly administration of classrooms, and that uncontrolled 
individuality of appearance tends to disrupt it. That has 
been the uniform experience of teachers and administrators 
for years, and that is why many of them have an almost re­
flexive tendency to move against personal oddities or eccen­
tricities in the dress or appearance of individual students.^9 
The court went on to say that it was not unreasonable for 
the school to require band members to wear uniforms and strive 
for uniformity in appearance. 
The court ruled that plaintiff's right to protest the 
war in Vietnam by wearing long hair was no higher or better 
than the right of some other band member to protest something 
else in some other manner. The district court held that re­
quiring students in the band to conform their hair length to 
29Ibid., 816. 
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reasonable requirements of band director did not deprive them 
of a federally protected right. The complaint was dismissed.31' 
31 Christmas v. El Reno Board (1970) was a case in which 
action was brought by the plaintiff for being unlawfully pro­
hibited by acts of defendants from participating in a post­
graduate diploma ceremony. 
The diploma in the El Reno, Oklahoma, school system is 
an unofficial document presented in a postgraduate ceremony. 
The plaintiff along with other seniors had regularly graduated 
earlier. Attendance by students who had graduated was op­
tional. An eight year old rule on hair length for diploma 
ceremonies was known to the plaintiff. He had been warned in 
September, October, November, April and May. His parents had 
also been informed of the regulation. 
The district court ruled: 
. . . .  r e g u l a t i o n s  p r o h i b i t i n g  m a l e  s t u d e n t s  f r o m  w e a r ­
ing their hair over their ears, eyes or collar were rea­
sonable, uniformly enforced, and did not unlawfully or in­
vidiously discriminate, as there were valid and compelling 
reasons for their enactment and enforcement, and that nei­
ther plaintiff's constitutional nor civil rights were vio­
lated by a refusal to allow him to attend ceremony without 
complying with regulations. Relief denied. 
30Ibid., p. 817 . 
31 
Christmas v. El Reno Board, 313 F. Supp. 618 (1970). 
32r^-» Ibid. 
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In Jackson v. Dorrier (1970),33 male students and 
their parents brought action against the high school princi­
pal and board of education to enjoin enforcement of the school 
board regulation which prohibited male students from wearing 
long hair. The United States District Court for the middle 
district of Tennessee dismissed the action and the pupils and 
their parents appealed. 
The case arose in Donelson High School in Nashville, 
Tennessee, over a board of education dress and grooming code 
adopted in 1961. The plaintiffs were allowed to finish out 
the 1967 - 19 6 8 school year, but were suspended at the be­
ginning of the 19 6 8 school year. They were members of a 
musical rock group. During the previous year they were often 
absent from school and made low grades. Teachers and students 
both testified that plaintiffs were a disturbing influence in 
the school. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision 
stated: 
In the absence of infringement of constitutional rights, 
the responsibility for maintaining proper standards of de­
corum, discipline and a wholesome academic environment at 
Donelson High School is not vested in the federal courts, 
but in the principal and faculty (of the school and the 
board of education. 
^Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d (1973). 
3tfIbid. , pp. 218-219. 
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The Sixth Circuit Court followed the Ferrell decision 
by the Fifth Circuit in holding that the district court com­
mitted no error in dismissing the case. The decision of the 
lower court was affirmed. 
In Griffin v. Tatum (1970), a high school student 
sought readmission as a student in good standing and an in­
junction restraining school authorities from taking any other 
disciplinary action, because of the length and manner in which 
he wore his hair. The district court ordered readmission and 
granted injunction against application of rule. The defendants 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The high school student was suspended solely for the 
reason that his hair was blocked, rather than tapered in the 
back. This fact was undisputed before the court. The student 
made no claim that the overall regulation was invalid, so the 
issue before the court was blocked haircuts. The hair regula­
tion prohibited Beatle haircuts, long sideburns and ducktails. 
The district court ruled the hair regulation was arbi­
trary and unreasonable as applied to students and violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court did not stop with the blocked haircut 
portion, but struck the entire regulation. 
35Griffiri v. Tatum, 425 F. 2d 201 (1970). 
152 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part 
and reversed in part the decision of the district court. 
The court said: 
The clearly erroneous rule is a sufficient basis for 
affirming the district court as to the wrongful suspension 
of the appellant and for striking the blocked hair prohi­
bition as it was applied to him. 
We reverse however, as to the action of the district 
court in striking the entire hairstyle regulation. This 
court held in Ferrell (196 8) that it was proper for school 
authorities to establish rules and regulations in the in­
terest of school management and this included a hairstyle 
regulation.^6 
Another case before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
was Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board (1970).37 This was a 
civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 and 1983, 
and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (3), (see Appendix B), by three male 
Negro high school students who were suspended for refusing to 
shave. The district court denied relief and appeal was taken. 
In September the District Court for Southern District 
of Georgia handed down a desegregation order to this high school. 
The Stevenson case was before the same district court in Novem­
ber, which prompted the following statement from the court: 
All this [desegregation effort] is suddenly jeopardized 
by a lilliput of a lawsuit - a legal controversy - a cause 
celebre that attracts a courtroom full of spectators . . . 
36Ibid., p. 203. 
37 
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board, 426 F. 2d 1154 (1970). 
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What does it involve? It concerns the monumental ques­
tion of the constitutional right of a student to wear a 
mustache in violation of a regulation of the school au­
thorities.^ 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered two 
questions: 
(1) . . .whether the school board could constitution­
ally maintain a good grooming rule for its students which 
as a part, thereof, required that male students shave. 
(2) . . .if so, whether the rule was unconstitutionally 
applied to the three students in question.39 
The Fifth Circuit Court affirmed the district court 
decision and held that no substantial federal question was 
presented. Judge Bell for the court in answer to the two 
questions held: 
The Fifth Circuit Court has not denied school authori­
ties in this circuit the right to promulgate reasonable 
regulations concerning hair styles. 
. . . .there was no evidence of racial discrimination 
nor any denial of equal protection as amongst male stu­
dents, and also held that rule was founded on a rational 
basis and was not arbitrarily applied.4̂  
The action in Carter v. Hodges (1970)4-1- was brought by 
a twenty year old tenth grade student at Northside High School 
in Fort Smith, Arkansas. His action was brought to enjoin the 
3 8 
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board, 306 F. Supp. 98 (1969). 
39 
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board, 426 F. 2d 1156 (1970). 
U0Ibid., p. 1158. 
^Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (1970). 
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enforcement of a high school dress code prohibiting long hair. 
The plaintiff was a member, of a rock group and lived 
in an apartment away from his parents. He returned home be­
fore reporting for school in August of 1970. The plaintiff 
reported to school, picked up schedule cards and was sent to 
the dean's office, because of the length of his hair. After 
being suspended by the dean, the plaintiff physically assaulted 
him. He was expelled for the semester. 
The dress code in question read: 
Hair of extreme length or bizarre style will be con­
sidered undesirable, this to be regulated by school of­
ficials. Facial hair will not be considered appropriate. 
Any hair over the ear lobe will be considered facial hair.42 
In regard to the question of hair length being a fed­
eral question, the district court said: 
There is no United States Constitutional requirement 
that any State of the Union maintain a public school sys­
tem and there is no United States public school system.4̂  
On the question of the power to make and enforce such 
regulations, the court said: 
The courts are agreed that school authorities have 
broad discretion to enact and enforce student regulations 
so as to insure proper and efficient operation of the 
school. 
2̂Ibid., p. 90. 
43XbidL, p. 91. 
^Ibid., p. 92. 
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The court found the. code reasonable citing Corley v. 
Daunhauer and Terrell and upheld student expulsion for strik­
ing the dean. The burden of proof in this case was on school 
officials to show the rule was reasonable and related to the 
educational process. The proof in this case was overwhelming 
in favor of the school. 
The case of Jeffers v. Yuba School District (1970)'+̂  
resulted from action by plaintiffs to have certain portions of 
the school dress code pertaining to the length of male students1 
hair declared unconstitutional. After the plaintiffs were sus­
pended for being in violation of the dress code, they brought 
class action on behalf of all male students in the high school. 
At the beginning of the 196 9-70 school year, dress re­
gulations were in effect which prohibited the wearing of ex­
cessive hair styles by male students. In February of 1970, 
the standards were formalized prohibiting (1) beards; (2) side­
burns below the ear lobe; and (3) hair draping over the ears, 
shirt collar or eyes.^^ 
Trial began in the District Court for the Eastern Dis­
trict of California in April 1970. The court considered the 
haircut issue under the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments 
llR 
Jeffers v. Yuba School District, 319 F. Supp. 368 (1970). 
46Ibid., p. 369. 
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to the Constitution and decided the Fourteenth was the proper 
framework within which to place the hair regulation problem. 
The court was faced with the following question: 
Do the hair regulations at Yuba City High School 
substantively violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution?47 
In answer to this question, the court made the follow­
ing statement: 
. . . because of compulsory attendance laws students 
don't always want to attend school, discipline under these 
circumstances is difficult to maintain. The court there­
fore feels that school authorities should be given the 
widest discretion within constitutional limits in promul­
gating regulations in the school. Unless the regulation 
is arbitrary and capricious the court will not interfere.48 
In addition to the briefs and opinions filed with the 
court, there were many educators who testified on both sides 
of the issue. The court pointed out that its decision consi­
dered only the right of school officials to make the regula­
tion and not the wisdom of maintaining the hair regulation. 
On the basis of the evidence presented: 
The court therefore finds that the hair regulations at 
Yuba City High School are reasonably and rationally re­
lated to the educational process and they do not deprive 
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.4̂  
^Ibid., P« 372. 
48Ibid., P« 373. 
Ibid., P- 374. 
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In the case of Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School 
District (1970),^ the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
hair regulations were not arbitrary or unreasonable and were 
sufficiently related to alleviating interference with the edu­
cational process. One significant point in the case was the 
recognition by the court of student participation in the draw­
ing up of dress code regulations. 
The case of Freeman v. Flake (1971)^ before the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals involved the consolidation of three 
cases concerning regulation of hair styles for male students 
in the public schools. Before the court were decisions by the 
district court which upheld school board regulations in Utah 
and Colorado and rejected board regulations in New Mexico. The 
district court decision in each case had been appealed. 
Though different in language, the regulation in each 
case essentially required that hair should not hang below the 
collar line in the back, the ears on the side and the eyebrows 
in front. In each case students sought to express their indi­
vidualities and the school board offered justification for the 
regulations. 
^Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, 
433 F. 2d 355 TT970). 
5̂ Freeman v. Flake, 448 F. 2d 258 (1971). 
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The Tenth Circuit Court reviewed male hair regulations 
at the appeals court level and found the circuit courts sharp­
ly divided on the issue. 
In regard to challenges to hair regulations in the 
federal courts, the Tenth Circuit said: 
No apparent concensus exists among the lawyers for the 
students as to what constitutional provision affords the 
protection sought. Reliance is variously had on the First, 
Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and on the penumbra of 
rights assured thereby. The uncertainty of position com­
plicates, rather than clarifies the issue.^2 
The briefs for students in all three cases cited Tinker, 
but the court did not agree that hair style constituted sym­
bolic speech. 
The briefs for students also alleged the hair regula­
tions were an invasion of privacy protected by a combination 
of the First and Ninth Amendments to the constitution. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut (19 65) was cited as the basis for this 
claim. The court did not agree with this assertion. The Tenth 
Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit in King v. Saddleback 
Junior College District (1970:53 
. . . that conduct controlled by hair style regulation 
is not conduct found in the privacy of the home but in 
52Ibid., p. 260. 
^King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 445 F.2d 
938 (1970T; 
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public educational institutions where individual liberties 
cannot be left completely uncontrolled to clash with simi­
larly asserted liberties of several thousand others. 
The briefs for students either dismissed or entirely 
failed to discuss the problem of federal intervention in the 
control of state schools. In addressing himself to this ques­
tion, the circuit judge stated: 
United States Constitution and statutes do not impose 
on federal courts duty and responsibility of regulating 
hair styles of male students in state public schools, and 
problem, if any, is one for states and should be handled 
through state procedures. 11 
The court felt the strongest constitutional argument 
which could be made on behalf of the students was based on the 
liberty assurances of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Tenth Circuit Court expressed doubts about the need 
for a test of reasonableness on any asserted constitutional 
rights concerning hair length for male students. The court 
further questioned the wisdom or necessity of the issue turn­
ing on the views of federal judges. The court said: 
The states have a compelling interest in the education 
of their children. The states, acting through their school 
authorities and their courts, should determine what, if 
any, hair regulation is necessary to the management of 
their schools.55 
54 
Ibid., p. 258. 
55Ibid., p. 261. 
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The court felt that all three complaints should have 
been dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief 
could be granted. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of 
the district court in the Utah and Colorado cases and reversed 
the district court decision in the New Mexico case. 
The case of King v. Saddleback Junior College District 
S 6 (1971) involved appeals by high school district, junior col­
lege district and junior college district superintendent from 
orders of the United States District Courts in California. 
Both cases involved dress codes placing limitations on the length 
of hair for male students. The cases were argued and submitted 
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Since the issues were 
substantially the same, they were considered together. 
In California, the statutory and regulatory authority 
for a junior college is the same as that for a high school, 
since both institutions are a part of the public secondary 
school system. 
Under California law, a board of education has the power 
to adopt a code of pupil discipline including a grooming policy. 
Such policy is to insure personal cleanliness and neatness of 
dress, but the pule must not unreasonably infringe upon the 
exercise of a constitutional right. 
56 
King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 4^5 F. 2d 
932 (197lTT^ 
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Both cases were on appeal from orders of the district 
court enjoining the enforcement of a dress code regulations, 
pertaining to length of hair, by school officials. 
The high school case before the Ninth Circuit Court 
was Olff v. East Side Union High School District (19 69).̂  
A fifteen year old was denied enrollment at the beginning of 
the school year, because his hair length was in violation of 
the dress code. The code included seven items to be observed 
by boys and five to be observed by girls. The policy also 
provided for a review committee made up of students, parents, 
teachers and administrators. This committee had affirmed the 
hair regulation in question in June of 1969. 
Action was brought by the plaintiff in district court 
and school officials were enjoined from enforcing the hair re­
gulation. Defendants were also enjoined from excluding the 
plaintiff from attending school. 
The King case involved a dress code in a student hand­
book for junior college students similar to the regulation in 
Olff. The King case had been in the Court of Appeals before 
when a preliminary injunction was vacated and the case re­
manded for further proceedings.^® 
5'7'0'lff v. East Side Union High School District, 305 
F. Supp. 557 (196977" 
5®King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 425 F. 
2d 426 (l570T. 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the hair 
length cases decided in the circuit courts. It reviewed the 
challenges to the issue under the First Amendment, Fifth 
Amendment right of privacy and under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It rejected all claims 
under these challenges. 
The court saw the only challenge being under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, under 
California law the circuit court found that: (1) school boards 
have the authority to establish regulations for the day to day 
operation of its schools; and (2) students have the duty to 
5 9 comply with the board's regulations. 
The court also placed the burden of proof on those who 
attached regulations unless there was a clear violation of a 
constitutional right. In both Olff and King, affidavits had 
been presented by experienced teachers and administrators that 
extreme hair length of male students interfered with the edu­
cational process. 
In its decision the Ninth Circuit Court stated: 
This is not a question of preference for or against 
certain male hair styles or the length to which persons 
desire to wear their hair. This court could not care less. 
It is the question of the right of school authorities to 
develop a code of dress and conduct best conducive to the 
eg 
King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 445 F. 2d 
939 (157TT. 
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fulfillment of their responsibilities to educate and to 
do it without unconstitutionally infringing upon the rights 
of those who must live under it. We do not believe that 
the plaintiffs have established the existence of any sub­
stantial constitutional right which is in these two in­
stances being infringed. We are satisfied that the school 
authorities have acted with consideration for the rights 
and feelings of their students and have enacted their codes, 
including the ones in question here, in the best interests 
of the educational process.6" 
The judgment granting a permanent injunction in King 
was reversed and the preliminary injunction in Olff was set 
aside by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found itself once 
again with a lawsuit attacking hair length regulation in the 
case of Karr v. Schmidt (1972).The appellee, Chesley Karr, 
was a sixteen year-old student who had not been permitted to 
enroll for his junior year in an El Paso, Texas, high schoolj 
because he was in violation of school board regulation limiting 
the length of male students' hair. 
The district court enjoined school officials to enroll 
Karr and to refrain from enforcing the hair-length regulation. 
The district court decision was based on the regulation being 
in violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees 
6 2 of the Federal Constitution. 
60Ibid. 
61Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F. 2d 609 (1972). 
k^Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728 (1970). 
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The Fifth Circuit Court stayed the district court's 
injunction pending appeal by school authorities. Karr then 
petitioned Mr. Justice Black in his capacity as Circuit Justice 
for the Fifth Circuit to vacate, the stay of injunction, pend­
ing appeal. Mr. Justice Black denied the petition saying: 
All the federal courts, including the Supreme Court 
are heavily burdened with important cases, the kind they 
must be able to handle if they are to perform their re­
sponsibility to society. Moreover, our Constitution has 
sought to distribute the powers of government in the nation 
between the United States and the states. Surely, the 
federal judiciary can perform no greater service to the 
nation than to leave the states unhampered in the perfor­
mance of purely local affairs. Surely few policies can 
be thought of in which states are more capable of deciding 
than the length of hair of school boys.6 3 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc with 
fifteen judges heard the Karr case. In a review of hair length 
regulations in numerous cases, the Fifth Circuit beginning with 
Ferrell had upheld the validity of hair and grooming regulations 
with the exception of Dawson v. Hillsborough County, Florida 
School Board, 445 F. 2d 308 (1970).64 
The district court in Karr ruled that hair regulation 
was unreasonable and in violation of the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court 
63Karr v^ Schmidt, 91 S. Ct. 592, 593 (1971). 
6̂ Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F. 2d 612 (1972). 
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placed the burden of proof on school authorities to demon­
strate that long hair resulted in disruption of the educa­
tional process. 
As a result of the district court decision, the circuit 
court was called on to answer a question reserved in Ferrell; 
Is there a constitutionally protected right to wear 
one's hair in a public high school in the length and style 
that suits the wearer?^ 
The Fifth Circuit Court rejected the First, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments as supplying a basis in 
the Constitution for such a right. After a full review, the 
court held no such right was found within the Constitution. 
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on two major pre­
mises: First, that interference with this liberty is tempo­
rary and relatively inconsequential. Second, that local school 
boards should be given wide latitude in the management of school 
affairs. On this point the court said: 
School administrators must daily make innumerable deci­
sions which restrict student liberty Examples 
are regulations requiring students to park automobiles 
in a designated parking lot and not move them until a de­
signated hour; forbidding students from leaving school 
grounds during recess and noon hour; prohibiting member­
ship in high school fraternities and sororities; forbid­
ding students from taking lunch except from the school 
cafeteria. Each of these regulations imposes restrictions 
on student liberty at igast as substantial as the regula­
tion here in question. 
65Ibid., p. 613. 
66Ibid., p. 615-616. 
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These regulations were cited by defendants as having been 
held valid in the Texas state courts. 
The Fifth Circuit Court announced a per se rule that 
school grooming regulations are valid. District courts in 
the circuit were directed to dismiss such actions for failure 
to state a claim unless a regulation was wholly arbitrary or 
discriminatory in its enforcement. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis­
trict court decision by an eight to seven vote with this final 
statement by the majority: 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today 
evinces not the slightest indifference to the personal 
rights asserted by Chesley Karr and other young people. 
Rather, it reflects recognition of the inescapable fact 
that neither the Constitution nor the federal judiciary 
it created were conceived to be keepers of the national 
conscience in every matter great and small. The regula­
tions which impinge on our daily affairs are legion. 
Many of them are more intrusive and tenuous than the one 
involved here. The federal judiciary has urgent tasks 
to perform, and to be able to perform them we must re­
cognize the physical impossibility that less than a 
thousand of us could ever enjoin a uniform concept of 
equal protection or due process on every American in 
every facet of his daily life. 
There were three dissenting opinions filed in the case 
with the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments cited as 
justification for the constitutional protection of students 
67Ibid., p. 618. 
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to wear their hair as they pleased, although unspecified in 
the Bill of Rights. Unlike the' maiority, they viewed the 
liberty as a fundamental right. 
Cases where the federal courts held invalid regulations 
involving hair style and hair length in the public schools will 
be considered in this part of the chapter. The same amendments 
to the United States Constitution are cited in these decisions 
as those upholding grooming regulations. 
The case of Sims v. Colfax Community School District 
6 9 
(1970) was the only federal case found involving a female 
student for violation of a hair regulation in the public schools. 
The plaintiff, Susan Sims, was suspended in December of 
1968 from an Iowa high school for failure to comply with a 
hair rule as set forth in student handbook. The hair rule 
follows: 
Hair must be kept one finger width above the eyebrows, 
clear across the forehead.70 
The issue before the court was whether the rule in ques­
tion violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. While 
there has been many hair cases, to the court's knowledge, this 
was the first involving the hair length of a female student. 
68Ibid. , p. 621. 
6'̂ Sims v. Colfax Community School District, 307 F. Supp. 
485 (1970T 
70lbid., p. 486. 
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Faced with a case dealing with hair length of a female 
student, the district court said: 
The Court well knows that the field of female coiffure 
is one of shifting sand trodden only by the most resolute 
of men. The Court thus undertakes this journey with some 
trepidation. Since time immemorial attempts to impose 
standards of appearance upon the fairer sex have been 
fraught with peril. Arbiters of hirsute fashion, perhaps 
understanding the chameleon nature of the subject matter, 
have approached the problem with more innovation than in­
sight. Against this delicate social milieu and ever mind­
ful of the equal protection clause, this court undertakes 
to comb the tangled roots of this hairy issue.71 
The district court found that a student's choice of his 
appearance was constitutionally protected under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that school 
hair rules are reasonable and constitutional only if the school 
can objectively show that such rules are needed to prevent dis­
ruption . 
The defendants gave only two reasons for such a rule. 
First, the rule promoted good citizenship by teaching respect 
for authority and instilling discipline. Second, typing class 
was disrupted because the instructor could not see the plaintiff's 
eyes. The court did not accept the first reason and was not 
convinced of the second. 
The district court found the Colfax Community School 
rule governing student hair length had unnecessarily and un-
Ibid. 
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reasonably circumscribed the plaintiff's constitutional rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Due to the interest in the 
case and for further clarity, the court pointed out that in 
the area of law, a court proceeds on a case by case approach. 
Thus, if disruption had been shown the court might have reached 
a different decision. 
The court denied the second count in the suit seeking 
monetary damages and entered the following judgment: 
(1) declare the hair rule herein unconstitutional; 
(2) forbid further enforcement of said hair rule; 
(3) expunge from the school record any reference to 
plaintiff's suspension from which she complained, 
and; 
(4) award plaintiff her statutory costs.72 
In the case of Crossen v. Fatsi (1970)the court held 
that a high school grooming code in Connecticut was unconsti­
tutionally vague and unenforceable. The court ruled the code 
violated the pupil's right to privacy under the Griswold doc­
trine. 
The basis for such a constitutional right was found in 
an expansive reading of the United States Supreme Court's 
72Ibid.. p. 489-490. 
73 
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (1970). 
7 M-holding in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). In the case, 
the court invalidated a Connecticut statute forbidding the 
use of contraceptives. The Court said certain specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights have "penumbras" that 
create a "zone of privacy" that must not be transgressed 
by the state. 
The plaintiff in Crossen generalized from Griswold 
a constitutionally protected zone of personal privacy which 
may be infringed only for compelling reasons. 
In other cases long-haired students and their lawyers 
have sought to bring hair within that "zone of privacy" by 
contending that the Griswold decision means that hairstyle 
is a matter of the individual's right to privacy. The 
courts have rejected this contention on the basis that the 
bedroom and classroom were quite different, constitutionally 
speaking. 
The case of Dunham v. Pulsifer (19 70)7̂  involving an 
athletic grooming code was similar to the Neuhaus case in 
California. The district court held in Neuhaus that groom-
7U 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). 
75 
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 311 F. Supp. mi (1970). 
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ing standards for male athletes was not a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Dunham, action was brought by students in Battle-
boro Union High School in Vermont to enjoin school authorities 
from enforcing an athletic grooming code. The district court 
held: 
. . . that athletic grooming code requiring males to 
wear hair tapered in back and on sides of head with no 
hair over the collar, and with sideburns no lower than 
ear lobe and trimmed was unconstitutional, and asserted 
justification based on performance, dissension on teams, 
discipline and conformity and uniformity were not sub­
stantial justification for infringement on fundamental 
right.76 
The district court held that athletic grooming code was a 
violation of equal protection under the constitution. 
The case of Richards v. Thurston (19 70)^7 involved a 
seventeen year old boy who was suspended from school at the 
beginning of his senior year because he refused to cut his 
hair. A local paper described his hair as falling loosely 
about his shoulders. 
The school had no written regulations governing hair 
length or style. The principal, defendent in this case, con-
7 6 r , . ,  Ibid. 
77 
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1970). 
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tended that students and parents were aware of the fact that 
long hair would not be permitted. 
The plaintiff brought action in the district court 
seeking injunctive relief against deprivation of his rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both parties in court sought to 
place the burden of proof on the other. The plaintiff felt 
that since there was no evidence that his appearance caused 
a discipline problem, the court should uphold his rights. 
The defendant maintained that plaintiff had failed to show 
that a fundamental right had been infringed or that defendant 
was motivated by other than a legitimate school concern. 
The district court granted the plaintiff's request for 
a permanent injunction and ordered that he be readmitted to 
school. Judge Wyzanski in his decision for the district court 
in Massachusetts made the following statement: 
. . . liberty to express in his own way by preference 
as to whatever hair style comports with his own person­
ality and his search for his own identity was protected 
under the broad terms of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from what the court found was a lack 
of a rational ground for regulation.78 
This statement has since been quoted often in hair length 
cases before the federal courts. The principal appealed the 
decision of the district court. 
78 
Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 452, 453 (1969). 
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals asked two basic 
questions in this case: First, was there a personal liberty 
involved which was protected by the Constitution? The court 
established there was such a right under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment saying: 
Many cases have involved rights expressly guaranteed 
by one or more of the first eight amendments, But it is 
clear that the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill 
of Rights has not been construed by the court to preclude 
the existence of other substantive rights implicit in the 
"liberty" assurances of the Due Process Clause.79 
Second, does the state's interest in maintaining a school 
system justify the intrusion? The court responded: 
The answer to this question must take into account the 
nature of the liberty asserted, the context in which it is 
asserted, and the extent to which the intrusion is confined 
to the legitimate public interest to be served. For ex­
ample , the right to appear au naturel at home is relinquished 
when one sets foot on a public sidewalk. Equally obvious, 
the very nature of public school education requires limi­
tations on one's personal liberty in order for the learning 
process to proceed. Finally, a school rule which forbids 
skirts shorter than a certain length while on school grounds 
would require less justification than one requiring hair 
to be cut, which affects the student twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week, nine months a year. ^ 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in the decision placed 
the burden of proof on school authorities since there was no 
visible justification. Since the defendant offered no justi-
79 
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1284 (1S70). 
80Ibid., p. 1285. 
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fication, the judgment of the distract court was affirmed. 
Crews v. Clones (1970)®^ came before the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals after the district court in Indiana had up­
held school regulations requiring satisfactory hair length and 
style before admittance to public high school. The school rules 
and regulations in question were unpublished. 
The school officials maintained that regulations were 
necessary for reasons of health and safety. They alleged the 
plaintiff's long hair distracted other students and provoked 
incidents that caused actual disruption in the school. On the 
point, the court said: 
Ct]he record is silent however, concerning actions taken 
by school officials to punish those students who actually 
caused the relatively insubstantial disruption which occurred 
in this case. Therefore, we hold that defendants have failed 
to satisfy their substantial burden of justification under 
their [disruption] theory. ^ 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision 
of the district court and held that school officials' actions 
constituted denial of equal protection to male students. This 
decision was based on the fact that school officials offered 
no reasons why health and safety objectives were not equally 
applicable to high school girls who engaged in the same acti­
vities as boys, although only boys had been required to cut 
81Crews v. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1259 (1970). 
82Ibid., p. 1265-1266. 
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their hair to attend class. 
The case of Bishop v. Colaw (1971)83 resulted when 
Stephen Bishop, a fifteen year old student in a St. Charles, 
Missouri high school, was suspended for violating provisions 
of the school dress code. A suit was brought seeking read-
mission and to overturn the dress code regulation governing 
the length and hair style of male students. The rule was 
challenged as violating the plaintiff's and his parents' per­
sonal rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
The plaintiff based jurisdiction upon 42 U.S.C. § 19 8 3 
and upon 28 U.S.C. i 1343. After the district court denied 
the Bishops any relief, they appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
The regulation in question stated: 
A. All hair is to be worn clean, neatly trimmed around 
the ears and back of the neck, and no longer than 
the top of the collar on a regular dress or sport 
shirt when standing erect. The eyebrows must be 
visible, and no part of the ear can be covered. 
The hair can be in a block cut. 
B. The maximum length of sideburns shall be the bottom 
of the ear lobe.®4 
The appellant trimmed his hair to conform to the regu­
lation at the insistence of his physical education teacher in 
83Bishop Vj_ Colaw, 450 F. 2d 1069 (1971). 
8UIbid., p. 1070-1071. 
176 
September and again in November of 1969. In January of 19 70 
because his math teacher objected to his hair length, he once 
again trimmed his hair. When school administrators demanded 
that his hair be trimmed again in February, the student and 
his parents refused and he was suspended. Litigation followed 
the suspension. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the cases 
involving hair regulations in the circuit courts. This review 
found disagreement about the validity of hair-length regula­
tions in both the federal, district and circuit courts. Only 
two cases were found in the district courts of the Eighth Cir­
cuit where hair regulations were upheld. In both cases, the 
courts were shown factually that students' appearance caused 
school disruption. 
Thus the Eighth Circuit joined the First and Seventh 
Circuits in holding that students possess a constitutionally 
protected right to govern their personal appearance, and that 
any infringement of the right must be justified by the state. 
After this background review, the court turned to the 
Bishops' challenge that regulation violated: 
(1) Stephen's First Amendment right to "symbolic ex­
pression"; (2) his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection; (3) his Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
85Ibid., p. 1073. 
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to govern his personal appearance; and (4) his parents1 
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to governing the 
raising of their family. 
The Eighth Circuit did not find merit in the First 
Amendment challenge. The court likewise did not agree with 
the Seventh Circuit decision in Crews that regulation violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No 
record of any invasion of the parents' rights was established 
before the court. 
The court held valid the third point raised by appelant, 
that Stephen possessed a constitutionally protected right to 
govern his personal appearance while attending a public high 
school. Among the circuit courts that recognized such a right 
existed there had been disagreement as to the nature and source 
of the right. The Eighth Circuit referred to Breen, Crews, 
and Richards in stating: 
Some have referred to the right as "fundamental," 
others as "substantial," others as "basic," and still 
others as simply a "right." The source of this right 
has been found within the Ninth Amendment of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
privacy penumbra of the Bill of Rights.®^ 
A common theme was found in the decisions striking down 
hair style regulations. This was that the United States 
86Ibid., p. 1071k 
87Ibid., p. 1075. 
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Constitution guarantees rights other than those specifically 
enumerated, and that the right to govern one's appearance is 
one of those guaranteed rights. 
The court said: 
The existence of rights other than those specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution was recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 
We believe that, among those rights retained by the 
people under our constitutional form of government, is 
the freedom to govern one's personal appearance. As a 
freedom which ranks high on the spectrum of our societal 
values, it commands the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.88 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals while reversing the 
decision of the district court by holding the hair length re­
gulation invalid did point out that personal freedoms were not 
absolute and must yield when they intrude upon the freedom of 
others. School administrators must demonstrate the necessity 
for regulations of hair length and they failed to do so in 
this case. 
89 
Massie v. Henry (1972) was a North Carolina case, which 
resulted from suspension of male high school students for their 
deliberate refusal to conform to grooming guidelines. The guide­
lines on length of hair and sideburns were recommended by a stu­
dent-faculty-parent committee and adopted by the high school 
88Ibid. 
8̂ Massie v. Henry, 455 F. 2d 775 (1972). 
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principal. 
Action was brought by students under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 
in the United States District Court for Western District of 
North Carolina at Asheville. The district court dismissed the 
action and plaintiffs' appealed. 
The regulations at Tuscola Senior High School in Haywood 
County were defended before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
as being necessary for safety reasons, to promote good disci­
pline and to avoid disruption. 
The Fourth Circuit traced the history of the hair issue 
and stated. 
We find Breen, Crews, Richards and Bishop, and their de­
cisional approaches more persuasive than Ferrell and its 
progeny, and we have concluded to follow the former.^0 
The court in looking at the reasons for such regulations 
suggested the faculty teach tolerance rather than use suppres­
sion to avoid disruption over hair length of male students. 
The court also suggested the use of hairbands, hairnets or pro­
tective caps for safety reasons in shop or laboratory classes 
as an alternate solution - short of shearing locks. 
The court made reference to our forefathers and the 
past presidents of the United States and pointed out that every 
president before Woodrow Wilson would have been in violation 
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of this school regulation. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a two to one 
decision reversed the action of the district court on the 
grounds that guidelines were not justified on the theory of 
need for discipline and consideration of safety. 
Judge Boreman dissented citing the statement from Tinker 
on dress and grooming and Justice Black's ruling in Karr as the 
basis for his position. 
Chapter six has reviewed the issue of dress and grooming 
regulations in the public schools as adjudicated in the federal 
courts. The chapter has centered on the hair controversy with 
a complete review of the cases at the circuit court level, sup­
plemented by selected district court decisions. 
This review has shown that the First, Fourth, Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits are holding for the student and the Third, 
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, for school officials. 
The Second Circuit was the only one without a court of appeals 
decision, but district courts in the circuit seem to be lean­
ing toward the student. Se Appendix B for the organization 
of the circuit courts. 
91Ibid., p. 780. 
^Ibid. , p. 788. 
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The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari 
in the following cases upholding the school board: King v. 
Saddleback Junior College District, Stevenson v. Wheeler 
County, Jackson v. Dorrier and Terrell v. Dallas Independent 
School District. Certiorari was also denied in Breeri v. Kahl 
where the court held for the student. 
Until the United States Supreme Court considers the 
hair issue, the split seems likely to remain in the circuit 
courts. 
With the federal courts struggling to decide if hair 
length is a constitutionally protected right, adult society 
has added this controversy to the growing debate about govern­
ment v. the individual. One side contends that extension of 
personal freedoms leads to a breakdown both of our society and 
discipline in the schools. The other side warns that govern­
ment is becoming too restrictive and seeking to regulate too 
many aspects of the personal life of adults and students. 
There are no problems if one talks about extremes, for 
both state and federal courts have consistently upheld the 
authority of school officials to regulate student conduct that 
results in disruption in the school. Thus, if a student's 
hair is so outlandish it disrupts school he can be sent home. 
However, if hair style is only a matter of fashion 
and not disruption some parents are insisting that school 
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boards have no right to enforce grooming regulations unless 
it can be shown that hair length is disrupting school or 
violates health standards. 
With the growing number of hair cases the federal 
courts are having second thoughts about the emphasis and time 
spent on student appearance. Following the lead of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals the federal courts are increasingly 
taking the position that hair length of students in secondary 
schools does not involve a substantial federal question and 
should more properly be decided by state courts. 
This trend seems likely to continue and school admini­
strators may find themselves in state courts if they deny a 
student the right to an education because of his appearance 
unless it can be shown that his conduct infringes on the rights 
of other students to an education. 
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CHAPTER VII 
LIFE STYLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
AN EMERGING INTERACTIVE PATTERN 
The life style of students and their quest for constitu­
tional rights form an emerging interactive pattern with public 
schools both the target and the site. When student's life 
style confronts authority of school officials litigation often 
results in the federal courts. Students have alleged their 
constitutional rights are being violated while school officials 
maintain their authority is being undermined by the courts. 
One has difficulty determining if student life style led 
to efforts to secure their constitutional rights or were efforts 
to secure constitutional rights for the purpose of enjoying 
their own life style. Regardless of the reason student efforts 
to secure constitutional rights has touched all phases of the 
school program. 
This chapter will not only focus on the interaction be­
tween the life style and constitutional rights of secondary 
students but will also examine changes taking place in the schools 
as a result of the student movement. Most of these changes are 
in response to student demands for greater participation in 
their school and community. High school students want to be 
involved in decisions affecting their life and recognized as 
individuals. 
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The movement in the 1960's by students to achieve their 
constitutional rights originated over matters of national and 
international concerns. Students wishing to express their 
views on the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, or other 
political and social issues have been denied this opportunity 
by school authorities. This denial often came in the form of 
suspension or threat of suspension. As a result, one can see 
an interaction between the life style of students and their 
effort to achieve constitutional rights. 
Protest of the Vietnam War by the wearing of black arm­
bands resulted in litigation in both Tinker and Butts. The 
civil rights movement prompted the wearing of buttons in both 
the Burnside and Blackwell case. Ethnic recognition resulted 
in the wearing of black berets in Hernandez and brown arm bands 
in Aquirre. 
The action of students in each case resulted in reaction 
on the part of school officials. In most incidents, students 
have been suspended for their expressions. 
Youth, by their expression, indicate their awareness 
of the problems of both the nation and the world. Youth are 
speaking up, because they realize they have had little or no 
voice in determining their goals in life. Even their life style 
and ideas have been generally foisted on them by the adult 
society. 
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By speaking out, youth have threatened the political es­
tablishment and institutions of society. This is most evident 
in the public school which, as a miniature of society, exhibits 
the same shams and distortions as the larger society. 
This points out a paradox. The youth of today are more 
intellectually able to speak up, because of better education 
received as a result of mass communication and prolonged school­
ing. Youth thus taught to think, find their ideas repressed 
when they seek to express them.^ 
Polarization of attitudes is reflected in the genera­
tion-gap in the United States. The American ideal of freedom 
and liberty of the individual has not been extended to the high 
school student. The high school student aware of the discre­
pancy between the ideal and its practice in the area of expres­
sion would probably subscribe to the proposition of John Stuart 
Mill, a great British writer of the Nineteenth century, who 
stated: 
If all mankind were of one opinion, and only one per­
son were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more 
justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had 
the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were 
an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the 
owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were 
^Samuel Brodbelt, "Values in Conflict : Youth Analyzes 
Theory and Practices," The High School Journal, Vol. 55 
(November, 1971), p. 70. 
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simply a private injury, it would make some difference 
whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons 
or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the ex­
pression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human 
race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those 
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who 
hold it. If the opinion is right they are deprived of 
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, . 
they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by 
its collision with error. 
Underground newspapers have become part of the school 
scene, because students feel school publications are controlled 
and censored by the school administration. Opposition to the 
Vietnam War, protest of school rules and regulations and criti­
cism of school officials have been major topics in publications 
involved in court cases. 
The sexual freedom of youth has created a moral gap be­
tween generations. Attempts by school officials to stifle this 
freedom has resulted in litigation, especially when expressed 
in off-campus publications distributed at school. 
Indeed, the whole question of obscenity poses a problem 
for both students and adults today. With local community stand­
ards serving as the guide established by the Supreme Court, this 
question remains a puzzle to all. 
Censorship by school authorities of responsible criticism 
^John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Etc. (England: Oxford 
University Press, 1912), pp. 23-24. 
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does not serve a democratic objective, if the school is to 
provide a free market place for ideas. Student newspapers. 
could provide a peaceful channel for dissent, if encouraged 
rather than suppressed. 
The student revolt manifested itself with sit-ins, walk­
outs and other forms of protest in the schools. Students chal­
lenged assembly not as a per se issue, but as a result of pro­
test over the Vietnam War or school rules and regulations. 
Such demonstrations disrupted the educational process 
and have not been upheld by the courts. The courts have ruled 
that picketing and parading on public premises may be regulated. 
Tennessee and North Carolina are among states that passed 
stronger legislation to deal with student demonstrations. 
Student life style is having an impact on the high school 
with both students and educational leaders questioning the ra­
tionale of students having to spend every minute of the school 
day in class or under supervision. 
The wide spread use of drugs by the youth of this na­
tion, along with an effort to establish constitutional rights 
for juveniles has provided the framework for challenges, under 
the Fourth Amendment, to searches by school officials. 
o 
The In re Gault (1967) case while not directly concerned 
with search and seizure extended this right to juveniles as a 
3In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). 
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result of Justice Fortas1 statement in the decision of the 
Supreme Court. 
The tenor of the times with bomb threats being received 
by schools throughout the nation has generally affirmed the 
right of school officials to search student lockers. Another 
problem supporting this right of school officials is weapons 
brought to school by students. North Carolina is among the 
states that have passed stricter laws prohibiting weapons on 
school grounds. 
The counter culture influence and the popularity of 
rock music groups left its mark on the dress and grooming habits 
of youth in the 1960's. Like each teen-age generation, students 
today have their own fashions for adornment and amusement. 
Students in the past have been more manageable and 
usually wore their costumes or extreme fashions away from 
school. In the past, the girls, not the boys, paraded the 
reigning adornment or new fashion. 
Today, the girls wear mini-skirts, jeans and sweatshirts 
with slogans and patches on all types of clothing. The boys, 
in addition to the jeans, sweatshirts, and patches have long 
hair, beards and mustaches. 
Whether to express their individuality, to conform to 
peer influence, or to challenge the authority of school offi­
cials, students increasingly are challenging dress and grooming 
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regulations in the school. As a result, the length and style 
of male students1 hair became both the most controversial and 
most contested issue of appearance in the federal courts. 
Prior to 1969 there had been only two hair cases in the 
federal courts. At the present time, the number of hair length 
cases in the federal courts exceeds one hundred. 
Hair styles have changed in recent years and long hair 
has become common place. Still unanswered is whether this 
occurred as a part of mod dress or as symbolic protest against 
those in control of society. The federal courts have not up­
held hair length as a form of symbolic expression protected by 
the First Amendment. 
Rock and protest music of the past decade, beginning 
with the Beatles, contributed greatly to the popularity of long 
hair for males. HAIR is even the name of a popular musical. 
School authorities assert the right to regulate length 
of hair as a means of promoting order, discipline, an academic 
atmosphere, and good citizenship. Students insist the length 
of one's hair is a matter of individual discretion and personal 
freedom, hence protected by the Constitution and exempt from 
any school regulation. 
Despite the fact that their own grandfathers wore long 
hair, many school officials look upon long hair with great 
distaste and perceive it as a genuine threat to their own 
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authority and to quality education. School authorities,by 
banning unusual hair and dress, tell students by their actions 
that it is acceptable to condemn and repress any deviation 
from the norm.1* 
The right to wear one's hair in the manner desired is 
at best an ambiguous constitutional right and appears trivial, 
except to the individual involved. The validity of hair rules 
and regulations have been questioned for reasons other than 
just constitutional. Personal choice, pride and human dignity 
are other factors governing one's appearance. 
Today, neither the student nor his principal can say 
with any certainty that there is or is not a constitutional 
right concerning long hair. Unless the United States Supreme 
Court changes its judicial mind or unless long hair on boys 
ceases to be stylish, the present state of confusion will pro­
bably continue. The manner in which one may wear his hair will 
vary according to the state in which the student resides. 
Young people have evolved their own views on life, their 
own music, their own fashion and they exact a significant in­
fluence on our society. In addition to their own life style, 
ii 
Nat Hentoff, "Why Students Want Their Constitutional 
Rights," Saturday Review (Hay 22, 19 71), p. 62. 
^T. Page Johnson, "The Constitution, The Courts and 
Long Hair," NASSP Bulletin, Vol. 57 (April, 1973), p. 32. 
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it has become evident that young people have contributions to 
make to the society and the schools. Indeed, Margaret Head 
pointed out that: 
. . . the young people of today have had experiences 
that no adult has had at the same age, so they have a 
unique perspective. If their ideas are to benefit rather 
than divide our society, students must exercise the right 
to make choices that will make a difference, not just pre­
tend decisions. 
The life style of students and their efforts to secure 
constitutional rights form an interactive pattern. This pattern 
is observable when students are suspended for their expression 
or appearance and seek relief in the courts. 
The movement by students to gain their constitutional 
rights has been as varied as their life style. There has been 
no discernible chronological or geographical pattern to the 
movement. Students across the nation have challenged dress 
codes, censorship of the press, right to wear buttons and arm­
bands , or other rights of immediate concern in a particular 
school or city. Though part of a common cultural pattern, the 
effort to gain constitutional rights for students has been 
largely a decentralized phenomenon. 
At a White House Conference on Youth held in the spring 
of 1971 at Estes Park, Colorado, fifteen hundred delegates 
g 
Margaret Mead, Culture and Commitment: A Study of the 
Generation Gap (Garden City, New York: Natural History Fress, 
Doubleday and Company, 1970), p. 64. 
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including one thousand young people age fourteen to twenty-
four heard the preamble read by Karen Rux of Durham, North 
Carolina at the close of the conference. Part of the preamble 
is included here for it sums up the feelings of youth in the 
19 70's. The preamble stated: 
The approach of the two hundredth anniversary of the 
revolution which gave birth to the United States of America 
leads us to re-examine the foundations of this country. 
We find that the high ideals upon which this country was 
ostensibly founded have never been a reality for all peoples 
from the beginning to the present day. The Constitution 
was both racist and sexist in its conception. The greatest 
blemish on the history of the United States of America is 
slavery and its evil legacy. The annihilation of Indians, 
genocide, exploitation of labor, and military expansion 
have been among the important shortcomings which have under­
mined the ideals to which the people of this country have 
aspired.' 
The preamble contained a list of rights and grievances, 
spoke of deprivation, repression and fear in the nation and 
concluded by saying: 
Out of the rage of love for the unimplemented principles 
we here assert, we challenge the government and power struc­
tures to respond swiftly, actively and constructively to 
our proposals. We are motivated not by hatred, but by 
disappointment over and love for the unfulfilled potential 
of this nation. 
The reports of the various task forces at the conference 
found many beliefs and ideals shared by all youth. These youths 
7 
Bonnie Barrett Stretch, "The White House Conference 
on Youth," Saturday Review (May 22, 1971), p. 76. 
aibid. 
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felt one should be free to choose his own life style so long 
as it did not interfere with the rights of others. 
Out of the 19 71 White House Conference on Youth came 
a call for the adoption of written policies by boards of edu­
cation on student rights. The Education Task Force urged 
junior and senior high schools to adopt codes of student 
rights, responsibilities and conduct. 
The American Civil Liberties Union has called for regu­
lations governing students in school to be fully and clearly 
formulated, published and made available to all members of the 
school community. Such regulations should be reasonable and 
clearly defined avoiding such vague statements as - conduct 
unbecoming a student or not in the best interest of the school. 
Board regulations of this nature allow a wide latitude of in­
terpretation on the part of the school principal. 
Review of the cases in chapters two through six of this 
paper show the need for written codes of rights for students. 
A trend is developing in that such codes have been drawn up as 
guidelines for some schools and school districts. Sometimes 
called "student bill of rights," these written codes are most 
often found today in metropolitan areas. 
Some codes of student rights and responsibilities have 
been developed jointly with the local chapter of the American 
Civil Liberties Union. A guide to student rights was developed 
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independently by the American Civil Liberties Union chapter in 
New York City and distributed to students in the city without 
the endorsement of school officials.^ 
Some codes of student rights have been developed coopera­
tively by students, teachers, administrators and parents. 
These codes attempt to establish an operative definition of 
student liberties, rights and responsibilities. With a clear 
set of guidelines on paper, it may become easier for many school 
administrators to come to terms with the United States Consti­
tution. 
Written student codes are needed to clearly define the 
legal and social relations of the institution to the student 
and the student to the institution in such areas as speech, 
distribution of literature, dress, etc. 
Despite Tinker, written codes of student rights are 
also needed to define the gray areas of the law for both stu­
dents and teachers. Such codes may establish additional rights 
for students or may impose new restrictions. Many schools only 
need to put on paper their unwritten codes. 
Two examples of written codes will be given to show how 
they can be established. In the first example, a state seized 
Ira Glasser and Alan H. Lovine, "Bringing Student Rights 
to New York City's School System," Journal of Law and Education, 
Volume I (April, 1972), p. 213. 
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the opportunity to develop student responsibility while spell­
ing out student rights. A balance sheet is set forth in tan­
dem giving each right and its corresponding responsibility. 
This code was developed in South Dakota by a project 
financed through Title III, Section 303 of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act. The end result of the project in­
volving students, board members, teachers, principals and 
parents was the publication of A Guide to Student Rights and 
Responsibilities. The thirty-one page publication included 
the student code of rights and responsibilities on page ten 
through twelve. (see Appendix C). 
The second example is the code in Seattle, Washington 
where students were told that it was their responsibility as 
citizens to observe the laws of the United States and the State 
of Washington and/or its subdivisions. The code also points 
out that students shall respect the rights of others and not 
interfere with their education. 
The written code covers all aspects of the student's 
life at school. Each topic will be listed; but because of the 
length, only the topics related to the First, Fourth and Four­
teenth Amendments will be included in detail in this paper, 
(see Appendix C). 
Written codes of student rights will call for a revision 
in the procedure for handling student suspensions and expulsions 
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in the public schools. Such procedures will have to satisfy 
the requirements of due process. Most cases involving student 
rights in the federal courts resulted after suspension for 
violation of school rules. 
Until Tinker, few procedural requirements were placed 
upon the school when it decided to suspend or expel a student. 
Education was considered a privilege, not a right, prior to 
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education (19 54). This ques­
tion is still in doubt and will be pursued further, later in 
the chapter. 
North Carolina General Statute 115-147 permits a prin­
cipal to suspend a student for up to ten days. A suspension 
for over ten days must have the approval of the superintendent.^ 
Robert E. Phay in a fifty page publication for the In­
stitute of Government, University of North Carolina, recommends 
an examination of the procedures and policies for the suspen­
sion of students. These procedures and policies should be in 
written form. 
Phay calls for the establishment of a hearing board to 
make recommendations to the superintendent for any suspension 
^State Board of Education, Public School Laws of North 
Carolina (Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 197171 
p. 104. 
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over five days. Any suspension for less than five days would 
be handled administratively by the principal.1"*" 
The hearing board would be chaired by a presiding officer 
either appointed by the principal or elected by the faculty. 
This person would schedule and conduct the hearing, but would 
not have voting power. The board should consist of an odd num­
ber to avoid tie votes. 
Three options were recommended for the membership of 
the hearing board. Option one would find the board made up 
of students, teachers and parents. Option two would limit 
membership to teachers and parents and option three would con­
sist of teachers only. 
The hearing should be closed, with witnesses brought 
in only at the time to be heard. The parents of the student 
appearing before the board should be present. An attorney 
might be permitted, if the school board attorney were available 
for the hearing board. A record of the hearing should be kept 
in case of an appeal. 
The hearing board would vote on the evidence presented 
and send its recommendation to the superintendent. If the 
recommendation was to suspend, then the student should have 
Robert E. Phay and Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Student 
Suspensions and Expulsions : Proposed School Board Codes 
(Chapel Hill : Institute of Government, University of North 
Carolina, 19 70), p. 30. 
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the right of appeal either to the board of education or a dis-
12 trict review board. 
One direction of change in the public schools attribu­
table in part to the movement to gain student rights concerns 
compulsory attendance laws. Due to poor attendance and the 
number of drop-outs in the public schools, many educators are 
beginning to question the wisdom of compulsory attendance in 
13 school until age sixteen. 
Figures from the National Education Association and 
the United States Office of Education show that approximately 
seventy-eight percent of the students in the ninth grade in 
1966 graduated in 19 70. Poor attendance is an even greater 
problem with daily attendance less than fifty percent of en­
rollment on any given day in many inner-city schools. Enforce 
ment of compulsory attendance laws under such conditions be­
comes an impossibility. 
Still another reason for re-examining compulsory attend 
ance laws is the decision by the United States Supreme Court 
in Yoeder v. Wisconsin (.1973),in which the Court held that 
^Ibid. , pp. 35-36. 
"^Howard M. Johnson, "Are Compulsory Attendance Laws 
Outdated?" Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LV (December, 1973), p. 226 
"^Yoeder v. Wisconsin, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1973). 
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Amish children could not be forced to attend school beyond age 
fourteen. If Amish children cannot be compelled to go to 
school, it is hard to see how others can be under a rule of 
law that promises equal treatment to all. 
The relationship to student rights was established by 
the federal district court in Jeffers v. Yuba School District 
(1970) when a hair regulation in a California school was 
upheld partly because of compulsory attendance laws. The 
court pointed out that students did not always want to attend 
school and that discipline under such conditions was difficult 
to maintain. 
The National Commission on the Reform of Secondary Edu­
cation sponsored by the Kettering Foundation has urged the 
lowering of the compulsory attendance age to fourteen. The 
Commission stated that public schools could no longer remain 
custodial institutions in view of the expanded rights given 
students by the federal courts. 
The Commission further recommended that at age fourteen 
youngsters who did not wish to continue at traditional schools 
be given opportunities for alternate kinds of schooling. These 
"^Jeffers v. Yuba School District, 319 F. Supp. 368 
(1970) .  
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alternates would include occupational education, on-the-job 
training or entry into the job market.^ 
The recommendation of the National Commission is in 
line with the growing trend of starting small sub-schools as 
alternative schools with different educational emphasis from 
the traditional school. The intent is to offer students more 
of a choice and to place more responsibility on the student 
for his conduct and educational progress. 
Despite the call for change by the National Commission 
on the Reform of Secondary Education, changes in secondary 
education are extraordinarily slow in coming about. Demon­
stration schools or pilot programs may be established with 
federal funds but seldom are major revisions undertaken in a 
school system. 
Silberman in his book, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM,lists 
the changes taking place in the secondary schools into three 
broad categories: 
(1) Modest changes in school regulations designed to 
create a freer and more humane atmosphere outside the 
classroom; 
(2) Somewhat bolder attempts to humanize the schools 
as a whole - for example, by cutting the number of re­
quired classes, leaving students with a third or more 
16 
Los Angeles Times - Washington Post News Service 
Dispatch, Greensboro [N.C.] Daily News, December 9, 19 73. 
201 
of their time unscheduled, to be used for independent study, 
for taking more elective courses, for fulfilling some 
course requirements outside the classroom, or for relaxa­
tion and leisure; 
(3) Radical experiments involving changes of the most 
fundamental sort - reordering the curriculum and indeed 
the entire teaching - learning process, and in some in­
stances broadening the very concept of what constitutes 
a school.I? 
One finds most changes taking place in the secondary 
school are of the modest type. Some changes have occurred 
voluntarily and others have been mandated by court action. 
Examples are modification of dress and grooming regulations 
and eliminating the requirement of a pass to the toilet or 
library. 
One way in which high schools are finding it possible 
to move toward greater freedom and responsibility for their 
students is the adoption of flexible modular scheduling. 
Rather than six fixed periods of fifty minutes the school day 
is divided into modules of fifteen to twenty minutes which 
make it possible to vary class length. One might have forty 
minutes for a lecture or demonstration and eighty minutes for 
a seminar or lab. The schedule is also flexible in that it 
may vary each day. 
Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom 
tNew York : Random House, 19 70), p. 337. 
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Another innovative program in the secondary school is 
the mini-course. These courses which vary in length from one 
week to one semester began as non-credit courses of special 
interest to students such as guitar playing and pottery making. 
Mini-courses are now being taught as credit courses in 
some schools. Tnis is especially true in required courses 
such as English and Social Studies. Most courses are nine 
weeks in length which is one-fourth of the school year. One 
finds such mini-course titles as Mystery and Suspense, The Novel, 
Speech, Journalism, Adventures in Reading and many others listed 
in the curriculum guide of a high school English department. 
Some high schools offer twenty to thirty English mini-courses 
each nine weeks. The student still is required to take an 
English course each quarter but he has an option as to which 
one. 
Independent study is another approach to making schools 
more responsive to the needs of the student. This has been 
especially adaptable to the teaching of such courses as Russian, 
Botany and Advanced Math where only a few students in a given 
school wish to take the course. One instructor could possibly 
serve several schools using programmed material, tape recordings 
and video tapes. 
Whether by modular scheduling, mini-courses or indepen­
dent study one outgrowth has been to bring more openness to 
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the high school campus. The modular schedule permits blocks 
of time to be built in for research in the library or relaxa­
tion in the student lounge. A mini-course in English may in­
volve a nine week project culminating in a poetry booklet com­
plete with illustrations. The student involved in an indepen­
dent study program has unscheduled time set aside each day. 
These are not separate programs from which a school 
must select one, for all three or a combination of any two may 
be found in a given school. 
A radical change in secondary schools took place with 
the introduction of the alternative school. The forerunners 
of the alternative school concept can be found in the Philadel­
phia Parkway Program, the Murray Road Annex in Newton, Massa­
chusetts and John Adams High School in Portland, Oregon. 
NATION'S SCHOOLS found in November of 19 72 that sixty 
school districts are either operating or planning to begin some 
form of alternative school. These alternatives cover grades 
K-12 and include open schools, learning centers, community 
19 schools and schools without walls. 
18Ibid., p. 349. 
19 
Robert D. Barr, Vernon H. Smith and Daniel J. Burke, 
"All About Alternatives," Nation's Schools, Vol. 90 
(November, 19 72), p. 33. 
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Open schools are patterned after the British Infant 
School. Space is divided into resource areas, which works 
especially well in the non-graded schools. Emphasis is placed 
on informality, independence and creativity. 
Learning centers are specialized subject area centers 
that usually serve students of all schools in a school system. 
Students leave their regular school and go to the learning 
center for seminars or mini-courses in subjects like physics, 
foreign language, art or career exploration. 
Community schools are designed to involve both parents 
and students in policy-making with professionals. Students 
help to decide the courses to be taught, help to select the 
instructors and participate in drawing up rules and regulations. 
Community schools differ greatly in structure, organization 
and approach to teaching. 
Schools without walls began with the Philadelphia's 
Parkway Program. The school functions without classrooms by 
utilizing the resources of the community. Parkway offers stu­
dents over a hundred learning options in hospitals, museums, 
social agencies and local businesses.^0 
Alternative schools or options to the traditional school 
program may represent an effective change mechanism for 
20 
Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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education. Alternative schools should be thought of not as a 
cure all for public education, but only as one of a variety of 
change strategies to solve educational problems. 
The process should take precedence over substance in 
alternative schools. For example, student participation in 
decision-making essential to an alternative school may also 
be found in a regular school. The alternative or option should 
provide a different way of constructing a learning environment 
for a group of children which would be impossible, if the 
alternative did not exist. 
Today there is a need in the alternative school's field 
for research and evaluation. Research is needed to learn more 
about the effects of options as a change strategy for public 
school systems. Evaluation is needed to help guide partici-
21 
pants in making decisions as to how to reach desired goals. 
Alternative schools are more in line with student life 
styles in the 1970's than traditional schools. Schedules are 
usually more flexible and rigid rules and regulations are con­
spicuously absent. School officials maintain control while 
sharing real power and responsibility for the success of the 
school program with students. 
21 
"David L. Clark, "Options-Success or Failure?" 
NASSP Bulletin, Vol. 57 (September, 1973), pp. 2-3. 
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The changes taking place in the curriculum of secondary 
schools today can be attributed in part to student efforts to 
gain constitutional rights. While these changes might have 
occurred eventually, they certainly appeared more quickly as 
a result of the student revolution. 
The student movement offers a tremendous impetus and 
indefinite resource for educational reform in the United 
States. Through the objectives and energies of youngsters a 
new institutional foundation can be constructed. The angry 
voices of the young do not deserve just more coverage by the 
press and media. They also deserve responsible and responsive 
action by school officials. 
Another result of the student revolution is the es­
tablishment of a student advocate or student ombudsman who 
will represent student interest. The ombudsman idea came from 
Sweden where the office of "citizens' protector" was set up 
one hundred-sixty years ago to watch-dog the government.22 
The idea seems to have merit in the schools as a way 
of dealing with student unrest and of protecting student rights 
against arbitrary and impersonal district bureaucracies. 
2 2  
"Crusader For Conciliation," Nation's Schools, 
Vol. 89 (June, 1972), p. 33. 
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Opinions differ as to where the school ombudsman fits 
into the school structure. Is he independent, an administra­
tor, a faculty member or student? Is he responsible to the 
principal, the superintendent or the board of education? Does 
he serve one school or the entire district? 
The answer to these questions would vary according to 
the school or school district of the particular ombudsman. 
The ombudsman in Englewood, New Jersey, is a faculty member 
responsible to the superintendent and serving one school. The 
Montgomery County, Maryland, ombudsman serves as a district 
representative for the system. He is an administrator re­
sponsible to the board of education. The high school in El 
Cerito, California, has a student ombudsman, who is responsi­
ble to the principal. 
By far the largest and most ambitious school ombudsman 
program in the United States can be found in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. Under the controversial "Student Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities" adopte., by the board of education in 
December, 1970, the students choose their own ombudsman. They 
may pick an adult, peer or no one at all. Most schools have 
chosen students, but teachers, parents and people in the com­
munity also serve. The student ombudsman in the Philadelphia 
2 3 program serves without pay. 
^Ibid. , pp. 34-37. 
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Schools using the student ombudsman have not emphasized 
the watch-dog function; however, they have used the position 
as one of conciliation and communication between administra­
tion, faculty, students and the community. The primary duty 
of the ombudsman to this point has been that of fact-finding 
in the mediation of complaints. Rather than authority, he 
has relied on politeness and tact to accomplish his task. 
The position of student ombudsman may well be one that 
will be required, if the high school of the future is to operate 
effectively. The person in the position would be in charge 
of all the school services that serve the wants, needs and 
purposes of students. The success of the position will depend 
on the ability of the ombudsman to always speak for students 
and at the same time to work cooperatively with the faculty 
and administration of the school. 
M. Chester Nolte, professor of educational administra­
tion at the University of Denver, went one step beyond the om­
budsman and suggested the possibility of boards of education 
negotiating with students. The precedent is already established, 
since boards have gone to collective bargaining, with teachers, 
even in states that have no legislation on the subject. 
Nolte found no legal barrier to collective bargaining 
on student rights in most states. He points out that many 
school principals have bargained with students in arriving 
209 
at dress codes, behavior and ethical standards. A written 
agreementthus arrived at would help each side to know what 
to expect from the other. Youngsters might have more respect 
O || 
for a set of rules they help formulate themselves. 
Codes of student rights and responsibilities, student 
disciplinary hearing boards and possible student negotiations 
call for a restructuring of student government organizations 
in secondary schools. Student councils need to be upgraded 
if they are to truly represent various student concerns. 
Traditionally, only honor students have become student 
council members and their main function has been to plan 
school dances and keep the halls clean. If these councils 
are to become student policy-making groups, they need to be 
given far greater voice in developing positive programs about 
hall rules, cafeteria regulations, curriculum changes and en­
forcement of student developed rules and regulations. 
One suggestion for making student government more viable 
is to have student council participation accredited as a lab­
oratory course in political science. A second method would 
provide an avenue for conflict resolution among students by 
establishing disciplinary hearing boards as a student council 
function. Finally, it is suggested that special days be set 
M. Chester Nolte, "Student Rights:The Next Negotiable?" 
American School Board Journal, Vol. 159 (November, 1971), 
pp. h^-45. 
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&side once a month with student planned classes, seminars or 
programs. A two or three hour period for student activities 
can be arranged by having a shortened schedule for regular 
classes. 
High school youngsters are saying that student in­
volvement does not necessarily mean student dissent. This 
offers a potential resource to schools if educators take ad­
vantage of student interest and channel it into responsible 
areas of activity. Thus, the means of achieving a new level 
of student involvement is limited only by the imaginations 
of students and educators. 
The reaction of school officials to the student revo­
lution has been as varied as the protest of students. Many 
administrators are attempting through their leadership to 
involve students in the decision making process, to restruc­
ture the curriculum and to help students understand that when 
one exercises constitutional rights he must also assume re­
sponsibility. 
Other administrators have not been as creative and 
are attempting to recontrol students through suspension and 
expulsion, use of police in school and loyalty oaths. This 
Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor, Student Unrest: 
Threat or Promise (Washington: Association for Supervision 
and Curriculum Development, 1970), p. 88. 
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repression has not worked,as Silberman points out in this 
statement: 
Certainly it is clear that repression does not work 
that "cracking down" serves only to breed more defiance 
and disruption, which breeds more repression and so on 
ad infinitum. And all the more so when "cracking down" 
is accompanied by the kind of arbitrariness, racial pre­
judice, assumption of student guilt and general disre­
gard of individual rights that characterizes "difficult 
schools." In a war between faculty and students, the 
students are bound to win, there are more of them, and 
when put to the test, they can be disruptive in the 
most ingenious ways.26 
Another response on the part of educational leaders to 
the student revolution has been to ignore or deny that a 
crisis exists. These administrators focus on symptoms of 
unrest rather than inequities in school life. Such educators 
may distort student grievances or demands to gain sympathy 
and support from the community. Still another form of denial 
is the administrator's statement that he is powerless to act 
and students should go to the superintendent or board of edu­
cation with their grievance. 
A third popular response used in a crisis is the attempt 
to cool off the situation by talking matters to death. Admini­
strators use this response as a delaying tactic to avoid an­
swering a student grievance or to consolidate their position. 
26 Silberman, op. cit. , p. 340. 
212 
It is evident that school boards and administrators are 
becoming more sophisticated in drawing up school rules and re­
gulations. Detailed dress and grooming regulations have given 
way to broad general statements on student conduct. Students 
now face suspension for being disrespectful, provocative or 
disruptive. 
School boards and administrators have also become more 
knowledgeable about the application of the Bill of Rights to 
high school students by the federal courts. Since Tinker, 
each new student rights decision has brought a review and 
often a modification of school rules and regulations in an 
effort to avoid litigation^ 
The well informed administrator knows the courts are 
not anxious to become school administrators and handle every 
act of disobedience and disruption in the schools. He re­
alizes that courts will interfere only when administrators 
act outside the legal parameters set forth by the courts. 
Since it would be impossible for a stated rule to cover 
all possible situations concerning student conduct, administra 
tors do possess the prerogative to exercise discretion in 
governing situations that continually arise in the day-to-day 
operation of their schools. The courts have only said that 
administrators must act in good faith and with reason in 
exercising their prerogative as disciplinarians. 
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Some administrators feeling that the movement to gain 
student rights is a threat to their authority continue to re­
strict student expression and appearance despite federal court 
rulings to the contrary in their district. These administra­
tors realize that a suit through the federal courts is a long 
and difficult process. Also, they are aware that each case 
stands on the merits of the facts presented to the court un­
less it is a class action case. 
These administrators continue to enforce regulations 
that probably would not be upheld by the courts knowing the 
odds are they will not be challenged. This enforcement often 
has the backing and support of the majority of people in the 
community. 
Such action by school administrators prompted the Ameri­
can Civil Liberties Union to issue a memorandum on class action 
in civil liberty cases. Designed for use primarily in hair 
and dress cases the memorandum came out in April, 19 70. Called 
a plaintiff's class action it secures a judgment on behalf of 
the class. If a defendant does not comply with the court de­
cision, any member of the class can seek relief without having 
to initiate a law suit. This tactic proved most successful 
during the Civil Rights Movement in suits filed on behalf of 
all black children in a particular school or school system. 
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This memorandum advocates a new procedure known as 
bilateral class action where the judgment of the court is 
binding on both parties to the suit. Thus, a decision on 
behalf of all high school students affected by the rule would 
be binding on all principals in an administrative unit. This 
recommendation is aimed particularly at school systems where 
regulations on dress and grooming are left to the discretion 
of the school prinicpal. 
The organization points out that risks are involved, 
for a bilateral class action results in added procedural diffi­
culties and renders improbable new suits on the same issue, 
if the suit is lost.2? 
The high school principal, as a result of the expansion 
of student rights, is faced with the critical task in the 1970's 
of redefining the concept of discipline in the public schools. 
Many principals believe they must decide between authoritarian 
rule or a completely permissive atmosphere. These administra­
tors feel the courts are forcing them toward the latter choice. 
Some form of control must be present to insure a learn­
ing environment in a public school. North Carolina General 
Statute 115-146 under the paragraph entitled "Duties of Teachers 
and Principals" states in part: 
2 American Civil Liberties Union, Class Actions in Civil 
Liberty Cases (Memorandum. New York: American Civil Liberties 
Union, 1970). 
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It shall be the duty of all teachers, including student 
teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' 
aides and assistants when given authority over some part of 
the school program by the principal or supervising teacher, 
to maintain good order or discipline in their respective 
schools; . . .28 
This law points out that principals and teachers in 
North Carolina are the qualified people legally charged with 
the responsibility of maintaining discipline. 
A professor at Virginia Commonwealth University writing 
in THE HIGH SCHOOL JOURNAL points to punishment as the key ele­
ment in discipline. He feels that punishment should not be 
generalized but thought of as treatment of the individual pro­
blem. The author further states his position on discipline by 
saying: 
. . .  i f  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s  a r e  g o i n g  t o  p r o d u c e  s t u d e n t s  
as individuals capable of facing and coping with the com­
plex problems of our society, individuals who will feel 
responsible for their actions and behavior, school prin­
cipals must see to it that discipline exists as an educa­
tional experience and cease to be solely punitive. 
Robert L. Ackerly, chief counsel for the National Asso­
ciation of Secondary School Principals, in his publication THE 
REASONABLE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY while calling for full parti­
cipation of students in drawing up rules of discipline agrees 
^®State Board of Education, Public School Laws of North 
Carolina (Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1971), p. 104. 
29Richard S. Vacca, "The Principal as Disciplinarian: 
Some Thoughts and Suggestions for the 70's," The High School 
Journal, Vol. 54 (March, 1971), p. 406. 
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that public school principals are responsible for discipline 
and order in the school. Ackerly said: 
The principal must in the final analysis, exercise the 
final authority and assume responsibility for the proper 
application of all rules. The rule of law, not the rule 
of personality should be his guide. Tolerance of dissent 
and non-violent protest may avoid violence and serious 
disruption. 
The Gallup Poll on important problems confronting the 
public schools found discipline at the top of the list in four 
of the last five years. In 1971 the public cited finance as 
31 the major school problem, with discipline rated third. 
Whether the result of an irrelevant curriculum, permis­
siveness in society, expanded student rights, Hippie influence, 
drugs or other school and societal causes discipline seems 
likely to remain the major problem of school administrators 
in the 19 70's. 
Discipline remains the means of achieving the necessary 
climate for effective teaching and learning within the school. 
The courts have not said that schools must give up discipline 
to remain within the framework of the law. The court's position 
30 Robert L. Ackerly, The Reasonable Exercise of Authority 
(Washington: National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
1969), pp. 15-16. 
31 
George H. Gallup, "The Fifth Annual Gallup Poll of 
Public Attitudes Toward Education," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 
LV (September, 1973), p. 38. 
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is that administrators may not act arbitrarily, but must 
observe due process of law. One might say that courts are 
replacing the in loco parentis doctrine with the. due process 
doctrine. 
One question that arises out of cases involving the 
constitutional rights of students in the federal courts is 
whether education in the United States is a right or privilege. 
This question remains unresolved. 
The United States Supreme Court in a five to four deci­
sion in the historic desegregation case of Brown v. Board of 
3 2 Education (1954) and subsequent decisions involving race 
have held that education is a right which should be available 
to all students regardless of race, nationality or ethnic back­
ground . 
The case of Serrano v. Priest (1971)33 before the Supreme 
Court of California challenged the public school financing sys­
tem in the state with its substantial dependence on local pro­
perty taxes and resultant wide disparities in school revenue, 
as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
32 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). 
33 
Serrano v. Priest, 9 6 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). 
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The California Court cited the Brown decision of 1954 
in holding that education is a right, by saying: 
We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless 
function of education in our society warrants, indeed 
compels, our treating it as a fundamental interest.^ 
A similar case in Texas, San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez (19 73),^ reached the United 
States Supreme Court. The Court in a five to four decision 
ruled that education is not a fundamental right since it is 
not specified in the Constitution. Justice Powell for the 
majority . stated: 
Education ... is not among the rights afforded ex­
plicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor 
do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so 
protected.36 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has expressed 
opposite views in Brown and Rodriguez on whether education 
is a right or privilege. Constitutional rights of students 
could be the issue that decides whether education is a con­
stitutionally protected right in the United States. 
3UIbid. I 
3®San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, v 
16-105, 4FT1973). 
36Ibid. 
I 
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The status of student rights in secondary schools 
today can best be illustrated by this statement in Esteban v. 
Central Missouri State College (1969) : 3"7 
The court recognizes that education is no longer a 
luxury but a necessity, education is vital and valuable . 
and remaining in college or school in good standing, much 
like reputation is something of value. So, too, is one's 
personal freedom. But one may act so as to constitutionally 
lose his right or privilege to attend a college or a school. 
Any student rights issue could conceivably reach the 
United States Supreme Court just as the wearing of black arm­
bands did in Tinker. The issue may not be as important as 
the suspension or expulsion of the student which denies him 
an education whether it be a right or a privilege. It appears 
the Fourteenth Amendment may be the route to student consti­
tutional rights and the establishment of education as a fede­
rally protected right. 
Tinker and other federal court decisions covered in this 
paper are only the beginning of the search for a definition of 
student rights. There is an emerging trend toward an extension 
of student rights in the public schools,but full constitutional 
guarantees will not be achieved until society demands the change 
and makes it imperative upon the courts. 
^Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 
1077 (196771 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Decisions of the federal courts in cases involving 
student rights have had a great impact on the public schools 
since 1967. The time in which children are viewed as chattels 
in the public schools is long passed. Students are now con­
sidered clients of the school. Schools exist for students 
and the school's purpose is to serve them. 
Students in the public schools have two basic rights: 
(1) rights guaranteed to them as citizens under the United 
States Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and (2) rights 
they derive as clients of an educational institution. -*• The 
constituional rights of students are decided by federal courts 
on a case by case basis. Thus each case stands on its own 
merit and each decision is based on the facts before the court. 
Decisions in previous cases are often cited as precedents to 
an issue before the court. The circumstances in each case 
must be considered by the court before handing down a deci­
sion. 
National Education Association, "Student Rights and 
Responsibilities," Today's Education, Vol. 61 (January, 1972), 
p. 50. 
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The courts are not anxious to become school adminis­
trators and historically have been reluctant to interfere 
with the principal's control of students in the secondary 
school. The courts remain reluctant to become enmeshed in 
educational policy and will only when the actions of adminis­
trators are arbitrary or capricious. 
The substantive constitutional rights of students are 
defined in degrees and such degrees are defined by court de­
cisions. This is especially true in the federal district 
courts where decisions governing the constitutional rights 
of students are dependent in part upon the judge's attitude 
and philosophy. 
Since the Supreme Court in the Gault decision ruled 
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
A 
is for adults alone," federal courts have been in the process 
of defining the constitutional rights of secondary students. 
The reported decisions in this study are only the beginning 
of this search for a definition of student rights. 
Tinker remains the only discipline case from the 
public schools to be decided by the United States Supreme 
Court. Tinker along with the decision in Gault extended 
2In re Gault, 307 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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constitutional rights to juveniles both in and out of school. 
The extension of rights to students must consider a 
balance between institutional needs and individual rights. 
The rights of students like those of adults are not absolute. 
Also, the rights of one student should not limit the rights 
of another student. 
The question of students' freedom came before the United 
States Supreme Court in West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette (19 43). In this case involving a required flag salute 
in all public schools of the state the Court proclaimed: 
. . . that educating the young for citizenship is reason 
for scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of 
our government as mere platitudes. 
This case won by Barnette, a Jehovah's Witness, did not 
recognize student rights; for it only prohibited the state from 
compelling individuals to act in a certain manner. However, 
Barnette philosophically did lay the ground work for the Tinker 
decision which established student rights. 
Despite the gains made since Tinker, Nat Hentoff made 
the following statement on student rights in 1971: 
Such basic rights of an American citizen as freedom of 
speech and assembly, protection from invasion of privacy, 
^West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
637 (194377" 
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and guarantee of due process of law do not exist for the 
overwhelming majority of high school students.4 
Since the constitutional rights of students are emerg­
ing as an issue in the federal courts a summary of these rights 
xs included here. These rights are protected by the First, 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu­
tion. 
Justice Fortas in the Tinker decision pointed out that 
"students did not shed their constitutional rights at the school 
house gate."5 He went further in stating that wearing of arm­
bands divorced from disruptive conduct was closely akin to 
pure speech. 
The Court, while pointing out that speech holds a pri­
vileged position, stated that this right must be balanced a-
gainst the state interest of maintaining a school system. 
The federal courts have repeatedly held that freedom 
of speech is not an absolute right and officials may make rea­
sonable rules and regulations for the maintaining of order in 
\ 
the school. 
The courts have also held that a student's freedom of 
expression could be limited, if it resulted in school dis­
ruption. This was evidenced by the Fifth Circuit Court deci-
^Nat Hentoff, "Students Want Their Constitutional 
Rights," The Education Digest, XXXVII (October, 1971), p. 39. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U.S. 506 (1969). 
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sion in Blackwell where school officials were upheld, because 
of the disruptive activity of students wearing buttons. In 
the Burnside case before the same court on the same day, the 
right of students to wear buttons was upheld due to the ab­
sence of any disruptive conduct. 
The major problem in any speech or expression case is 
defining substantial disruption and determining the reason­
ableness of a rule or regulation. This determination is made 
on the basis of facts before the court. Protection of free 
speech is usually afforded on a sliding scale. The less the 
speech element, the less protection the First Amendment gives 
to a particular form of expression. 
The key to student freedom of expression centers around 
the "clear and present danger" and "balancing" test so often 
referred to by the federal courts. These tests, while recog­
nizing governmental power to inhibit speech, does not permit 
across the board application of this limitation. 
A review of cases involving freedom of the press found 
courts generally upholding the students' right to publish 
and distribute underground newspapers. In doing so, the courts 
pointed out that state laws of libel and slander remain avail­
able and cover such publications. 
While upholding the publication and distribution rights 
of students, the courts stated that school authorities may de­
225 
termine the time, place, manner and duration of distribution 
on school premises. On these points the. courts are in agree­
ment and consistent in their judgments. Freedom of the press 
is thus one of the most settled of the constitutional rights 
of students. 
One aspect of freedom of the press remains to be resolved. 
This is the question of prior restraint or censorship of the 
press. The Second Circuit Court in Eisner held that rules of 
prior restraint could be drawn up by boards of education with­
in certain constitutional limits. The Fourth Circuit Court 
agreed in Quarterman using Eisner as the basis for its decision. 
The Seventh Circuit Court in Fujishima held that no rule of 
prior restraint.could be adopted by boards of education. This 
aspect of the issue will likely remain unclear until the United 
States Supreme Court rules on the question of prior restraint. 
The right of assembly is a constitutionally protected 
right, but it has only been challenged as a result of sit-ins, 
walk-outs or other types of protest in the public schools. 
Students are limited in the exercise of this right by class 
periods. The right of assembly outside of class time can be 
limited in time of an emergency. 
The courts have ruled that stricter regulations are per­
missible for high school students, than for college students. 
The state is able to impose greater restrictions on demonstra­
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tion activity at the high school level during the school day, 
because of the responsibility to use limited student time most 
efficiently. 
High school students have the right to assemble peace­
ably on campus during school hours, when class attendance is 
not mandatory. This First Amendment protection does assure 
students of an outlet for their grievances, since it also in­
volves the right to petition. 
Once again one must define what constitutes a peaceful 
assembly or an orderly demonstration. As with freedom of speech 
and the press, any activity that disrupts the educational pro­
cess is not constitutionally protected. 
Freedom of association in the judicial sense remains in 
the abstract as an alleged right in the public schools, for it 
has not been challenged in the federal courts. State courts, 
however, have consistently upheld anti-fraternity rules in the 
public schools. 
Chapter five reviewed both state and federal cases in­
volving Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search 
and seizure in the public schools. Several state casfes were 
reviewed, since this is an emerging issue brought about primari­
ly by drugs in the school. 
The courts have said that this protection is not an ab-
I 
solute right, for there is such a thing as a "reasonable search." 
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What constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure, as 
specified in the Constitution is difficult to state, and it 
must be determined by the facts in each case. The standard 
established by courts is reasonable cause to believe that crim­
inal law is being violated or other evil is present.6 
The doctrine of in loco parentis remains undisturbed as 
to the Fourth Amendment rights of students. In view of this 
fact, students should consider their lockers public, not pri­
vate places. School lockers are not the exclusive possession 
of the student, for the school retains ownership. State courts 
have also ruled that the search of a student does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, if it is made with probable cause or on 
reasonable suspicion. 
The courts have ruled that school administrators are not 
government officials, for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 
Further, the courts have held that school officials not only 
have the authority; but also have a duty to search, if necessary. 
Court decisions indicate that if a student has reached 
the age of criminal responsibility, the prudent action for school 
authorities would be to call the police and let them make a 
search with a warrant, if such action might result in an arrest. 
g  . . .  
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy Sta:te Univer­
sity, 284 F. Supp. 725 (1968). 
228 
If circumstances do not permit such action, the school admini­
strator should have the student present and a third party as 
a witness, before making a search of the student or his locker. 
No issue remains as uncertain and with as many conflict­
ing court decisions as that of regulations on dress and groom­
ing in the public schools. Cases on this issue were reviewed 
extensively in chapter six. This controversial issue has cen­
tered primarily around the question of male hair length and 
suspension for violation of grooming codes. 
Not only has the issue been conflicting judicially; 
but also procedurally, as rules and regulations on dress and 
grooming have been challenged under several amendments to the 
constitution. Challenges have been brought under: (1) The 
First Amendment as violating freedom of expression, (2) The 
Ninth Amendment as violating the right of privacy,7 (3) The 
combining of First and Ninth Amendment to find a penumbra in 
Q 
which the right to govern one's appearance is fundamental, 
and (4) The Fourteenth Amendment - Equal Protection Clause 
and Due Process Clause. Most courts have considered the issue 
under the Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process Clause. 
7Crews v. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1259 (1970). 
8Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034 (1969). 
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In general, dress and appearance may be regulated only 
when necessary for reasons of health, safety, and welfare of 
students or to control material disruption of the school pro­
gram. 
With decisions on dress and grooming running about fifty-
five to forty-five percent in favor of the students, one can 
see the split in the circuit courts. The circuits upholding 
dress and grooming regulations are doing so when school au­
thorities show the need for such rules, if they are reasonable. 
Reasonableness becomes the key in determining if regu­
lations on dress and grooming violate the constitutional rights 
of students. Courts determine reasonableness by: (1) the cir­
cumstances of each case, (2) the evidence of need for such rules, 
(3) the rationale behind the questioned rule, and (4) the rela-
9 tionship of rule to the operatxon of the school. 
The effect of the regulation on the student is another 
judicial criterion of reasonableness. Prohibiting students from 
playing in the school band or participating in athletics is one 
thing, but it is another matter for a student to be denied an 
education because of his hair length. 
Ronald Sealey, "The Courts and Student Rights - Substan­
tive Matters," Emerging Problems in School Law (Topeka, Kansas: 
National Organization on Legal Problems in Education, 19 72), 
pp. 31-34. 
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The courts have said that certain elements of dress 
can be controlled by school authorities. The idea that stu­
dents may wear whatever they want to at school is an over-
generalization. If a particular element of dress or appear­
ance constitutes a health hazard, the element can be con­
trolled. Thus students with dirty hair or apparel can be 
barred. If the regulation is justifiable as a safety pre­
caution, it is enforceable in any activity where a danger 
derived from the attire is present. As a distraction school 
officials can bar those who are obscenely or scantily clad. 
Appearance rules generally can be enforced if uni­
formity of dress is important for the activity such as a 
band concert or graduation exercise. The rules must be applied 
equally so that if long-haired females can participate in band, 
long-haired males cannot be excluded. in regard to uniformity 
of appearance for athletic competition, the cases are in con­
flict. 
Another legal problem with many dress codes is that 
they are either too vague or too broad. Thus a regulation 
prohibiting extreme hair style allows the administrator 
to have complete authority in determining the standard to be 
applied. An example of an over-broad regulation is one com­
pletely banning dungarees which are acceptable on the streets. 
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Underlying this whole new concept of student rights 
is the one basic fact that all actions by school authorities 
should be ones of fairness to all students. Students need 
to feel that individuals in responsible positions will not 
act in an arbitrary way. Decisions should be based on facts. 
School districts as arms of the state government must uphold 
the concept of one's legal rights. 
Guidelines for school administrators which should 
help to minimize disruptions in the educational process and 
protect them in the event of litigation are included here. 
These guidelines are drawn from a review of the cases in 
this study and will cover only those areas. 
These guidelines will be general in nature, since stu­
dent rights are generally relative as compared to absolute. 
The relative rights of students were described by Justice 
Wysanski in Richards v. Thurston (1969), with this statement: 
Order can be defined properly only in terms of the 
liberties for which it exists, as liberty can be defined 
properly only in terms of the ordered society in which it 
thrives. As Albert Camus implied in The Rebel. order and 
liberty must find their limits in each other. 
The guidelines that follow are not intended as the final 
statement on student rights, because circumstances differ in 
^Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (1969). 
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in each case. Despite this limitation, much of what is con­
tained should contribute to a better understanding of students' 
constitutional rights. 
I. Freedom of Speech. 
A. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right of freedom of speech to all 
Americans, including students. 
B. This constitutional right is not absolute and does not 
include license to interfere with the orderly conduct 
of class, to coerce or violate the rights of others. 
C. Student speech may be subject to disciplinary action 
by school officials, if such speech: 
1. is slanderous 
2. poses a clear and present danger to school proper­
ty or other students 
3. materially and substantially interferes with the 
normal operation of the school. 
II. Freedom of Expression 
A. Students have the right to wear or display buttons, 
armbands, flags, decals or other badges of symbolic 
expression. 
B. Symbols worn by students must symbolize a specific 
viewpoint or idea to be protected by the Constitution. 
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C. The right of expression may be limited by school offi­
cials, when its. exercise materially disrupts the edu­
cational process or infringes on the rights of others. 
III. Freedom of the Press. 
A. The First Amendment provision of freedom of the press 
gives students the right of distribution on campus. 
This right extends to their own publications. 
B. School officials may regulate the time, manner, place 
and duration of distribution on the campus. 
C. The distribution of such material may not interfere 
with or disrupt the educational process. 
D. All material must identify the person or persons dis­
tributing*, who in turn, assume full responsibility for 
the content of such publications. 
E. Distribution may be prohibited by school officials, 
when publications contain material that is obscene or 
libelous. Also prohibited is material which expresses 
or advocates racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice 
creating a clear and present danger to the orderly 
operation of the school. 
IV. Assembly: 
A. Students may exercise their constitutionally protected 
right peaceably to assemble provided it does not inter­
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fere with the operation of the regular school program. 
B. Under this right, students may also petition school 
officials for redress of grievances. 
C. Facilities, under the right of assembly, must be 
granted on a non-discriminatory basis to school groups 
without regard to point of view. 
V. Association: 
A. State courts have consistently upheld school rules 
prohibiting secret societies and fraternities in the 
high schools. 
VI. Search and Seizure: 
A. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit reasonable 
search, when the search is conducted by a superior 
charged with the responsibility of maintaining dis­
cipline and order or of maintaining security. 
B. The principal is not a government official within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
C. The principal may search a student or his locker on 
reasonable suspicion. 
D. The right of inspection of students' school lockers 
is inherent in the authority granted school boards 
and administrators and should be exercised so as to 
assure parents that the school will exercise every 
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safeguard for the well-being of the children. 
E. The courts have left the doctrine of in loco paren­
tis undisturbed with respect to locker search. 
VII. Dress and Grooming: 
A. Students should have the right to determine their 
appearance provided it is not destructive to school 
property, complies with health and safety standards 
and does not interfere with the educational process. 
B. Regulations governing hair will probably be upheld 
within the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Fede­
ral Court Circuits, if school officials show some 
compelling reason related to education to justify 
such regulations. 
C. Articles of clothing that cause excessive mainte­
nance problems such as cleats on shoes that scratch 
floors and rivets on jackets that scratch furniture 
can be ruled unacceptable. 
D. Apparel must meet obscenity standards in the com­
munity . 
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APPENDIX A 
CHAPTER V 
THE MIRANDA WARNING 
The United States Supreme Court case of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), set out clear requisities 
for policemen when making an arrest: The Miranda warning 
demands that an individual subject to arrest must be advised 
that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he 
says may be used against him in a court of law; and that, if 
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed before 
any further questions are asked. 
SEARCH OF STUDENT AND LOCKERS 
The National Association of Secondary School Princi­
pals in a Legal Memorandum on search and seizure in Septem­
ber of 1972 suggested that in the spirit of due process the 
following general guidelines might well be taken into account 
when personally making a search of the student and/or his 
property: 
1. The student should be present when his property 
is searched. 
2. The presence of a third party as witness could 
well prevent many kinds of countercharges. 
3. Although not legally required in a strict sense, 
an attempt to secure prior student consent would 
promote student - administrative relationships. 
4. The school has keys or combinations to the lockers 
and the students are on some form of prior notice 
that the school reserves the right to search the 
lockers. 
250 
APPENDIX B 
CHAPTER VI 
The Pittsfield School Board adopted the proposed dress code 
which was initiated by the student council. 
DRESS CODE 
1970-71 
BOYS: 
1. Hair cannot be over the eyes, ears or over the 
collar. Sideburns are allowed provided they are 
not below the earlobe. 
2. Shirts must be tucked in unless they are square 
cut in which case they can be left out. T-shirts, 
sweatshirts will not be allowed as outside garments. 
Jersey shirts without lettering or pictures will be 
allowed. 
GIRLS: 
3. Dungarees will not be allowed. 
4. Cleats will not be added to ehoes. Socks must be 
worn at all times. Sandals will not be allowed. 
5. No neck jewelry. 
6. Outer clothing will remain in the locker unless 
specific permission is given by the office. 
7. No bell bottoms will be allowed. 
1. No dungarees, slacks or shorts will be worn during 
the school day. 
2. Blouses will be tucked in unless designed with a 
straight edge. 
3. Skirts must be a reasonable length and in lady like 
appearance. 
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4. Culottes may be worn. 
5. Make up may be worn with discretion. No hairclips, 
curlers, or kerchiefs may be worn. 
6. Sandals are not allowed. 
7. Maxi and midi skirts will be allowed. 
GENERAL: 
1. Ankle high footwear may be worn. 
2. No bleached clothing will be allowed. 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
42 U.S.C.A. 1981 
Equal Rights Under the Law 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have the same right in every state and territory to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and 
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and 
no other. 
42 U.S.C.A. 1983. 
Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, sub­
jects, or causes within the jurisdiction there of to the de­
privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed­
ings for redress. 
28 U.S.C.A. 1343 
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 3. Purpose 
Provisions of this section authorizing civil action in 
district courts to redress deprivation, under color of any 
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state law, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the 
Constitution of the United States or by acts of Congress pro­
viding for equal rights of citizens has as its purpose the 
enforcement of U.S.C.A., Constitutional Amendment 14. 
This section conferring jurisdiction in civil rights 
cases was not adopted to supersede state laws affording re­
medies for derelictions by state officials but was enacted 
to provide remedy only where one either did not exist or for 
some reason existing remedy was unenforced or otherwise in­
sufficient . 
Major purpose of civil rights jurisdiction of federal 
courts is to redress deprivation of constitutional rights 
having no pecuniary valuation. 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
First Circuit: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island 
Second Circuit: New York, Connecticut, Vermont 
Third Circuit: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware 
Fourth Circuit: West Virginia, District of Columbia, Virginia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina 
Fifth Circuit: Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, 
Louisiana, Texas 
Sixth Circuit: Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee 
Seventh Circuit: Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana 
Eighth Circuit: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas 
Ninth Circuit: Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, 
Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Arizona 
Tenth Circuit: Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Kansas, 
Oklahoma 
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APPENDIX C 
CHAPTER VII 
A GUIDE TO STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
IN SOUTH DAKOTA 
Free Public Education 
A prized birthright of state citizens is that an educa­
tion at public expense for those citizens between the ages of 
five and twenty-one unless they graduate from high school be­
fore the age of twenty-one. The birthright carries with it 
correlative responsibilities, as follows: 
It is the Student's Right to: It is the Student's Respon­
sibility to: 
Attend school in the district 
in which his/her parent or 
legal guardian resides 
Attend school until graduation 
from high school at public 
expense 
Obtain free textbooks and 
supplies needed in the course 
of study 
Attend school at no expense 
even though married 
It is the Student's Right to: 
Assist in the making of 
decisions affecting his/her 
life in school 
Attend school daily, except 
when ill, and to be on time 
at all classes 
Attend school until sixteen 
or complete the eighth grade 
Pay admission to activities 
if attendance therein is 
voluntary 
Obey reasonable restrictions 
on married students where the 
board has such rules and regu­
lations 
It is the Student's Responsi­
bility to: 
Pursue and attempt to complete 
the course of study prescribed 
by the state and local 
authorities 
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Express his/her opinions 
verbally or in writing 
Expect that the school will be 
a safe place for all students 
to gain an education 
Dress in such a way as to 
express his/her personality 
File a grievance with the 
appropriate school official 
when accused of misconduct 
Be afforded a fair hearing with 
the opportunity to call wit­
nesses in his/her own behalf, 
and to appeal his/her case in 
event of disciplinary action 
Expect that where he/she bears 
witness in a disciplinary case, 
his/her anonymity will be 
honored by the school 
It is the Student's Right to: 
Be represented by an active 
student government selected by 
free school elections 
Assist in the making of school 
rules 
August, 19 72 
Express his/her opinions and 
ideas in a respectful manner 
so as not to offend or 
slander others 
Be aware of all rules and 
regulations for student 
behavior and conduct himself/ 
herself in accordance with 
them 
Dress and appear so as to 
meet fair standards of pro­
priety, safety, health and 
good taste 
Be willing to volunteer in­
formation in disciplinary 
cases should he/she have 
knowledge of importance 
Be willing to volunteer in­
formation and cooperate with 
school staffs in disciplinary 
cases 
Assist the school staff in 
running a safe school for 
all students enrolled 
therein 
Take an active part in stu­
dent government by running 
for office, or voting for the 
best candidates; making his/ 
her problems known to the 
staff through his/her repre­
sentatives 
Assume that until a rule is 
waived, altered or repealed 
that it is in full effect 
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STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Seattle Public Schools 
August 12, 1970 
Rights, Responsibilities and Limitations 
1. Criminal Acts Defined 
2. Smoking 
e. Dress and Appearance 
a. Dress and Appearance must not present health or safety 
problems or cause disruption 
4. Attendance 
5. Disruptive Conduct 
6. Cooperation with School Personnel 
7. Refusal to Identify Self 
8. Off-Campus Events 
9. Freedom of Speech and Assembly 
a. Students are entitled to verbally express their 
personal opinions. Such verbal opinions shall 
not interfere with the freedom of others to ex­
press themselves. The use of obscenities or 
personal attacks are prohibited. 
b. All student meetings in school buildings or on 
school grounds may function only as a part of the 
formal education process or as authorized by the 
principal. 
c. Students have the freedom to assemble peacefully. 
There is an appropriate time and place for the ex­
pression of opinions and beliefs. Conducting demon­
strations which interfere with the operation of the 
school or classroom is inappropriate and prohibited. 
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10. Freedom to Publish 
a. Students are entitled to express in writing their 
personal opinions. The distribution of such 
material may not interfere with or disrupt the 
educational process. 
b. Students who edit, publish or distribute hand 
written, printed or duplicated matter among their 
fellow students within the schools must assume re­
sponsibility for the content of such publications. 
c. Libel, obscenity and personal attacks are prohibited 
in all publications. 
d. Unauthorized commercial solicitation will not be 
allowed on school property at any time. An excep­
tion to this rule will be the sale of non-school-
sponsored student newspapers published by students 
of the school district at times and in places as 
designated by the school authorities. 
e. The distribution by students in school building or 
on school grounds of unlawful or political material 
whose content reflects the special interest of a 
political candidate or political organization is 
prohibited. 
11. Search and Seizure 
The following rules shall apply to the search of school 
property assigned to a specific student (locker, desk, 
etc.) and the search of items in his possession. 
a. There shall be reasonable cause for school authorities 
to believe that the possession constitutes a crime or 
rule violation. 
b. General searches of school property may be conducted 
at any time. 
c. Search of an area assigned to a student should be 
for a specific item and be in his presence. 
d. Illegal items (firearms, weapons) or other possessions 
reasonably determined to be a threat to the safety 
or security of others may be seized by school 
authorities. 
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e. Items which are used to 
the educational process 
from student possession 
disrupt or interfere with 
may be temporarily removed 
